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Foreword
One of the main findings to have emerged from the debate spearheaded by 
the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) 
in recent years is that economic and social development are closely 
intertwined and should form an active part of any public policy aimed at 
achieving greater equality. However, social gaps and debt in the region call 
for efforts to be redoubled to achieve full equal opportunities and universal 
rights. Although, in the past five years, there have been promising results 
in terms of poverty reduction and economic growth, Latin America 
remains the world’s most unequal region. This poses challenges not only in 
terms of monetary income but also from the gender, ethnic and territorial 
standpoints. In excluded and other groups, these factors tend to lead to 
precarious employment that does not serve as a vehicle for social mobility 
and welfare. Furthermore, the working conditions of large sections of the 
population are a far cry from the normative horizon of decent work and 
fail to ensure access to social protection mechanisms.
The region still has a very long way to go in achieving full realization 
of rights. In the absence of effective public or private protection channels, 
this undermines people’s sense of belonging and precludes the legitimacy 
needed for a common project shared by all citizens.
Since the 1990s, ECLAC has been tackling these challenges 
extremely vigorously. The question of how to achieve a new social contract 
to boost the exercise of citizenship in all its dimensions, which entails 
defining specific social, political-institutional and fiscal mechanisms, is 
addressed in the report Fiscal covenant: strengths, weaknesses, challenges, 
presented at the twenty-seventh session of ECLAC in 1998. It argues that it 
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is inconceivable to secure a social contract without insurance mechanisms 
for the entire population, particularly the very poorest. Since 2006, social 
protection has come to play a leading role in the ECLAC research agenda, 
as reflected in the report Shaping the future of social protection: access, 
financing and solidarity, presented at the thirty-first session of ECLAC in 
2008. It urges States to honour their commitments to the international 
community to respect, protect and promote social rights, and to adopt 
concrete measures through social protection policies.
The persistent dynamic of inequality and exclusion, which is 
reflected in the tools available to individuals and families for protecting 
themselves and securing better living conditions, have an impact not 
only on their levels of material well-being but also on their perception of 
a shared social and institutional project. Inclusion and social cohesion, 
viewed as key concepts of development in the new millennium, and 
discussed in the document Social cohesion: inclusion and a sense of belonging 
in Latin America and the Caribbean (2007), are intended precisely to address 
the conflict between the demands that States make on their citizens and 
the rights they guarantee them.
As stated in the report Time for equality: closing gaps, opening trails, 
presented at the thirty-third session of ECLAC in 2010, the primary task in 
the 21st century is to build inclusive, more equal societies with full respect 
for a framework of rights, in a globalized world with open economies. To 
ensure equal rights, it is necessary to establish redistributive instruments 
that provide specific guarantees of protection, paying attention to the 
distinctive characteristics and requirements of each society and to the 
various population groups within it.
This book examines the above issues in detail and identifies the 
scope and role of social protection in extremely unequal societies subject 
to a high incidence of persistent poverty. Social protection, seen from a 
rights-based perspective, is linked to the fight against inequality in a 
number of ways: it greatly reduces or eliminates the probability of failing 
to cope with a contingent risk; it curbs the vicious circle of poverty and 
inequality by preventing families from mortgaging future key assets for 
human development, such as health and education; and it facilitates the 
implementation of strategies for empowering the most vulnerable groups 
to cope with risk, particularly children, elderly people and women. The 
book concludes by providing a normative basis on which to build more 
just and caring societies that guarantee to protect, as a public good, what 
are considered to be essential welfare standards.
The book goes on to explore and outline a vision for developing 
comprehensive social protection systems in the region, with universal 
coverage and solidarity-based financing, establishing fundamentally 
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egalitarian citizens’ rights. It highlights the importance of the local 
context in creating public institutions that are strongly committed to 
protection and to seeking effective and efficient solidarity mechanisms for 
realizing this goal. It also recognizes the wide range of actors involved in 
operating protection systems, in particular the State, market, families and 
social organizations. In essence, the entire citizenry becomes the subject 
of protection policies, and social policies come to be viewed as a whole 
that encompasses the complementary —not contradictory— principles of 
targeting as a means and universality as an end.
This book was produced as part of the programme “Towards 
sustainable and equitable globalization”, supported by ECLAC, jointly 
with Germany’s Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(BMZ) and the German Agency for International Cooperation (GTZ). 
It is the outcome of a systematic and productive exchange to identify 
viable and effective options for consolidating social policy design and 
implementation in the area of poverty reduction and social protection, and 
so help to build the required institutional and human capabilities.
Alicia Bárcena  
Executive Secretary  
Economic Commission for Latin 
America and the Caribbean (ECLAC)
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Summary
The purpose of this book is to encourage dialogue on social protection 
in Latin America. It highlights the need for innovation in designing 
policies and instruments, as well as in management, in order to build 
comprehensive systems that provide inclusive social protection. 
Social protection has become one of the pillars of social development 
strategies. But, lacking a consistent standard for social protection in the 
region, the issue has been approached in different ways and from different 
analytical and policy dimensions. This book examines the principal 
ongoing discussions regarding social protection and co-responsibility 
transfer programmes, looks at the role assigned to them and weighs the 
conceptual elements, the needs and the challenges to be addressed in 
order to consolidate comprehensive social protection systems. 
These systems should provide universal coverage. Their funding 
should be grounded in solidarity. And, above all, the citizens’ rights 
that they establish should be egalitarian. The entire citizenry becomes 
the subject of protection policies, and social policies come to be viewed 
as a whole that encompasses the complementary —not contradictory— 
principles of targeting as an instrument and universality as a goal.
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Introduction
A. Background to social protection analysis
Owing to continuing severe problems in Latin America, including poverty, 
inequality, vulnerability, unemployment and informal employment, 
which worsened during the crisis of late 2008 and early 2009, Latin 
American countries must be urged strenuously to strengthen their social 
protection systems and to extend them to include those that are currently 
excluded, as advocated by previous ECLAC documents.1 Boosting social 
protection helps to build fairer and more inclusive societies where all 
citizens can enjoy their economic, social and cultural rights. To achieve 
this, it is necessary to influence income distribution and invest in human 
capability.2 When countries succeed in harnessing the human capability of 
their citizens throughout their lifetimes, the gains in terms of productivity 
and social cohesion can be enormous.
Persistent poverty and inequality —which increased significantly 
during the ‘lost decade’ of the 1980s and have decreased slowly in periods 
of economic growth— is a key element in the contemporary debate on 
social protection in Latin America and is central to the analysis made 
in this book. Employment is seen as another key element in meeting 
1 See ECLAC 2006, 2010a and 2010b.
2 The concept of ‘human capability’ is broader than that of ‘human capital’. Human 
capability focuses on the expansion of human freedom, so that people will be able to 
lead the lives they have reason to value, while human capital only takes into account 
human qualities in relation to economic growth (Sen, 1997).
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social protection needs because it is the main route for workers and their 
dependents to stable incomes and contributory social protection. However, 
the promise of full employment and decent work for all has not been 
fulfilled in the region, as labour markets have failed to become a gateway 
to universal social protection (United Nations, 2010).
This crisis in integration through the formal labour market poses 
a number of major challenges for the region, such as extending social 
protection mechanisms to include those who do not currently benefit 
and improving the quality of such mechanisms (ECLAC, 2006; Uthoff, 
2006). Achieving these goals calls not only for political, institutional and 
policymaking systems commensurate with the current challenges, but 
also for non-contributory social protection instruments combined with 
existing contributory instruments.
Innovative non-contributory instruments have been introduced 
in the region, including co-responsibility transfer programmes (CTPs), 
which have been so successful that they are being replicated in most 
countries in the region and on other continents.3 This makes it important 
not only to acknowledge progress and achievements but also to critically 
assess the new social protection and poverty reduction programmes and 
policies currently being developed. The aim is to identify the challenges 
facing the region in terms of achieving the objectives of inclusion, 
equality and social justice.
The goals of social protection are to: ensure an income sufficient to 
maintain a minimum quality of life for people’s development; facilitate 
access to social and advocacy services; and secure decent work for 
all. Three major components are required to achieve these goals: non-
contributory social protection (traditionally known as social assistance, 
which can include both universal and targeted measures); contributory 
social protection (or social security); and labour market regulation, 
which consists of regulations and standards designed to promote and 
protect decent work (see diagram 1). The analysis in this book focuses on 
including the poor and vulnerable in social protection and, hence, chiefly 
on the non-contributory component. Furthermore, it must be stressed that 
the subject of labour market regulation and its role in social protection 
calls for a more in-depth analysis than this book allows.
3 The concept of co-responsibility encompasses not only demand-side incentives, but 
also social service provision and social infrastructure (see Levy and Rodríguez, 2005; 
and Cohen and Franco, 2006a). This book calls upon both beneficiaries and the State 
itself to commit to the actions required by CTPs. In the bibliography, CTPs are also 
referred to as conditional cash transfer (CCT) programmes. Throughout the book, the 
term ‘conditionalities’ is used to refer to the specific commitments that families must 
meet to be entitled to transfers.









Source: Prepared by the authors.
B. The State and social protection
The United Nations Commission for Social Development (CSocD) denes 
social protection as “a set of public and private policies and programmes 
undertaken by societies in response to various contingencies in order to 
offset the absence or substantial reduction of income from work; provide 
assistance for families with children; and provide people with health care 
and housing” (United Nations, 2000). According to the Commission, these 
measures address both the protection and advocacy needs of the poor and 
extremely poor and the insurance needs of those who are not poor but 
need safeguards against adverse circumstances at certain stages in their 
lives. This book takes an even broader and more proactive view of social 
protection, based explicitly on economic, social and cultural rights, which 
includes individuals and families in all stages of life, and one of whose 
functions is to promote decent work. This makes protection responsible 
for ensuring access not only to health and housing, but also to education 
and other social services.
This book focuses mainly on the State’s role in providing its citizens 
with social protection and promotion4, while placing special emphasis on 
non-contributory social protection for all, starting with the poorest and 
most vulnerable. At the same time, it acknowledges that a further three 
major stakeholders,  apart from the State, also provide welfare and social 
protection —the market, families and social and community organizations 
(see diagram 2)— and that any comprehensive protection system must take 
into account their interactions. However, the primary responsibility for 
ensuring economic, social and cultural rights lies with the State.
4 The concept of social promotion (promoción social) is widely used in Latin America to 
refer to policies and programmes geared to strengthening the capacities of poor and 









Source: Prepared by the authors.
If social protection were left solely to the market, the weakest would 
be excluded, as demonstrated by the lack of coverage of informal sector 
workers and the poor in private pension systems. Nonetheless, the market 
plays a very important role in ensuring the nancial sustainability of social 
protection, which is highly relevant in view of Latin America’s rapidly 
ageing population. While the debate on mechanisms for guaranteeing the 
future sustainability of social protection (Carrera, Castro and Sojo, 2009; 
Sojo and Uthoff, 2006; Holzmann, Palmer and Uthoff, 2008) exceeds the 
scope of this book, in the region there is a need not only to continue to 
strengthen the non-contributory solidarity pillar of social protection 
(ECLAC, 2006), but also to establish the appropriate regulatory framework 
and incentives to enable families and workers with the ability to contribute 
to pension and retirement systems to do so. The recent reform of Chile’s 
pension system is a good example of this: it strengthens the solidarity 
pillar while maintaining incentives for formal sector workers to contribute, 
including on a voluntary basis (Berstein et al, 2009; Fajnzylber, 2010; Uthoff, 
2009). To achieve inclusive social protection, it is essential to pool private 
and State efforts within a comprehensive system.
Equally, if social protection were left solely to families, women 
would continue to be forced to devote much of their time to the unpaid 
care of children and the elderly, sick and disabled, as they have done in 
the past, reducing their ability to participate in paid employment. As 
highlighted by ECLAC (2010a), there is still a rigid sexual division of 
labour in the region, coupled with an increasing demand for care.
Literature on social protection and promotion has failed to 
appreciate the true role of social and community organizations, 
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although some authors (Pautassi and Zibecchi, 2010) have shown them 
to be instrumental in making up for the shortcomings of the other three 
major stakeholders (State, market and families). Despite their important 
contribution, social and community organizations have too few resources 
to take full social responsibility in this area, which falls primarily to the 
State, as social protection is seen as a right, not a privilege.
C.  Aims and content
This book aims to encourage dialogue on social protection in Latin 
America. It highlights the need for innovation in designing policies and 
instruments, as well as in management, in order to build comprehensive 
systems that provide inclusive social protection for all citizens.
It sets out to promote ideas that are crucial to progress in this 
area: the relevance of a rights-based approach to social development 
and the importance of comprehensive, effective, efficient and equitable 
social protection systems. The analysis focuses on incorporating and 
coordinating mechanisms based on citizen guarantees, which calls for 
the consolidation of strategies ensuring access to non-contributory social 
protection policies and instruments, while strengthening contributory 
policies and instruments. At the same time, it is vital to implement 
labour-market regulation policies, as they play a major role in reducing 
and mitigating the risks associated with unemployment and shortage of 
decent work, thereby helping to overcome on a long-term basis many of 
the risks threatening social protection. The goal is to create strategies for 
bridging gaps in access to social protection and advocacy and to build 
more comprehensive social policies that recognize the indivisibility 
of citizens’ rights, with the ultimate aim of creating less unequal, more 
cohesive societies.
Even though social protection has become one of the pillars of 
social development strategies, in Latin America there is no consistent 
standard. Instead, social protection has been approached in different 
ways and from different analytical and policy standpoints. This 
book examines the principal ongoing discussions regarding social 
protection and co-responsibility transfer programmes, looks at the role 
assigned to them, identifies current policies in this field and weighs 
the conceptual elements, the needs and the challenges to be addressed 
in order to consolidate comprehensive social protection systems. 
This book examines the main approaches informing their design and 
implementation, performance and gaps in existing protection, as well as 
the changes that a number of countries are making to secure effective 
and sustainable management in this area.
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Chapter  I presents a historical overview of social policy directions 
in the region in order to position the development of the debate and 
specific policies on social protection, identifying the contexts in which they 
are set, as well as the conceptual discussions and proposals underlying 
them. There are four different approaches to social protection, reflecting 
the cumulative policies and design choices they incorporate: (i) protection 
based on the formal sector, which is the oldest approach in the region 
and relates to traditional social security systems that have always been 
afforded to workers in the formal labour market; (ii) emergency protection, 
arising from a context of economic structural adjustment and the need 
for strategies to reduce the impact of the debt crisis on the very poorest; 
(iii) protection as assistance and access to promotion, which is linked closely 
with the previous approach, but combines risk mitigation and elimination 
policies with prevention and human-capital accumulation policies; and 
(iv) protection as a citizen guarantee, where protection encompasses a set 
of rights that the State is obliged to ensure, refining processes to reflect 
risks more closely by introducing changes in its operating rationale and 
setting incremental minimum social standards. In terms of protection as 
a citizen guarantee, the next chapter discusses a number of proposals and 
perspectives on specific policies and ways of perceiving social protection.
Chapter  II summarizes the status of social protection in Latin 
America and pinpoints the main efforts that countries have made. It begins 
by discussing existing gaps in formal employment and contributory social 
protection coverage, as well as levels of social spending and its redistributive 
effects. It goes on to describe the institutions and actors involved in social 
protection —both in policy design and management and in intersectoral 
coordination— and analyses the main debate on sources and systems of 
financing contributory and non-contributory social protection. Given the 
importance of a rights-based approach in a system where social protection 
is a citizen guarantee, it also examines the varying intensity with which 
this has been incorporated into social protection policies in the region, 
the constitutional recognition of social rights in different countries and 
the definition of explicit guarantees in social protection-related areas. 
Chapter  II  concludes with a discussion of current policies in different 
countries in the region, pointing out that, whereas some countries are 
engaged in consolidating a system of non-contributory social protection 
and promotion for poor individuals and families —in particular via 
co-responsibility transfer programmes— others have incorporated broader 
actions, linking together non-contributory social protection policies that 
take an approach midway between assistance/promotion and a citizen 
guarantee. Yet other countries have concentrated their efforts on linking 
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social protection systems by consolidating incremental guarantees for 
all citizens. In all these cases, institutional development is key to the 
establishment of basic operating capabilities and policy guidelines.
The region is characterized by the large number of CTPs in national 
social protection policies. Chapter  III presents an overview of CTPs 
and analyses the various forms they have taken, clarifying their role in 
social protection policy. CTPs can be divided into three types, based on 
their characteristics and the way in which transfers and conditionalities 
are combined. They are illustrated by three national programmes: 
Brazil’s Bolsa Família conditional cash transfer programme; Chile’s social 
protection programme for vulnerable groups and areas, Solidarity 
Chile; and Mexico’s Education, Health and Food Programme (formerly 
called Progresa and renamed Oportunidades). Each of these programmes 
establishes different policies depending on the objectives and on the way 
in which it implements the mechanism for transfers and conditionalities.
Chapter  IV describes the elements inherent in a comprehensive 
approach to social protection. It begins by clarifying the role of social 
protection as part of the broader social policy concept and pinpoints the 
differences and links between protection and promotion. It goes on to 
review the main functions of social protection in relation to the groups 
it serves and the rights pertaining to it. These functions are to: (i) ensure 
living conditions that sustain a minimum standard of welfare and offset 
declining income by means of basic standards; (ii)  facilitate access to 
social and promotion services, including care provision; and (iii) promote 
better employment policies to cope with the risks of a precarious labour 
market. Third, this chapter proposes various methods of integrating social 
protection, taking into account the supply of policies and programmes 
and demand from families, individuals and communities. On the supply 
side, it proposes two axes: horizontal (or sectoral) integration and vertical 
integration (according to the administrative levels at which policies 
and programmes are implemented). On the demand side, it proposes 
another two axes: cross-wise (relating to different population groups) 
and longitudinal (relating to people’s life cycle). Fourth, it analyses the 
link between social protection and the differing needs of the population 
it serves. Fifth, it describes in detail the components of social protection 
—non-contributory social protection, contributory social protection and 
labour market regulation— and identifies social protection instruments 
and policies. The sixth and final section discusses prerequisites for 
institutionalizing comprehensive social protection systems: intersectoral 
coordination, setting up management information systems and the 
definition of audit and conflict resolution instruments.
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Chapter  V describes the potential of CTPs to: act as a gateway to 
social protection based on its ability to incorporate poor population groups 
into public service provision; boost the availability and quality of public 
service provision, as well as coordinate it between sectors and between 
levels of government; improve links between service demand and supply; 
support institutional capacity-building for information, monitoring and 
evaluation of CTP-related actions and benefits; and define exit mechanisms 
linking beneficiaries with other social protection and advocacy policies.
Chapter  VI draws lessons and identifies current and future 
challenges for social protection and CTPs in Latin America. It addresses 
critical issues, including: consolidating a rights-based approach 
within social protection policies; fiscal sustainability; the dichotomy 
between differentiated schemes for vulnerable groups and the idea of 
equal protection inherent in the principles of citizenship; institutional 
challenges for the comprehensive, intersectoral management of social 
protection; and the need for policy management to include monitoring 
and evaluation systems. The main challenges for consolidating CTPs 
as a gateway to comprehensive social protection systems are to ensure 
adequate social service provision and to introduce specific objectives and 
functions to prevent CTPs from becoming non-specific and ineffective all-
encompassing structures.
A set of annexes supplement the information provided in this 
book. Annex  1 reviews the five main human rights instruments for 
social protection and their relation to social protection: the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights; the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights; the American Convention on Human Rights 
and Protocol of San Salvador; and Social Security (Minimum Standards) 
Convention, 1952 (No. 102) of the International Labour Organization 
(ILO). Annex 2 summarizes the development and main characteristics of 
three emblematic CTPs: Bolsa Família, Oportunidades and Solidarity Chile. 
Annex  3 includes a set of ECLAC simulations for estimating the cost of 
non-contributory cash transfers for income support and redistribution in 
Latin American countries. The statistical annex presents a set of statistical 
tables concerning gaps in protection in the region.
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Chapter I
Social policy and protection
The current status of social protection in Latin America has been 
determined by a number of key elements in the region’s social policy 
history. This chapter presents a brief overview of the policy lines that 
have inspired it over the past century, particularly with respect to social 
protection. It also identifies the main theoretical approaches and concepts 
that have guided the development of social protection in the region in 
recent years and discusses their history and differences.
A. Brief history of social protection in Latin America
While social issues have always been part of Government functions in 
Latin American countries, the form that they have taken and the emphasis 
and priorities assigned to them have changed over time in response to the 
different currents of economic and social thought that have prevailed at 
given periods in history and to how powerful these currents were.
Although national processes in Latin America cannot strictly be 
described as homogeneous, according to a number of authors, social policy 
development can be divided into three main periods: (i) the period prior to 
the Great Depression of 1929; (ii) the period of greater industrialization and 
inward growth between the Great Depression and the 1980s; and (iii) the 
period of market economy and globalization, which began in the 1980s 
(Marchesi, 2004; Cohen and Franco, 2005; Andrenacci and Repetto, 2006). 
As table I.1 shows, these successive periods have been named after their 
prevailing development model: primary liberal; import substitution; and 
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scal discipline and austerity. Each period has distinctive characteristics in 
terms of the development of contributory social protection policies (social 
security), as well as the principal guidelines governing non-contributory 
social protection (social assistance) and sectoral policies in the region. In 
turn, these models give rise to specic conceptions about the role of the 
State and of social protection.1
Table I.1 
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Source: Prepared by the authors.
The nal column of table I.1 depicts a fourth period that is unfolding 
this century. The theory is that two social policy approaches currently 
coexist in the region: the rst is linked with systemic competitiveness and 
features important concepts such as human capital and intergenerational 
transmission of poverty; the second, linked with a rights-based approach 
and citizen guarantees, is supported by international covenants and 
1 As there is no strict correlation between the evolution of development models and social 
policies, a given development model may be underpinned by different social policy 
directions. Table I.1 shows only broad trends.
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treaties concluded by States (see annex  1). These approaches are not 
mutually exclusive, although the second has achieved greater prominence 
in recent years. The following chapters describe the policy elements arising 
from the differing concepts of development, State and social protection 
underpinning these approaches.
The first period, beginning in the 19th century and lasting into the 
first few decades of the 20th century, was marked by the primary liberal 
model, with outward growth. In social terms, its characteristics included, 
first, the formation of national societies and citizens’ sense of belonging 
to a country and, second, charity, where attention to social problems was 
viewed as humanitarian aid for the needy, with broad participation from 
civil society organizations and the Church. It led to a non-secular, non-
institutionalized social policy where political, economic and social elites 
were the service providers and financiers. The earliest institutions for 
contributory social protection began to emerge at the end of this period, 
such as mutual societies and insurance associations, aimed mainly at urban 
wage earners and subject to little State regulation, simultaneously with a 
phase of growing social service coverage in the areas of public health and 
education. The first social security systems inspired by the Bismarckian 
model started to appear in Southern Cone countries in the early 1920s.2
The second period began with the Great Depression and continued 
through the post-War and Cold War period. It was characterized by the 
development of a model of import substitution industrialization, with 
inward growth, where the emphasis was on State planning. Justice, social 
order and social security were the main social policy issues and pressure 
from organized society and trade unions had a great impact on them. 
Added to this was the steady growth of the education and health sectors, 
as well as the debate over access to land and land reforms. Although the 
social policy approach was based on universalism, coverage was severely 
limited, which led to priority being given to wage earners, the middle 
class and organized sectors. Duhau (1997) refers to it as “fragmented” or 
“stratified” universalism. Emphasis was placed on protection for salaried 
workers (Franco, 1996), by means of such instruments as Uruguay’s 
unemployment insurance (1958), family allowances for private employees 
from the Mexican Social Security Institute (IMSS) (1943), or Argentina’s 
enshrinement of the right to social security in law  14370 (1954).3 Non-
2 In Uruguay, the earliest debates on social security mechanisms took place in the first half of 
the 19th century (Bonino, Kwon and Peyre Dutrey, 2007). The social security systems that 
emerged throughout Latin America in the 20th century were basically of the corporate and 
contributory variety and excluded vast segments of the population that did not belong to 
organizations linked with the formal labour market (such as associations or trade unions) 
or had no means for accessing power structures (mainly political parties).
3 Argentina’s first instance of contributory social security was law  4349 of 1904, which 
established the Civil Fund (Caja Civil) for permanent employees of the State administration: 
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contributory social protection was confined mainly to food and energy 
subsidies, although a few feeding programmes and small transfer 
programmes were starting to emerge for vulnerable groups, such as 
disabled persons (Ferreira and Robalino, 2010).4
The social policy management model of the time was characterized 
by central planning, a historical trend in Latin America determined by 
the political context, as well as the unitary organization of most countries 
and ‘latent centralism’ of those with a federal structure (Franco, 2003). 
There was also a bureaucratic-type organization and a marked impetus 
given to government sectors and, although this was positive in terms of 
knowledge and the development of specialized policies, their lack of 
coordination made it difficult to set up comprehensive interventions. Social 
policy was funded mainly by the State and resources were distributed 
primarily through supply-side subsidies, which, in several countries led 
to an increased State share in service provision, with little private sector 
involvement. During this period, social sectors exerted intense pressure 
on the State to meet their demands.
Finally, this period was characterized by the protection of some 
prices and the provision of subsidies to facilitate access to certain goods and 
services, as well as by high inflation, rising external debt and corporatism. 
There was also a social divide between formal-sector workers (and their 
families) and informal, urban and rural workers, which, as discussed, had 
a very strong impact on the design of social protection and on the way in 
which these policies were organized in the region.
The debt crisis of the early 1980s marked the third period, 
characterized by a neoliberal approach of outward growth with fiscal 
discipline and austerity, where reforms introduced to reduce inflation 
and promote economic growth neglected the problem of unequal income 
distribution (Cornia, Stewart and Jolly, 1987). The assumption was 
that the benefits of growth would be distributed gradually among the 
population (trickle-down effect). The idea that the market was the best 
means for allocating goods and services played a key role, as did the 
Washington Consensus.5
teachers and employees of the National Educational Council, employees of official banks 
and Argentine railways, magistrates and elected officials (Abritta and others, 2010).
4 Feeding programmes included the Costa Rican Supplementary Feeding Programme 
of 1951, Chile’s National Supplementary Feeding Programme (PNAC), which began 
delivering milk to children and pregnant women in 1954, and Brazil’s National School 
Feeding Programme (PNAE) of 1955.
5 The Washington Consensus consisted of 10  key policy recommendations: fiscal 
discipline; reordering public expenditure priorities; tax reform; liberalizing interest 
rates; competitive exchange rates; liberalization of international trade; liberalization 
of inward foreign direct investment; privatization of State-owned companies; 
deregulation (especially of labour markets); and property rights (Williamson, 1994).
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Social policy in this period was characterized by targeting the 
poorest sectors to rationalize the use of scarce resources, as illustrated 
by the school feeding programme of Chile’s National School Support 
and Scholarships Board (JUNAEB) and Mexico’s Social Milk Supply 
Programme. A priority concern was management efficiency, associated 
with fiscal discipline requirements, which over time came to be a major 
additional —but not the sole— component in the objective of maximizing 
the impact or effectiveness of programmes. So, not only was it important 
to spend in order to produce goods and services, but to spend wisely to 
achieve the desired objectives.
All this was coupled with a market rationale for social services that 
included the promotion of demand-side subsidies to foster competition 
among service providers, whether public or private, through a system 
of free choice. One example was Chile’s education system, where pupils 
received a State education grant that they could choose to spend on 
studying in a State or private school. Competition also featured in resource 
distribution, through procurement and competitive bidding to fund both 
public and private programmes and projects. This led to the development 
of safety nets, as well as the famous social investment funds, which were 
a prominent component of social management in the region, as they 
were considered a more flexible tool than line ministries for distributing 
public investment resources for health, primary education and water and 
sanitation services, even though, in many cases, social investment funds 
failed to make the leap from a rationale of budget implementation and 
production efficiency to one of social effectiveness and efficiency.6
Under this rationalization and competitiveness policy, 
decentralization played an important role during the period, arising from 
a desire to make resource and project management more independent 
from central government. Outsourcing of production was another 
important feature of this policy, boosting the participation of private and 
non-governmental organizations in management.
This rationalization and competitiveness policy was also reflected 
in social protection. There was a major transformation in retirement 
and pension funds and health insurance in the formal sector during 
the period. The problem of fiscal sustainability of pay-as-you-go social 
security led to the idea of individual funds, under the assumption that, 
with a formal labour market and job security, individuals could amass 
6 The first ever social investment fund was the Plurinational State of Bolivia’s Social 
Emergency Fund (FSE), established in 1985 and renamed Social Investment Fund (FIS) 
in 1990 (Araníbar, 2010). Further examples are the Honduran Social Investment Fund 
(FHIS), Peru’s Social Development Cooperation Fund (FONCODES) and the Bolivarian 
Republic of Venezuela’s Social Investment Fund (FONVIS).
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the required resources for a decent retirement and would also be able 
to finance their family’s health insurance. This meant that the existing 
rationale of fragmented universalism was sidelined to some extent and 
private fund managers emerged (including Chile’s Association of Pension 
Fund Managers (AFP) and Argentina’s Retirement and Pension Fund 
Management Companies (AFJP)), and health insurance institutions (such 
as Chile’s ISAPREs) were encouraged to participate. Social protection 
in this period was therefore marked by a dual approach. On the one 
hand, there was contributory social protection of employees based on 
pre-funded individual accounts and insurance, operating under the aegis 
of the ministries of labour and health and, on the other, non-contributory 
social protection aimed at meeting certain minimum welfare standards 
and mitigating the consequences of extreme poverty, administered by the 
ministries responsible for social development. Over this period, the State 
took an increasingly secondary monitoring and evaluation role, while its 
role as provider diminished, at least proportionately, as the case of Chile 
illustrates very clearly.
A new development approach has been taking shape since the mid-
1990s, with the ‘paradigm of systemic competitiveness’, where integration 
into a global economy depends on a country’s organizational and 
management ability to combine a variety of economic and non-economic 
factors and to coordinate various stakeholders (Lechner and Calderón, 
1998). This is a period of consolidation of democratic institutions, in which 
‘second-generation’ State reforms are being introduced (Marchesi, 2004) and 
the political leadership seeks to embody in a number of concrete actions the 
idea of a more present State, with greater capacity to intervene in economic 
and social development (Repetto, 2010a). Around 2000, concepts such as 
guaranteed human, economic, social and cultural rights, full citizenship 
and social cohesion started to gain a strong foothold among the approaches 
guiding social policy (ECLAC, 2007). They reflect an explicit concern to 
distribute the benefits of economic development more evenly and to reduce 
the existing high levels of inequality. This means that individuals are no 
longer considered as consumers and beneficiaries but as citizens with rights.
Although it is difficult to make a definitive analysis because social 
policy is only one stage in the development process, a number of elements 
can be said to characterize it. First, the clash between universalism and 
targeting has returned to the agenda, but with the idea of targeting 
resources in order to achieve universal social rights or minimum social 
standards (ECLAC, 2000; Ocampo, 2001): no longer the same product 
for everyone (or only a few) but universal policies with differentiated 
services for a heterogeneous population, to meet diverse needs and close 
gaps. Differences of ethnicity, culture, gender, age and place of residence, 
not just socio-economic differences, have come to be considered as key 
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variables in substantive and administrative aspects of policy. Second, there 
is an increased concern for objective and subjective service quality and the 
principles of effectiveness and efficiency, as well as for creating synergies 
among care and protection networks.
In terms of stakeholders, not only have public-private linkages been 
maintained, they are being boosted, with public and private organizations 
participating alongside non-governmental and other civil society 
organizations. However, the State is strengthening its regulatory role, 
gradually becoming a guarantor and, while it is not necessarily a provider, 
neither does it play a secondary role.
This has opened up new opportunities for debate on social 
protection, such as linking pre-funded individual account models with 
solidarity (ECLAC, 2006; Uthoff, 2006), flexicurity and the right to a 
minimum income, at least to lift people out of extreme poverty, with 
approaches focusing on short- and long-term action. The following section 
identifies the contexts and debates that have inspired the emergence of 
different social protection approaches and proposals.
B. Social protection, an evolving concept
Changes in social policies, particularly social protection policies, have not 
been divorced from the conceptual debate among academics, cooperation 
agencies and international financial institutions. In fact there is evidence 
of constant feedback and, even though implementation does not always 
mirror analytical proposals precisely, it is easy to see that concepts and 
lines of intervention are evolving and to identify the extent to which those 
proposals are present in different countries.
In recent decades, in response to widespread agreement on the 
lack of effective mechanisms to protect against poverty and vulnerability, 
there has been prolific debate on these issues, their multidimensional 
causes and consequences, how to measure them, the role and challenges 
for different actors and the effectiveness of policies and approaches that 
need to be adopted in order to achieve positive outcomes. The debate on 
social protection has therefore resulted in a large body of literature, where 
the analysis ranges from historical (Draibe and Riesco, 2007; Filgueira and 
Filgueira, 2002) to conceptual (Barrientos and Hinojosa-Valencia, 2009; 
Barrientos and Hulme, 2008; Cook and Kabeer, 2009; Norton, Conway and 
Foster, 2002) to normative (ECLAC, 2006; United Nations, 2009a), together 
with concrete proposals for their implementation and expansion.7
7 See, for example: World Bank, 2005; ECLAC, 2006; Deveraux, 2002a and 2002b; 
Holzmann and Jorgensen, 1999; OECD, 2009; ILO, 2008a and 2008b.
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A number of actors have contributed to the conceptual development 
of social protection. In the years following the United Nations’ definition 
of social protection in 2000 (see section B of the introduction), this has been 
extended to incorporate an explicit rights-based approach. Whereas the 
International Labour Organization (ILO, 2008a) has defined it in terms of 
rights to benefits and allowances that citizens can use to protect themselves 
against a sudden drop in their living standards and has developed the 
‘social protection floor’ initiative (see box  I.1), ECLAC (2006) has defined 
it with a view to devising social assistance, promotion and development 
responses to risks in the environment, taking a rights-based approach.
Box I.1 
SOCIAL PROTECTION FLOOR
The International Labour Organization (ILO), along with other United 
Nations agencies, is promoting a global initiative aimed at ensuring a basic 
level of social protection for everyone (the Social Protection Floor Initiative). 
It was motivated by the finding that 80% of the world’s population lacks 
access to any kind of social security (ILO, 2008a), and is underpinned by a 
rights-based approach, structured according to areas of basic needs that 
are crucial to realizing those rights.
The initiative consists of developing social protection systems for 
people who are not covered by existing systems, by establishing a social 
protection floor. This floor can be achieved by means of transfers in cash or 
kind and provides for a minimum package of benefits, regardless of whether 
recipients are registered to pay social security.
The basic package meets a set of standards concerning size of income, 
medical care and pensions for everyone. It does not attempt to define the 
content of benefits but defines a guarantee of access to them (ILO, 2008a), 
leaving countries free to implement this floor by means of targeted transfers, 
either universal or subject to conditionalities.
According to ILO calculations, less than 2% of global gross domestic 
product (GDP) would be necessary to provide this social protection floor 
to the world’s poorest (ILO, 2008a). Six percent of global GDP would be 
required to provide a social protection floor to everyone that currently has no 
access to social protection systems.
Based on studies in seven African countries (Burkina Faso, Cameroon, 
Ethiopia, Guinea, Kenya, Senegal and the United Republic of Tanzania) and 
five Asian countries (Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan and Viet Nam), ILO 
has estimated the cost of a basic social protection package for low-income 
countries (see the table below). These estimates have not been adapted to 
reflect the real situation in Latin America, where most countries are already 
implementing co-responsibility transfer programmes or non-contributory 
pensions, which ought to be included in the calculations to determine the 
approximate cost of such a package as a percentage of GDP.
(continued)
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COST ESTIMATIONS OF A BASIC SOCIAL PROTECTION PACKAGE  
FOR AFRICAN AND ASIAN COUNTRIES
Benefits Indicators Costa
Income security by means 
of basic old-age and 
disability pensions.
A universal pension was 
calculated worth 30% of 
GDP per capita of the 
countries included in 
the study, provided to all 
individuals aged 65 years of 
age or over and to persons 
with disabilities (estimated 
at 1% of the working-age 
population).b
Between 0.6% and 
1.5% of GDP.
Income security for children, 
aimed at facilitating access 
to nutrition, education and 
care.
15% of GDP per capita 
provided to two children in 
the age bracket 0–14 per 
woman.c
Less than 3.5% of 
GDP.
Access to basic/essential 
health care.
300 medical staff to 
100,000 population. Medical 
staff wages indexed in 
line with GDP per capita 
growth.d Overhead costs of 
67% of medical staff costs.
Between 1.5% and 
5.5% of GDP.
Some income support is 
provided to the poor and 
the unemployed (including 
by means of employment 
guarantee schemes).
Income support at 30% of 
GDP per capitab. 
The benefit is provided to 
10% of the working-age 
population for 100 days 
per year. Available to 
households not benefiting 
from any other form of cash 
transfer.
Between 0.5% and 
0.9% of GDP.
Total Between 3.7% and 
10.6% of GDP.
a  Estimates for 2010. ILO estimates (2008b) include projections up to 2034.
b  Capped at US$ 1 (purchasing power parity (PPP)) a day, indexed in line with inflation; 
exchange rates were calculated by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (2008b).
c  Capped at US$ 0.50 (PPP) per day, indexed in line with inflation; exchange rates were 
calculated by IMF (2008b).
d  Medical staff wages were assumed at a minimum of three times GDP per capita.
Source: International Labour Organization (ILO), “Setting social security standards in a 
global society. An analysis of present state and practice and of future options for global 
social security standard setting in the International Labour Organization”, Geneva, 2008; 
“Can low- income countries afford basic social security?”, Geneva, 2008.
The World Bank has developed a protection concept based on 
people’s ex ante and ex post ability to cope with various risk scenarios 
(Holzmann and Jorgensen, 1999) (see box  I.2). In recent years, the World 
Bank has supplemented this concept by incorporating the new social 
contract needed to provide effective social protection for all citizens. This 
new proposal emphasizes two major challenges that need to be addressed: 
Box I.1 (concluded)
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informal employment, which acts as a barrier to entry to social protection, 
and fragmented access by both formal- and informal-sector workers to 
the benefits of social protection policies. It also stresses the need to find 
ways to extend contributory social protection to all citizens, irrespective of 
their employment status, while ensuring the sustainable enhancement of 
their human capital and employability (Ferreira and Robalino 2010; Ribe, 
Robalino and Walker, 2010).
Box I.2 
SOCIAL RISK MANAGEMENT
In the late 1990s, the World Bank developed an analytical framework 
for understanding and developing social protection policies: social risk 
management. It defines a set of strategies for pinpointing the various 
sources and types of risk at an early stage, with the aim of risk prevention, 
mitigation and coping (Holzmann and Jorgensen, 1999, Serrano and 
Raczynski, 2003). Basically, social risk management is designed to ascertain 
the impact of market imperfections on the risk faced by families (Munro, 
2008) and the need to develop public social protection measures to reduce 
vulnerability, stimulate consumption and promote equity in managing the 
risk of individuals, households and communities, especially lower-income 
households (poor and vulnerable). Such mechanisms must be implemented 
where markets are either deficient or non-existent, and are seen as short-term 
interventions to aid economic development. Social risk management 
entails three strategies: informal, market and public. It also identifies public 
and individual responsibilities for social protection. Public responsibilities 
involve policymaking and regulation of market mechanisms, while individual 
responsibilities can be either formal (systematic savings, private insurance, 
employment in the formal sector of the economy and investing in children’s 
education) or informal (social and community networks).
However, social risk management has been criticized for its limited 
scope to change economic and redistributive structures (Cook and Kabeer, 
2009; Lo Vuolo, 2009; Sojo, 2003). Gradually, a rights-based approach has 
begun to be included in the agenda as a necessary complement to the more 
technical analysis of the specific risks faced by various population groups 
and means for overcoming them.
Source: S. Cook and N. Kabeer, “Socio-economic security over the life course: A 
global review of social protection”, Sussex, Ford Foundation, Institute for Development 
Studies, 2009; R. Holzmann and S. Jorgensen, “Social protection as social risk 
management: conceptual underpinnings for the social protection sector strategy 
paper”, Journal of International Development, vol. 11, No. 17, 1999; R. Lo Vuolo, 
“Social exclusion policies and labour markets in Latin America”, Financing Social Policy. 
Mobilizing Resources for Social Development, K. Hujo and S. McClanahan (eds.), New 
York, United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD), Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2009; L. Munro, “Risks, needs and rights: compatible or contradictory bases 
for social protection”, Social Protection for the Poor and Poorest. Concepts, Policies 
and Politics, A. Barrientos and D. Hulme (eds.), Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2008; 
C. Serrano and D. Raczynski, “Derechos sociales básicos, superación de la pobreza y 
protección social ante la vulnerabilidad”, Santiago, Chile, Asesorías para el Desarrollo 
[online] http://www.asesoriasparaeldesarrollo.cl/ secciones/areas_de_trabajo/politicas_
sociales.html, 2003; Ana Sojo, “Social vulnerability, insurance and risk diversification in 
Latin America and the Caribbean”, CEPAL Review, No. 80 (LC/G.2204-P/E), Santiago, 
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) 2003.
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In this context, authors have adopted a variety of standpoints both 
to analyse the concept of social protection and to define social protection 
policy objectives and alternatives (Barrientos and Hulme, 2008; Cook 
and Kabeer, 2009; Norton, Conway and Foster, 2002). Some authors have 
taken an employment economics standpoint, usually confined to the 
protection of formal-sector workers. Others have focused on the poor, 
the economically inactive and informal workers, while yet others have 
combined the two standpoints into a broader one that includes labour 
market regulation.8 For some authors, the scope of social protection 
includes only the first two components: social security and assistance 
(Ferreira and Robalino, 2010; Norton Conway and Foster, 2002). Others 
view all three components as inseparable in designing social protection 
systems (World Bank, 2001b; Barrientos and Hulme, 2008; Holzmann and 
Jorgensen, 1999).
The latest debates in Latin America have been inextricably linked 
with debates on poverty and the lack of mechanisms to protect the poor 
from risks (Barrientos and Hulme, 2008; Cook and Kabeer, 2009). This book 
takes a broad view of social protection as a citizen guarantee, and hence, 
universal in scope, even though it acknowledges the need to incorporate 
differentiated and targeted instruments to consolidate protection, giving 
precedence to the very poorest and most vulnerable. Social protection 
includes both contributory and non-contributory protection instruments 
owing to the limited capacity of formal employment to integrate workers 
to contributory social protection structures.
This view is not, and has never been, predominant. On the contrary, 
a number of different approaches can be identified, four of which 
have marked the debate: (i)  protection based on formal employment; 
(ii)  emergency protection; (iii)  protection as assistance and access to 
promotion; and (iv) protection as a citizen guarantee.
1. Protection based on formal employment
For much of the 20th century, the social protection debate was linked 
to contributory social protection and a ‘labour-based society’ (ECLAC 
2006). It was an approach of ‘protection based on formal employment’, 
which, as mentioned earlier, was a first attempt to devise mechanisms 
for protecting workers from unforeseen circumstances (unemployment, 
8 A distinction needs to be made between authors who focus on the role of labour market 
regulation (Barrientos and Hulme, 2008) and strengthening labour institutions (Weller, 
2008) for social protection (see chapter IV.E.3) and those who emphasize the role of 
labour policies and improving worker employability (Ribe, Robalino and Walker, 2010). 
According to the social protection approach presented in this book, the latter would be 
better described as social promotion policies (see chapter IV.A), which, while they have 
much in common with social protection policies, are implemented by different means.
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illness or occupational accidents), as well as at certain stages in their 
lives (mainly by means of retirement and other pensions and survivors’ 
insurance for workers’ relatives).
This approach led to instruments and mechanisms such as social 
insurance and mutual funds, as well as labour legislation developed by 
States to meet demands for better working conditions for formal-sector 
workers organized into unions and associations.9 In practice, these 
instruments were stratified in terms of coverage, as they were available 
only to people linked with the world of formal employment (Filgueira 
and Filgueira, 2002). Major social sectors were left out, particularly rural 
workers and the self-employed urban poor, a situation exacerbated by 
recent labour market trends. In such a context, ECLAC (2006) has referred 
to the unfulfilled promise of full employment, as it has failed to consolidate 
the rights pertaining to social citizenship in Latin America (Marshall, 
1950). While this social protection approach has been maintained over 
the years, the region’s governments, as well as a number of international 
institutions, have been focusing more attention on creating mechanisms 
to provide a basic level of protection for those who, for various reasons, 
remain outside the formal labour market.
2. Emergency protection
These considerations, as well as the changes taking place in social 
policy paradigms, have led to calls for more comprehensive and coordinated 
approaches for overcoming poverty. Interest intensified following the 
diagnosis of the impact of the recurrent economic crises that have struck 
the region. Price volatility, job insecurity and numerous restrictions on 
access to public and private insurance mechanisms are hitting the poor 
and vulnerable hardest, reducing the means available to them to smooth 
consumption and protect their basic welfare in the wake of critical events, 
leaving them more likely to suffer present and future losses in accumulated 
capital (Cook and Kabeer, 2009). It was then that the talk turned to ‘safety 
nets’10. Safety nets are part of a broader set of poverty-reduction policies and 
programmes that had existed hitherto (including cash or in-kind transfers, 
cash subsidies for food and energy, workfare and social investment funds), 
coupled with fee waivers for more traditional social services (health, 
education, transport and, in some cases, housing) (Grosh and others, 2008). 
Safety nets are compensatory interventions that increase income and other 
assets by means of targeted transfers, designed specifically to sustain 
9 Such as Uruguay’s pioneering labour reforms in the 1920s or Mexico’s 1943 social 
insurance act.
10 The authors of this document opt for the term “safety nets”, as opposed to social 
protection systems, which could be used to refer to coverage that is more comprehensive 
at a conceptual or operational level.
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or enhance the welfare of poor or vulnerable groups during periods of 
economic transition or crisis (Graham, 1994, in Cohen and Franco, 2006a), 
which is why it has been called the ‘emergency protection’ approach.11
Safety nets are non-contributory policies targeted at the poor 
and extremely poor and do not include contributory social protection 
policies (Grosh and others, 2008). The measures provided by safety 
nets are implemented for as long as people are seeking new economic 
opportunities, which, in theory, will enable them to improve their 
situation rapidly (Barrientos and Hulme, 2008). They are novel in that they 
coordinate public provision by offering safeguards to mitigate the impact 
of critical events. The idea is to incorporate into this temporary safety net 
people who are outside the reach of social policies and do not have the 
ability to cope with risks on their own. Even though they are residual 
interventions designed to offset sudden drops in income affecting the 
poorest households by means of mitigating and compensatory short-term 
measures (Deveraux, 2002a; Conway and Norton, 2002), safety nets are a 
direct predecessor of the latest debates on social protection.
3. Protection as assistance and access to promotion
Between the late 20th century and the early part of this century, a 
clear need has arisen to develop strategies that transcend critical events and 
their immediate effects of recurrently undermining the living standards 
of individuals and families. The aim is to address the longer-term 
 effects of intergenerational transmission of poverty and aggregate losses 
in the welfare of families and their members, as a result of adopting risk 
strategies that jeopardize essential assets.12 Thus, poverty is starting to 
be seen as a dynamic process, with multiple entries and exits over time, 
requiring more complex and lasting interventions to overcome it. Social 
protection should therefore assume both short- and long-term roles in 
reducing poverty (World Bank, 2001b) and address the most urgent needs 
arising from risks and crises. It should also support asset preservation 
and accumulation —including, for example, non-contributory pensions— 
by means of prevention policies, as well as helping to change the socio-
economic conditions at the root of poverty (Acosta and Ramírez, 2004; 
Barrientos and Hulme, 2005).13 This broader version of social protection 
has been called ‘protection as assistance and access to promotion’.
11 This approach was present, implicitly or explicitly, in the very first social investment 
funds (for example, those of the Plurinational State of Bolivia) and safety nets, from the 
late 1980s to the 1990s.
12 Wood (2003) describes the situation facing those in poverty as “staying secure, staying 
poor” (see Barrientos and Hulme 2005).
13 Acosta and Ramírez (2004) point to the need to combine comprehensive social protection 
systems with mechanisms for mitigating the risks associated with economic crises and 
counter-cyclical measures, in times of greater stability. The hope is that these mechanisms 
will maintain the funding and operational “functioning” of social protection.
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This new approach is reflected in the title of the World Bank’s first 
sector strategy paper (Social protection sector strategy: from safety net to 
springboard), which shows how the notion of social protection has changed 
from one of ‘safety net’ to ‘springboard’ (World Bank, 2001b; Cook and 
Kabeer, 2009), going beyond responses focused solely on ‘emergencies’.14 
Gradually, other measures that had been set aside during the structural 
adjustment period, are being incorporated. They include labour market 
regulation, non-contributory transfers to older  people not covered by 
contributory social protection mechanisms and the incorporation of 
unemployment insurance benefits (Cook and Kabeer, 2009; Acosta and 
Ramírez, 2004).
Even though, in practice, the two approaches —emergency 
protection and protection as assistance and access to promotion— are 
closely linked and both focus on poverty as their main line of action, 
they differ not only in terms of their time span but, more importantly, in 
terms of their policies. Emergency protection entails ad hoc responses to 
a crisis scenario, while protection as assistance and access to promotion 
is consolidating a longer term view, with more coordinated interventions 
intended to meet the protection needs of families and households 
throughout life. Policies designed as part of a social emergency protection 
approach were not always able to reach those living in extreme poverty, 
as in the case of social investment funds (Britto, 2004; Deveraux, 2002a), 
whereas the approach of protection as assistance and access to promotion 
is designed to be more attentive to the needs of the poor, extremely poor 
and vulnerable.
The approach of protection as assistance and access to promotion is 
also making an increasing distinction between promotion and protection 
actions: whereas protection actions are associated with the concepts of 
risk and vulnerability (see box  I.3), promotion actions are linked more 
closely with strategies to build human capital and improve the coverage 
and quality of related services.15 In particular, social promotion policies 
consist of a set of specific efforts to enhance the assets available to families. 
Promotion policies include sectoral policies of health and education (and 
others such as housing), together with programmes to increase family 
14 A recent World Bank report (Ferreira and Robalino, 2010) proposes the term ‘opportunity 
ropes’ (as opposed to ‘safety nets’) to emphasize the concept of sustainable self-reliance.
15 Between 1999 and 2001, the World Bank published a series of conceptual documents 
acknowledging the limitations of economic growth and macroeconomic policies alone for 
eliminating poverty (World Bank, 2001a and 2001b; Holzmann and Jorgensen, 1999). The 
World Development Report 2000/2001: Attacking Poverty addresses this concern and proposes 
a new strategy for attacking poverty in three ways: opportunity creation; empowerment 
of poor people; and social protection (World Bank, 2001a). At the same time, many studies 
have demonstrated the decisive role that education plays in poverty measured by income 
(Fiszbein and Psacharopoulos, 1995 and ECLAC, 2002 in Britto, 2004).
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incomes (such as microcredit) and to improve the employability of poor 
and vulnerable families and individuals (training programmes) (Deveraux, 
2002a; Dreze and Sen, 1989).
Owing to their potential to enhance the assets available to 
households, protect them from risks and help them to overcome poverty, 
human capital formation policies are linked closely with social protection 
policies. The latter safeguard the conditions that ensure individuals and 
families gain access to and remain in human capital formation systems, 
preventing child labour, for instance, from being used as a means for 
coping with certain critical events. In addition, human capital is an asset 
and building it can provide significant long-term protection against certain 
risks. As discussed below, this complementarity between protection and 
promotion underpins co-responsibility transfer programmes, which 
require greater coordination between the income-transfer component of 
programmes and sectoral public provision in the areas of human capital 
formation (health and education).
Box I.3 
RISK AND VULNERABILITY AS KEY SOCIAL PROTECTION CONCEPTS 
At the heart of the latest definitions of social protection are the ideas 
of risk and vulnerability. Events or conditions in the environment that pose 
a ‘risk’ are those that could undermine well-being and whose occurrence 
is uncertain (Sojo, 2007). While risk and critical events affect everyone 
in society, they hit particularly hard people living in poverty and extreme 
poverty and those who, while not actually poor, are vulnerable to poverty. 
In this context, ‘vulnerability’ means the probability of being poor in the 
future or of being harmed by a specific risk or threat (Barrientos and 
Hulme, 2008).
The World Food Programme (WFP) defines vulnerability to food insecurity 
as “the probability of an acute decline in ‘food access’ or ‘consumption’” 
in relation to a minimum critical level of human well-being (WFP, 2002 in 
Martínez and Fernández, 2006). This definition can be expressed as:
Vulnerability = exposure to risk - ability to cope
The definition appears to apply not only to food security and malnutrition, 
but also to low incomes and poverty, as well as to other areas of social 
protection. In fact, according to this definition, a key aspect for identifying 
vulnerable individuals or groups is the ability of individuals and families to 
cope with various types of risk. It follows that the most vulnerable will be 
those with the least ability to cope.
The ability to cope can be based on the assets available to households, 
families and individuals, together with the social and institutional capacity to 
cope with risk situations and the existing opportunity structure within society.
(continued)
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Assets are a set of resources that a household can mobilize at a given 
time to seek improvements in its welfare or to prevent its welfare from 
declining (Kaztman et al, 1999, p. 9). These assets include: human capital 
(health, education and knowledge); social capital (support networks, 
contacts and access to information); physical or financial capital (food, land 
and other items); income and work (Kaztman et al, 1999; Moser, 1996 in 
Escobar and González de la Rocha, 2002). In each type of asset there are 
individual or family attributes that can be controlled and mobilized for asset 
accumulation, consumption or productive investment (Kaztman et al, 1999).
Social capital enables mechanisms outside the home to be activated 
to provide protection in situations of social, economic or environmental 
risk that cause a sudden drop in income or loss of assets. The informal 
expression of social capital mechanisms is provided independently by the 
community itself, typical examples of which are consumer associations, 
barter markets, work paid in kind (minga) and community soup kitchens. The 
more formal expression is that provided by State institutions through their 
non-contributory social protection instruments, the distribution of resources, 
goods and services, or workfare.
The opportunity structure comprises both market and State 
mechanisms and refers to a set of asset renewal and accumulation sources 
enabling households to use their own resources or providing them with 
others that they can use to become integrated into society (Kaztman 
and Filgueira, F. 2006). Opportunity structures can provide new assets or 
regenerate depleted assets (for example, through health services and free 
education). They can also facilitate more efficient use of a household’s 
resources (for example, by opening a crèche to release human resources 
that can then be invested in producing income) (Kaztman and Filgueira, F. 
2006). Opportunity structures therefore incorporate both social advocacy 
and protection policies and strategies.
Source: A. Escobar and M. González de la Rocha, “Evaluación cualitativa del programa de 
desarrollo humano Oportunidades. Seguimiento de impacto 2001-2002, comunidades 
de 2.500 a 50.000 habitantes”, evaluación de resultados de impacto del programa de 
desarrollo humano Oportunidades, Mexico City, Centre for Research and Higher Learning 
in Social Anthropology (CIESAS), 2002; R. Kaztman and others, “Vulnerabilidad, activos 
y exclusión social en Argentina y Uruguay”, Documento de trabajo, No. 107, Santiago, 
Chile, International Labour Organization (ILO), 1999; R Kaztman and F. Filgueira, “Las 
normas como bien público y como bien privado: reflexiones en las fronteras del enfoque 
AVEO”, Colección aportes conceptuales, No. 4, Montevideo, Catholic University of 
Uruguay, 2006; R. Martínez and A. Fernández, “Modelo de análisis del impacto social 
y económico de la desnutrición infantil en América Latina”, Manuales series, No. 52 
(LC/L.2650-P), Santiago, Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean 
(ECLAC), 2006. United Nations publication, Sales No. S.06.11.G.175.
4. Protection as a citizen guarantee
The need to instil a more inclusive and sustainable vision of social 
protection has led to a fourth approach to social protection, which goes 
beyond people living in poverty by seeking to guarantee minimum levels 
of protection for all citizens: ‘protection as a citizen guarantee’, which 
Box I.3 (concluded)
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provides basic guidelines for achieving comprehensive and inclusive 
social protection. While this vision is based on the 1948 Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, the 1966 International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and other international human 
rights instruments (see annex  1), it is only in the past decade that its 
message has begun to resound more clearly and to gain a larger following 
in Latin America, among both analysts and staff responsible for designing 
and implementing social protection.
Social protection as a citizen guarantee focuses primarily on 
the realization of economic, social and cultural rights and on the four 
principles that should be incorporated into social protection systems at 
the conceptual and operational level: (i) equality and non-discrimination; 
(ii)  participation and empowerment; (iii)  accountability; and 
(iv)  transparency. These principles create for States mandatory, universal 
and progressive obligations towards their citizens that cannot be waived 
(Abramovich, 2006). States have an obligation to respect, protect, fulfil and 
promote rights, which are complementary and indivisible (Abramovich, 
2006). Thus, rights become a citizen guarantee and the basis of citizenship 
(ECLAC, 2006).
According to Abramovich and Pautassi, applying these rights to 
development strategies leads to the establishment of guidelines and criteria 
for designing and implementing sustainable development strategies and 
inclusive social policies. These guidelines culminate in legal standards 
(such as the obligation to guarantee the minimum content of rights; the 
obligation for States to apply progressive, not regressive, policies; and 
the obligation to guarantee citizen participation). They also culminate 
in principles (equality and non-discrimination; universality; access to 
justice; and access to public information). In turn, these standards and 
principles can be used to develop a matrix enabling States, social partners 
and development cooperation agencies to define intervention policies and 
strategies, as well as to devise means for monitoring and evaluating public 
policies (Abramovich and Pautassi, 2009).
In complying with their obligations under the mandates 
enshrined in constitutional charters and international covenants and 
treaties, States develop positive public policy measures, which facilitate 
the implementation of mechanisms to monitor these public policies 
(Abramovich and Pautassi, 2009). It is increasingly common in the region 
to find social programmes, sectoral policies and reforms that have been 
designed using a rights-based approach. Examples are Chile’s System of 
Universal Access with Explicit Guarantees (the AUGE Plan, see box  II.5) 
and its social protection system and Colombia’s health system reform. Some 
co-responsibility transfer programmes, such as Mexico’s Oportunidades or 
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Brazil’s Bolsa Família, make direct reference to rights standards, although 
not all their interventions result from this matrix and neither are they 
always effective.
Placing the concept of social protection in a normative framework of 
rights entails setting and implementing specific and egalitarian standards 
for all citizens. The guarantees therefore cover a set of standards that 
transpose economic, social and cultural rights in specific policy areas 
—such as access, quality, financial protection, revision and participation 
and redress— that are subject to legislation requiring the State to 
implement and monitor them (Gacitúa-Marió and Norton, 2009). According 
to the rights-based approach, the aims of social protection should 
therefore be: (i)  the definition and widespread communication of rights, 
entitlements and standards that citizens can demand; (ii) a commitment to 
the equitable delivery of the specified rights, entitlements and standards; 
and (iii)  the availability of mechanisms of redress that citizens may use 
if they are unable to enjoy specified entitlements (Norton, Gacitúa-Marió 
and Georgieva, 2009).
The approach of protection as a citizen guarantee has emerged 
from a series of discussions, analyses and concrete proposals on rights-
based social protection by various academic circles in the region and by 
international organizations, rather than from a single source (cf. ECLAC, 
2006; Filgueira and others, 2006; Gacitúa-Marió, Norton and Georgieva, 
2009; Molina, 2006; ILO, 2008a and 2008b; United Nations, 2009a and 2000). 
Despite their diversity, these proposals converge to some extent as they 
all seek to extend protection mechanisms to those not yet covered and to 
achieve social citizenship. Most share the following aspirations:
(i) Social protection based on the concept of social citizenship and 
economic, social and cultural rights, where the State plays a 
key role as guarantor of standards defining minimum social 
protection levels and establishing a common basis for quality and 
access (coverage) to the services and benefits arising from social 
protection policies, irrespective of whether they are provided by 
the State, the private sector or a combination of the two.
(ii) Universal social protection as the ultimate goal, while maintaining 
targeting as a means of reducing inequalities and optimizing 
resource distribution and revealing the existence of contrasting 
positions concerning the introduction of conditionality criteria.
(iii) A set of standards for content, access and quality, understood as 
‘minimum social standards’, which have been incorporated into 
various mechanisms and proposals for translating universal 
social protection into specific policies.
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(iv) Instruments designed to identify more clearly the risks 
facing families and different groups, to enhance their asset 
accumulation and to contribute to realizing their rights, which 
requires social protection measures that are comprehensive, 
intersectoral and adaptable and managed as part of social 
protection and promotion policy systems, rather than through 
isolated programmes and interventions.
The approach of social protection as a citizen guarantee is distinctive 
because it adopts a synergistic view of social protection that includes, 
yet transcends, the spheres of contributory protection (security) and 
non-contributory protection (assistance). Its scope goes beyond defining a 
priori social protection policies to identify intervention needs and gaps, 
making it more complex to design and manage.
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Chapter II
Social protection in Latin America  
in the new millennium
The differing conceptual frameworks and analytical trends concerning 
social protection and the policies implemented by countries in the region 
determine the context for analysing current policies, the resources involved 
and institutional arrangements for their implementation. Below are some of 
the key elements, achievements and limitations of social protection policies.
A. The present situation: shortcomings  
and achievements
In 2009, a total of 183  million Latin Americans were living in poverty 
(one third of the region’s inhabitants), 74 million of whom were extremely 
poor (ECLAC, 2010c). This means that between 2008 and 2009, a further 
3  million people slipped into extreme poverty are a result of the global 
economic crisis, rising unemployment and informal employment rates and 
inadequate social protection mechanisms. Many other citizens continue to 
live in a vulnerable situation, which poses enormous problems for dealing 
with economic or other types of crisis.1
Despite the early introduction of the “protection based on formal 
employment” approach (see chapter I.C), supported mainly by contributory 
social protection policies (Draibe and Riesco, 2007; Mesa-Lago, 2004a), two 
1 According to ECLAC data (2010a), between 37% (Uruguay) and 86% (Honduras) of 
Latin America’s population is extremely poor, poor or vulnerable to poverty (their per 
capita income does not exceed 1.8 times their country’s poverty line).
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very different realities coexist for Latin American citizens (Bertranou, 2008; 
ECLAC, 2006 and 2008a; Filgueira, 2007; Regalia, 2006). First, less than half 
the working population is integrated into the formal labour market and 
has some kind of contributory social protection, meaning they have access 
to mechanisms to hedge against contingencies and structural risks. Second, 
much of the population remains excluded from the formal labour market and 
consequently has no access to such mechanisms. The origin of this duality is 
to be found in the basic premise of embedding social protection in a formal 
labour market that was expected to expand steadily (Lo Vuolo, 2009), a 
promise that has been largely unfulfilled in the region (ECLAC, 2006).
Available statistics indicate that insecurity in the region’s labour 
market is associated with informal employment and employment in 
low-productivity sectors of the market. In 2008, around half of all Latin 
American workers were in low-productivity, low-income sectors with 
limited social security coverage (see figure  II.1).2 That year, only 19.1% 
of informal-sector workers had social security coverage, compared with 
51.5% of all workers aged 15 and over. Among rural workers, coverage was 
27%. The large proportion of women employed in low-productivity sectors 
(55.5%) compared with men (45.9%) is a cause of particular concern (United 
Nations, 2010) (see table 3 of the statistical annex).
In 2006, around 41% of workers in 12 Latin American countries had 
no formal employment contract (ECLAC, 2009a), a figure that includes 
middle-income workers with no form of contractual employment 
relationship, making them more vulnerable. In the same year, only 26.2% 
of employees in the low-productivity sector contributed to social security, 
in stark contrast with the 76.7% of employees in the medium- and high-
productivity sectors.
Even in periods of growth (as between 2003 and 2008), structural 
employment problems remained unresolved and there are still high levels 
of “vulnerability to impoverishment” (ECLAC, 2010a). Clearly, the region’s 
poor and vulnerable families do not enjoy permanent employment and 
income, even though employment is the main resource available to the 
great majority of households to guarantee their livelihoods (Cecchini and 
Uthoff, 2008; ECLAC, 2009a).3
2 According to ECLAC, informal-sector workers are those employed in the low-
productivity sector, that is to say, either employers or employees (professional and 
technical or otherwise) working in firms of up to five employees (microenterprises) or in 
domestic work, or else unskilled non-wage workers (self-employed workers or unpaid 
family workers with no professional or technical qualifications).
3 According to ECLAC data, earnings from work represent an average 79% of household 
income in the region. Wages represent around two thirds of that percentage, equivalent 
to 52% of total income (ECLAC, 2009a).
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Figure II.1 
LATIN AMERICA (18 COUNTRIES): WORKERS IN LOW-PRODUCTIVITY SECTORS 
OF THE LABOUR MARKET (INFORMAL SECTOR) AND WORKERS  

























































































































































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special 
tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in the relevant countries.
a  Urban areas.
b  Weighted average.
There is a further group of people —including older adults, children 
and disabled people— who remain outside the labour market. Although 
some are covered by contributory social protection through their spouse’s 
or relative’s insurance and pensions, in many cases they lack such coverage 
and need non-contributory social protection mechanisms.
Social protection has therefore been called upon to address a variety 
of situations by creating insurance mechanisms —either linked with or 
separate from the labour market— and to provide coverage against a 
sudden drop in income by means of non-contributory social protection. 
Clearly, State non-contributory cash transfers, including co-responsibility 
transfer programmes (CTPs) and social pensions, have helped to improve 
the living standards of the poorest households (ECLAC, 2010a). This 
contrasts with contributory social protection instruments, such as private 
insurance and workers’ and health compensation, which are concentrated 
in higher-income sectors and among workers in the formal labour market 
(ECLAC, 2010a; Mesa-Lago, 2009), have a negative or zero redistributive 
impact and are highly segmenting.
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B. Welfare regimes and social investment 
Latin America is characterized by great diversity, not only in terms 
of social protection systems and levels of public social investment 
(traditionally referred to as public social “spending”), but also in terms 
of their redistributive impact.4 Many countries have made progress in 
protecting their citizens by extending coverage to groups that, until 
a few years ago, had been excluded.5 This came about partly through 
increased social investment, which rose an average of 5 percentage points 
between 1990-1991 and 2007-2008, to 18% of gross domestic product (GDP) 
(ECLAC, 2010c).6 While significant, progress is still insufficient, given that 
the region remains 7  percentage points below the member countries of 
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 
whose social investment represents 25% of GDP (ECLAC, 2010a). In Latin 
America, social investment per capita also varies widely from one country 
to another (from a minimum of US$ 107  in Nicaragua to a maximum of 
US$ 2,276 in Argentina) and, in some cases, they are not consistent with 
the country’s level of development (see figure II.2 and table 1 and table 2 in 
the statistical annex).
An analysis of the redistributive impact of public and private cash 
transfers (see figure  II.3 and table  2 of the annex) shows that they help 
to reduce the concentration of primary income, especially in countries 
with more established, wider-coverage social protection systems, such as 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica and Uruguay. However, even when 
transfers reduce the concentration of primary income, they are not always 
progressive in absolute terms, as in some countries they are concentrated in 
households with higher primary income, owing to the relative importance 
of retirement benefits and the smaller proportion of households reliant 
solely on them. Even though transfers represent only 9% of total income, 
they make up one third of recipients’ incomes, especially in households 
consisting solely of older adults (ECLAC, 2010a).
4 Government finance statistics and national accounts typically refer to social “spending” 
to denote funding resources for social policies, programmes and projects. However, this 
book prefers the term social “investment”, in view of its returns in terms of human 
development in society (Martínez and Collinao, 2010).
5 With the exception of Haiti, which, prior to the January 2010 earthquake, was just 
beginning to consolidate its network of basic social services, virtually all Latin American 
countries have mechanisms for access to sectoral policies in health and education, 
even though some are weak in terms of coverage and social investment. Nearly all 
countries in the region have also implemented transfer programmes with or without co-
responsibility, either as the main instrument or to supplement other non-contributory 
social protection measures.
6 This figure is the weighted average for 21 Latin American and Caribbean countries.
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Figure II.2 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (21 COUNTRIES): PUBLIC SOCIAL 
INVESTMENT AND PER CAPITA GDP, 2007-2008

















































Source: Prepared by the authors on the basis of Economic Commission for Latin America and the 
Caribbean (ECLAC), Social Panorama of Latin America 2010, Brieng paper, Santiago, 2010.
Figure II.3 
LATIN AMERICA (18 COUNTRIES): GINI COEFFICIENT OF HOUSEHOLD  
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special 
tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in the relevant countries.
a  Refers to primary income, after tax and social security contributions.
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One way of assessing social protection performance in the region is 
to analyse budgets and achievements. ECLAC (2010a, 2010b) has divided 
countries into three groups according to their social investment levels, 
which has an impact on social protection outcomes and the coverage of 
health and education services (see table II.1). As the table shows, there are 
still gaps in welfare provision in Latin America: on average, less than half 
the countries’ working population has social security coverage, whereas 
in countries with lower social investment, this proportion comes to just 
over one fifth. Even in the group with the highest social investment, social 
security coverage is not universal, making it urgent to find alternatives for 
improving State responses in this area. In addition, there are wide gaps in 
health insurance and access to education.
Table II.1 
LATIN AMERICA: SOCIAL INVESTMENT INDICATORS AND SOCIAL PROTECTION, 
HEALTH AND EDUCATION COVERAGE, AROUND 2008
(Simple averages for each group of countries)
Indicator












State of), Dominican 





Public per capita social 
investment (dollars at 
constant 2000 prices) 1 220 646 181 666 a
Public social investment 
as a percentage of GDP 18.5 12.7 10.0 14.2 a
Public investment in social 
security and assistance as 
a percentage of GDP 8.1 5.0 2.6 5.0 b
Public investment in health 
as a percentage of GDP 4.1 2.2 2.3 2.9 b
Public investment in 
education as a percentage 
of GDP 4.7 4.2 4.1 4.3 b
Social protection, health and education coverage
Workers affiliated to social 
security (percentages) 58.5 49.9 23.9 41.4 c
Pension and retirement 
coverage in urban areas 
(percentages) d 64.4 26.6 14.1 32.8 c
(continued)
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Indicator












State of), Dominican 





coverage (percentages) d 69.7 45.6 17.2 39.4 c
Net secondary school 
enrolment rate e 76.1 71.0 57.9 66.1 f
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special 
tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in the relevant countries; C. Mesa-Lago, “Social 
insurance (pensions and health), labour markets and coverage in Latin America”, Financing Social 
Policy. Mobilizing Resources for Social Development, K. Hujo and S. McClanahan (eds.), New York, 
United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD)/Palgrave Macmillan, 2009 and 
UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS) [online] http://stats.uis.unesco.org/unesco/TableViewer/document. 
aspx?ReportId=143&IF_Language=eng.
a  Simple average for 21 countries.
b  Simple average for 17 countries.
c  Simple average for 18 countries.
d  Excludes Brazil. Data relate to 2004, 2005 and 2006.
e  Excludes Costa Rica and Honduras.
f Simple average for 16 countries.
The current situation reflects the different historical processes that 
Latin American countries underwent during the course of the twentieth 
century. While some, like Argentina, Chile, Cuba, Uruguay and later Costa 
Rica, “pioneered” the development of contributory and non-contributory 
social protection programmes in the 1920s and 1930s, Colombia and 
Mexico introduced them in the 1940s and 1950s and yet others, including 
El Salvador, Peru and the Plurinational State of Bolivia, did not follow 
suit until the 1960s and still have no social pensions (Mesa-Lago 2004a). 
These historical processes have resulted in a number of distinct Welfare 
State models: “stratified universalism” in Argentina, Chile and Uruguay, 
where the highest levels of protection are enjoyed by members of groups 
embedded in the formal employment market; a “dual regime” in Brazil 
and Mexico, countries that are extremely heterogeneous in terms of 
territorial distribution, resource distribution and protection levels 
between geographical regions; and an “exclusive regime” in countries 
like the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, 
Nicaragua and the Plurinational State of Bolivia, where, until recently, 
elites have benefitted greatly from State resources with virtually no public 
resource redistribution at all (Filgueira and Filgueira, 2002).
The widely diverse situations in the region reflect differing views 
about the role of the State in ensuring access to social protection compared 
with other players, such as the market, the family and community and 
Table II.1 (concluded)
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social organizations, which have become increasingly important in some 
countries owing to the lack of related policies. In countries where the 
State plays a lesser role in the provision of social protection and access 
to social services outside the market is more difficult, the family and its 
home-care systems based on the sexual division of labour play a crucial 
role (J. Martínez 2008a). This is the case with the “informal-family” regime 
(J.  Martínez 2008a) typified by the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 
Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru and the Plurinational State of 
Bolivia. In countries where the State plays a bigger role in welfare regimes, 
J.  Martínez (2008a) establishes two categories: the “State-productionist” 
regime (Argentina and Chile) and the “State-protectionist” regime (Brazil, 
Costa Rica, Mexico, Panama and Uruguay). Under the State-productionist 
regime, the market incorporates workers more actively into formal 
employment and is also a major player in welfare provision. In addition, 
State resources focus heavily on human capital formation, as demonstrated 
by the high levels of investment in health and education. Under the State-
protectionist regime, there are higher levels of informal employment and 
the State takes a more active role in labour market regulation and setting 
up non-contributory schemes.
As discussed below, this diversity of arrangements and capabilities 
should be taken into account when considering the requirements and 
challenges of a comprehensive social protection system.
C. Social protection institutions
This section presents some of the main elements in the current institutional 
framework of countries in the region to examine their level of development 
and potential for furthering social protection policies.
1. Social protection agencies and bodies
The involvement of institutional stakeholders, both public and 
private, in implementing and operating social protection policies varies 
greatly among countries in the region. This diversity stems from the 
very nature of social protection, which incorporates different dimensions 
and components —contributory, non-contributory and labour market 
regulation (see chapter IV.E)— and requires multiple synergies to function 
as a comprehensive system.
The first point to note is that central governments and their 
ministerial bodies and departments play a key role in social protection 
design, implementation, evaluation and monitoring. Social development, 
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health, education, labour and social welfare (or security) portfolios are 
often involved in both the contributory side of social protection (security) 
and the non-contributory side (assistance), as well as in defining labour 
market policies and regulations. These institutions may participate in 
policymaking as well as in policy coordination or in implementing some 
policy aspects.
Second, in line with the earlier finding that there is no single 
model of social protection in Latin America, it is possible to distinguish 
different types of institutional arrangement, which combine instruments 
of a contributory and non-contributory, universal and targeted, public 
and private or mixed nature (ILO, 2001 in Bertranou, Solorio and van 
Ginneken, 2002).
(a) Contributory social protection
Historically, a number of different actors have driven contributory 
social protection and continue to be involved today. Early pension 
instruments were created in the region, which were administered 
directly by trade unions or associations in each branch through social 
security funds. One such was Uruguay’s industry and commerce pension 
scheme, which was established in 1919 as a pension fund for employees 
in industry and commerce. In other cases, these instruments were State-
run, such as social security services or institutes7 (Draibe and Riesco, 
2007). While private social security institutions rose to prominence 
following the reforms of the 1980s and 1990s, public institutions have 
continued to play an important role in defining and monitoring policies 
and guaranteed levels of insurance, as well as in managing such 
policies. Within the private sector there are private insurers, pension 
7 There are many examples of social security institutes in the region, including the: 
Guatemalan Social Security Institute (IGSS); Honduran Social Security Institute (IHSS); 
Mexican Social Security Institute (IMSS); Nicaraguan Social Security Institute (INSS); 
and Salvadoran Social Security Institute (ISSS). Most are autonomous public institutions 
with their own legal status. In Honduras, a further five institutes, apart from the IHSS, 
provide pensions to specific groups: (i)  the National Teachers’ Social Security Institute 
(INPREMA) (for public- and private-sector teachers); (ii) the Public Employee Retirement 
and Pension Institute (INJUPEMP); (iii)  the Military Social Security Institute (IPM); 
and (iv)  the National Autonomous University Social Security Institute (INPREUNAH) 
(Badillo and others, 2009). In Mexico, there are another two public institutions apart from 
the IMSS, which are linked directly with workers’ social security: the Social Security 
and Social Services Institute for State Workers (ISSSTE) and the Ministry of Health. In 
other cases, a public service has been set up —such as Chile’s Social Security Institute 
(IPS), which is subject to Ministry of Labour and Social Security provisions for managing 
solidarity pensions (partially or fully non-contributory) and pension schemes formerly 
handled by the Institute of Social Security Standardization (INP).
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fund managers8 and mutual health insurance companies (mutuales de 
seguridad),9 which cover mainly formal-sector workers because entry is 
subject to contributions.
(b) Health sector
In the health area of social protection, particularly, the above-
mentioned institutions are joined by other institutions providing 
insurance or services. For example, alongside public and private health 
insurers covering sick leave, occupational diseases, disability or maternity, 
there are health ministries or departments and, in some countries, private 
health service providers too. A point of note, however, is that the status of 
the region’s health sector in terms of social protection is not clearly enough 
defined. The role of contributory social protection in this area should be 
defined more precisely, as should the spheres of protection —guaranteed 
coverage and access— and of promotion, as well as provision of the 
services themselves. As discussed below, protection-related health aspects 
should include only insurance and not service provision.
Most countries in the region have three systems: public; social 
security for sickness and maternity; and private (Mesa-Lago, 2009). While 
public systems protect the uninsured by other means, many coverage 
and quality problems are apparent in the services actually provided. 
Brazil and Cuba have no social insurance system but a nationwide public 
system, whereas Chile has a combined public and social security system 
(Mesa-Lago, 2009). Although most countries’ constitutions and legislation 
establish the right to some form of health coverage, maternity protection 
and access to universal and free systems for those without any form of 
health insurance, in practice in nearly half these countries the legislation is 
not complied with fully (Mesa-Lago, 2008).
(c) Non-contributory social protection
As regards non-contributory benefits, responsibility for managing 
the region’s transfer programmes, with and without co-responsibility, lies 
mainly with the line ministries and departments in charge of the areas 
covered by these programmes.
(i) Co-responsibility transfer programmes
CTPs tend to be established in ministerial bodies linked specifically 
with social development and poverty reduction issues, including 
8 Such as Uruguay’s retirement savings fund management companies (AFAP) or Chile’s 
pension fund managers (AFP). Private fund managers do not exist in all the countries of 
the region and this varies in line with the parameters of the reforms undertaken by the 
different countries, where the State and market have varying degrees of involvement.
9 Private, non-profit organizations responsible for providing health coverage guarantees 
against occupational risks to workers affiliated to these schemes.
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ministries of social development and planning. While this is consistent 
with including CTPs in overall social policy as part of a long-term 
vision, in some cases the ministries are new or overly technical and lack 
political clout. CTPs should be embedded in an institutional structure that 
encourages intersectoral programme management, even when this means 
paying less detailed attention to the elements relating to each particular 
sector, although this could be problematic when programme objectives 
contain a strong human capital component.10 A second set of CTPs are 
envisaged from a sectoral standpoint, which is to say they are incorporated 
into the structure of health and education ministries and departments 
or, in the case of Argentina, the Ministry of Labour, Employment and 
Social Security.11 While this has come about because some programmes 
have specific sectoral guidelines, it reduces their ability to establish links 
with other sectors and could lead to duplication of functions and actions. 
Another point of note is that CTPs have enabled links to be forged with 
other institutions conducting social development programmes such as 
in the areas of microentrepreneurship and access to credit, where they 
are embedded in social ministries, as well as in the ministries of rural 
development or economy or employability, which comes under the 
responsibility of employment or training programmes (see chapter V).
Two of the elements that come into play in deciding the type of 
institutions in which CTPs should be embedded are competence in 
handling a specific target population, which might be individuals in 
the case of line ministries (for example, students) or families in the case 
of ministries of social development, and more extensive experience 
of targeted programmes and poor families by ministries of social 
development, which in turn report more cases of welfarism and patronage 
practices. Brazil, which has merged its sectoral programmes Bolsa Escola 
(education) and Bolsa Alimentação/Cartão Alimentação (health) into the 
intersectoral Bolsa Família conditional cash transfer programme is a good 
example of the trade-offs that occur between effectiveness in achieving 
human capital objectives and the rationalization of social policy and 
10 Reimers, DeShano da Silva and Trevino (2006) examine problems arising in the 
education sector when programmes are not managed by the line ministries, including 
lack of a specifically education-based approach to problems, scant consideration of 
experience gained in the area and limited involvement of officials from the sector. For 
more information on the case of Brazil, see Draibe (2006).
11 In Argentina, non-contributory social assistance transfers are managed by both the Ministry 
of Labour, Employment and Social Security and the Ministry of Social Development. For 
example, institutional responsibility for Argentina’s Plan for Older Persons is shared 
between the Ministry of Labour, Employment and Social Security, the Ministry of Social 
Development and the National Council for Coordination of Social Policies (CNCPS), 
while the Head of Households Programme was managed by the Ministry of Labour, 
Employment and Social Security. See http://www.trabajo.gob.ar/index.asp.
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its structures (Draibe, 2006).12 A third group of CTPs is embedded in 
structures that are highly subject to political fluctuations, such as agencies 
that come under the Office of the President of the Republic or the Office 
of the First Lady (Bastagli, 2009; Cecchini and Madariaga, 2010). In such 
cases, there is a serious risk of poor policy sustainability.
(ii) Other non-contributory benefits 
Responsibility for managing other types of transfers and benefits 
related with non-contributory social protection lies with entities 
administered by ministries of labour, welfare and social security. This 
applies to subsidies for hiring poor and vulnerable workers and targeted 
consumer subsidies, which are established by ministries in charge of 
economic policy and finance. Responsibility for implementing non-
contributory and solidarity pensions falls mainly to the public social security 
institutions described earlier, or other institutions set up for this purpose. 
For example, in 2006 Mexico established the Public Social Security System to 
cater for self-employed workers, non-wage workers and fee contractors not 
incorporated into existing social security systems and identified through 
the Oportunidades programme. By contrast, Argentina’s non-contributory 
pension system is managed by the Ministry of Social Development and the 
National Social Security Administration (ANSES), under the jurisdiction of 
the Ministry of Labour, Employment and Social Security.
Other public institutions apart from ministerial departments and 
divisions are actively involved in social protection policymaking. In 
the case of Costa Rica, the institution responsible for managing various 
transfer and subsidy programmes (including the CTP Avancemos) is the 
Joint Institute for Social Aid (IMAS), an autonomous institution with 
legal status financed through a variety of sources: the Fund for Social 
Development and Family Allowances (FODESAF), decentralized State 
institutions, municipalities, international organizations, the private sector 
and non-governmental organizations (Román, 2010).
Increasingly, public institutions decentralized to local level have 
come to join centralized public institutions. Countries like Argentina, 
Brazil and Mexico have contributory and non-contributory instruments 
created specifically in certain federal states and municipalities. Mexico’s 
federal “70 and over” programme operates at federal level and provides 
non-contributory pensions to older adults belonging to Oportunidades 
beneficiary families living in towns with fewer than 30,000  inhabitants. 
These policies coexist with the non-contributory universal pension scheme 
for older adults implemented by the Federal District of Mexico. The three 
programmes are administered by different institutions: the old-age cash 
12 Levy and Rodríguez (2005) review the rationalization strategies of fiscal programmes 
and resources associated with the implementation of Mexico’s Progresa programme.
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supplement scheme provided to households participating in Oportunidades 
is implemented through the Oportunidades National Coordination Agency; 
the “70 and over” programme is administered by the Ministry of Social 
Development; and the food support supplement scheme is administered 
by the Institute for the Care of Older Adults (IAAM) of the Federal District 
of Mexico (see Rubio and Garfias, 2010).
(d) Supervision and regulation
In addition to the above-mentioned institutions there are institutions 
responsible for ensuring proper compliance with the duties of public and 
private institutions, as well as with labour market regulations. They include 
social security regulatory bodies and labour directorates. The Chilean 
Pensions Supervisor was set up in 2008 as an autonomous body but is 
governed by the regulations of the Ministry of Labour and Social Security, 
which is comptroller of the solidarity pension system, private pension fund 
managers (AFPs) and the unemployment funds administrator (AFC). Not 
all comptrollers come under ministerial institutions. Costa Rica’s private 
pension fund regulator (SUPEN), established in 1996, comes under the 
Central Bank and is responsible for the regulation, control and monitoring 
of basic pension systems as well as the supplementary schemes run by 
private operators.13
2. Inter-agency coordination
In addition to the range of institutions involved directly in social 
protection management, provision and regulation in the region, there 
are a number of social policy coordination bodies operating at policy, 
technical and operational level, which are linked, in various ways, with 
the coordination of social protection systems and policies.
(a) Policy level
Some of Latin America’s major policy experiences have included 
social cabinets and coordinating ministries for social issues, identified 
as alternative means for performing the functions of a social authority.14 
Even though they have not been totally successful to date, mainly 
because there are still many instances of overlapping functions and 
sectoral segmentation, they have created a space for communication that 
13 Countries with similar institutions are Argentina, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, El 
Salvador, Mexico, Peru, the Plurinational State of Bolivia and Uruguay. In other cases, 
such as Honduras, it is the institutions responsible for the pension system themselves 
—the five specialized institutes— that are responsible for oversight and monitoring, 
under the supervision of the National Banking and Insurance Commission.
14 Franco (2004, 2010) defines five functions for a social authority: to set priorities, 
coordinate, allocate resources, monitor and evaluate.
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is conducive to furthering coordination. Examples are Uruguay’s Social 
Cabinet, Paraguay’s Social Cabinet, Colombia’s National Council on 
Economic and Social Planning (CONPES) and Brazil’s sectoral chambers 
drawing together groups of ministers. Since 2007, Ecuador has developed a 
different model, under which coordinating ministries have been founded 
in various spheres, including the Ministry for the Coordination of Social 
Development, which has specific responsibility for coordinating the social 
programmes implemented by various ministries and for administering 
the register of beneficiaries.15 Although it is too early to assess the results 
of these models, it is evident that they require strong political support and 
willingness by the various ministries to cooperate in order to create the 
desired synergies.16
First ladies have always played a key role at this coordination level, 
especially with respect to social policies on children and reducing poverty 
and malnutrition. This is particularly true of Central American countries, 
such as Honduras, where, until the 2009 political crisis, the first lady was 
responsible for coordinating certain non-contributory social protection 
programmes (Repetto, 2010b). In Guatemala, too, the first lady is in charge 
of coordinating the Social Cohesion Council, which in turn coordinates 
the CTP Mi Familia Progresa. A major challenge, particularly in the area of 
social protection, is to deepen the technical component of this coordination 
model and to combine it, in an appropriate manner, with the policy role 
that these programmes have acquired.
(b) Technical level
In terms of technical coordination, the region’s experience with 
safety nets in the 1980s and social investment funds is rather illuminating. 
A common feature of these ventures is that they were not embedded in 
a specific ministry but, instead, fairly autonomous management models 
were adopted. According to Sojo: “When social emergency funds were 
set up, their operational independence of ministries and the social sectors 
was presented as one of their virtues and as a guarantee of their flexibility, 
efficacy and efficiency. […] Rather than ensuring flexibility or efficiency, 
the fact that they were competing with social sectors merely increased the 
administrative fragmentation of universal policies, since they increased 
the number of cases of overlaps or duplication, or else they gave rise to 
discontinuities with the dynamics of the social sectors.” (Sojo, 2007).
15 The Ministries of Finance, Labour and Employment, Public Health, Social and Economic 
Inclusion, Education, Housing and Urban Development, Agriculture, Livestock, 
Aquaculture and Fisheries, the National Secretariat for Planning and Development 
(SENPLADES) and the National Secretariat for Migrants (SENAMI).
16 A further example of a coordinating ministry for social issues is the Ministry of Human 
Development, which operated in the Plurinational State of Bolivia between 1993 and 
1997 (Araníbar, 2010).
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Current experiences of coordination at technical level include 
the Solidarity Chile system whose Executive Secretariat —which comes 
under the Ministry of Planning and Cooperation— is responsible for: 
coordinating the institutions responsible for providing welfare benefits and 
ensuring networking among them; generating resources targeted at needs 
not covered by regular provision (expanding existing social programmes 
and creating new ones); and overseeing information management, while 
maintaining an integrated support system. It operates on the basis of 
direct inter-agency agreements, within a legal framework that governs 
the operation of the entire system and regulates the system of guarantees 
(MIDEPLAN, 2009b). It is also characterized by the use of budget 
management as a means for monitoring progress and commitments by the 
various agencies involved in the work of the social protection system.17
The Dominican Republic’s Solidarity programme is another 
example of coordination developed in the context of a CTP. In this 
case, the mismatch between demand and supply of services led to a 
search for ways to coordinate non-contributory social protection and 
sectoral policies, at both central and local level (Gámez, 2010). Since the 
establishment of the Intersectoral Coordination Committee (CCS), which 
comprises the ministries of health, education and finance, the National 
Health Insurance Authority (SeNaSa), the Solidarity programme and the 
Technical Directorate of the Social Cabinet, common objectives have been 
established for health, education and nutrition in order to boost sectoral 
plans via the CTP. The Committee’s work has also led to progress in such 
areas as: determining coverage gaps at local level; establishing budget 
allocation mechanisms for securing the long-term funding required to 
expand provision (capped and earmarked (“locked”) budgets)); redefining 
the roles of local officials and implementers of sectoral plans in the context 
of the Solidarity programme; and providing them with training and 
induction into the programme’s operating rationale (Gámez, 2010).
(c) Operational level
At operational level, too, there have been useful experiences of 
coordination arising from the use of service management instruments, 
such as the “one-stop shop” for centralizing a range of administrative 
17 Even though the Executive Secretariat has no specific political or monetary resources 
to encourage these agencies to comply with their contribution to the operation of the 
overall system, the fact that it is able to retain the sectoral allocations for each ministry 
and service involved has become a key strategy to consolidating progress in this area. 
At the same time, the transformation of the Executive Secretariat into a key partner in 
negotiations with the Ministry of Finance to maintain and increase certain resources 
for the line agencies has become a powerful catalyst for collaboration and coordination 
(interview with Verónica Silva, Executive Secretary of the Solidarity Chile social 
protection system, 14 December 2009).
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formalities and providing information and access to various local social 
services via a single public service office or desk (or for “family support”, 
in the case of Solidarity Chile), and systems for identifying and registering 
beneficiaries, which have had the positive externality of promoting 
sectoral coordination and the planning of new interventions (Mesquita, 
2009) (see section IV.F). Beneficiary identification and registration systems 
established as part of pension funds and, in particular, of CTPs, include: 
Colombia’s System for the Identification of Potential Social Programme 
Beneficiaries (SISBEN); Chile’s Social Protection Record and its Integrated 
Social Information System (SIIS); El Salvador’s Single Register of 
Beneficiaries (RUB); the Target Population Identification System (SIPO) of 
Costa Rica’s Joint Institute for Social Aid (IMAS); Mexico’s Single Socio-
Economic Data Questionnaire (CUIS) and the Integrated Government-
Programme Registration System (SIIPP-G) (see box II.1); the Single System 
for the Identification of Beneficiaries (SIUBEN) in the Dominican Republic’s 
CTP Solidarity; and Brazil’s single register for social programmes, known 
as CadÚnico. Similar efforts have also been made by countries with a 
less developed institutional framework, such as Honduras, which has 
established the Beneficiaries Registration System of Honduras (SIRBHO), 
a register of beneficiaries for unifying information in the national Family 
Allowance Programme (PRAF) and PRAF  III as part of the Honduran 
Government’s Solidarity Network social protection scheme (Cecchini and 
others, 2009).
Box II.1 
MEXICO’S INTEGRATED GOVERNMENT-PROGRAMME  
REGISTRATION SYSTEM
The main objective of the Integrated Government-Programme 
Registration System (SIIPP-G) is to improve the quality of information and 
seek out overlaps in services to programme beneficiaries (Diario Oficial, 
2005). SIIPP-G is part of the Public Social Security System (SISSP), which 
comprises the Oportunidades programme, the Social Insurance scheme and 
the Public Housing Programme.a SIIPPP-G is a means for registering and 
identifying beneficiaries by unifying the various registers. Unification began 
in March 2006 (Fernández, 2006). Based on this pooled register, identity 
cards are issued to the families and individuals participating in any of the 
three programmes.
The identity cards, which have both a contact chip and a radio chip, 
are useful because they provide a direct interface with each beneficiary’s 
electronic file. The identity card includes biometric information on the 
beneficiary and is used in a unified manner for all formalities to be carried out 
in federal government agencies attached to the scheme. The code common 
to all programmes is the Single Population Registration Code (CURP) issued 
by the National Population and Personal Identification Register (RENAPO).
(continued)
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Apart from enhancing the system’s transparency and operational 
oversight, identity cards provide beneficiaries with more flexibility, as they can 
be attended to by any federal entity simply by presenting their identity card. 
Cards also act as a facilitation tool for Mexico’s federal states, district and 
municipalities, as well as for any entities involved in managing programmes.
SIIPP-G is administered by the federal executive branch through 
Mexico’s Ministry of Public Administration. Despite its potential advantages 
in terms of transparency and inter-agency coordination, the assessment 
of its performance by the Supreme Federal Audit Service (ASF) in 2007 
was not positive. Among other things, the audit stated that no goals, 
targets or progress indicators had been set against which to assess 
SIIPP-G implementation. The difficulty in measuring the progress of federal 
programmes stems from a general lack of mechanisms for evaluating other 
aspects, such as efficiency, effectiveness and transparency. In addition, the 
registers of only 45 of the Government’s 117 programmes had been unified 
(38.5%), while half of the 133  million records lacked the CURP code for 
identifying beneficiaries. Some quality problems further compounded the 
problems in integrating the registers into the SIIPP-G, with the result that 
only 11 of the 45 registers could be included. Neither was a computer system 
available to analyse programme information (ASF, 2007). All this shows how 
difficult it is to implement such initiatives, something that should be taken 
into account when considering future applications of this nature.
Source: Supreme Federal Audit (ASF) “Auditoría 501. Sistema integral de información 
de padrones de programas gubernamentales (SIIPP-G). Cuenta pública 2007” [online] 
http://www.asf.gob.mx/Pags/AED/PG_DGADDS2007/501SIIPPG.PDF, 2007; Diario 
oficial, “Decreto por el que se crea el sistema integral de información de padrones 
de programas gubernamentales”, 12 December 2005 [online] http://www.contraloria.
df.gob.mx/prontuario/ vigente/1182.htm; J.A. Fernández, “Sistema Integral de 
Información de Padrones de Programas Gubernamentales. Antecedentes – Prospectiva 
(SIIPP-G)” [online] www.normateca.gob.mx/.../4_Antecedentes_Prospectiva_Comision_
Nacional_de_Proteccion_Social.ppt, 2006.
a  The SISSP was set up in 2006, under the presidency of Vicente Fox , in order to 
extend social security coverage to self-employed workers excluded from the 
other social security institutes: the Mexican Social Security Institute (IMSS) and 
the Social Security and Social Services Institute for State Workers (ISSSTE). The 
SISSP addresses three areas not previously considered in relation to self-employed 
workers: access to health, housing and a decent retirement. [online] See http://fox.
presidencia.gob.mx/actividades/?contenido=23661.
D. Financing social protection
Social protection systems are financed through taxes or social security 
contributions (from workers, employers or both), or a combination of taxes 
and contributions, in addition to co-payments from families towards the cost 
of social services —such as health services— in the form of direct payments 
(“out-of-pocket spending”) or as insurance, in cases where the system does 
not meet their needs fully. The poorest countries can also count on the 
support of international cooperation agencies and financial institutions.
Box II.1 (concluded)
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Funding sources for social protection have been the subject of 
prolonged debate in the region, particularly for the retirement and 
pensions component, health systems and their potential expansion. 
Health systems are funded by both tax and social security contributions. 
Countries that finance health out of general government revenues include: 
the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Brazil, Cuba and most English-
speaking Caribbean countries. In some countries, such as Chile, Costa 
Rica or Colombia, contributions are used to supplement general revenues. 
In others, such as Argentina, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, 
Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, the Plurinational State 
of Bolivia and Uruguay, health is not financed out of general revenues 
(Cetrángolo and Goldschmit, 2009).
1. Contributory social protection
In Latin America, there are three main contributory pension 
models or systems: pay-as-you-go (PAYG) (defined benefit); partially 
funded collective; and individually funded (defined contribution) 
(Mesa-Lago, 2004b). However, ECLAC (2006) pointed out that, as the 
region’s labour markets have not succeeded in becoming a universal or 
dynamic gateway to social protection, there is an urgent need to develop 
social protection systems that are not necessarily employment-based, 
by promoting non-contributory social protection mechanisms. Major 
examples of this are CTPs and pensions for older adults funded by the 
Treasury in countries like Brazil, Chile, Mexico and the Plurinational 
State of Bolivia.
Until the 1970s, countries had collective financing and public 
administration systems based on an intergenerational contract for savings 
and protection and would set up a fund to cover the risks of disability 
and death, as well as reserves against unexpected demographic changes 
(Uthoff 2006).18 In the early 1980s, to address the possibility that the 
system would be unable to afford to pay out future retirement benefits,19 
18 Some of these systems were administered through a large (public or independent) 
national fund, such as Brazil’s Social Welfare Fund or the Costa Rican Social Security 
Fund, while others operated as targeted funds for specific occupational groups, such 
as Chile’s Private Employees’ Fund (EMPART) or Argentina’s national social security 
funds (industry, commerce and civic activities; State and public services and self-
employed) (ANSES, 2009).
19 Uthoff (2006) also points to the following factors as drivers of reform: the difference 
between administering savings funds for guaranteed outcomes (such as old age) and 
administering insurance funds for possible outcomes (such as disease, disability or 
premature death); the extreme vulnerability of the PAYG fund to the “political use” of 
its resources to finance other public policy initiatives while disregarding the balance 
between risk and return required to guarantee the reserve funds; and the persistence of 
cross-subsidies owing to the nature of contributions to the system.
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Chile developed an individually funded system of individual savings 
accounts, with their corresponding private pension fund managers (AFPs), 
which later spread in various forms to Argentina, Colombia, Costa Rica, 
the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Mexico, the Plurinational State of 
Bolivia, Peru and Uruguay. As a result of these reforms, coverage shrank 
and pension amounts did not increase significantly.
The universe of both the original PAYG schemes and the fully 
funded schemes includes only formal sector employees and the schemes 
are funded primarily by mandatory contributions from workers (defined 
by law), supplemented in some cases by employers. The difference is 
that, inherent in the PAYG model is a system of internal solidarity among 
contributors, which is not present in the individually funded model.
Both financing systems have come under criticism. It is argued 
that, owing to the impact of demographic transition (lower birth rates and 
mortality, coupled with higher life expectancy), the PAYG system would 
generate a long-term deficit, as the number of beneficiaries of retirement 
or other pensions, with predefined entitlements drawn for a longer 
average time, is growing steadily, unlike the actuarial income stream. This 
calls for a progressive increase in contributions from employed workers 
or a significant increase in social investment, or both, a situation that 
has already been observed in a number of countries, with major fiscal 
repercussions.20 Two of the criticisms levelled at the individually funded 
system are that transferral from one system to the other has produced 
considerable deficits in existing pension funds, owing to the break in 
the revenue stream, and that the widely varying contributions made by 
employees during the working phase of their lives means that they end 
up with insufficient retirement benefits that need to be topped up with 
State pensions.21 To rectify this situation, State-guaranteed minimum 
pension programmes or, less commonly, State contribution subsidies have 
been introduced. As both solutions are conditional upon payments into 
contributory systems, they exclude informal-sector workers. In contrast, 
non-contributory pensions have extended citizen solidarity to the least 
protected sectors (ECLAC, 2006).
In order to engender new political and social agreements on the 
pension issue, Uthoff (2006) points to the need to incorporate the following 
four “pillars”: (i)  a macroeconomic and institutional pillar based on 
countercyclical policies following the structural surplus rule (as in the 
20 See, for example, the case of Uruguay and the fiscal dilemmas facing this model in 
Filgueira, Georgieva and Lijtenstein (2009).
21 Individually funded systems have also been criticized from a gender equity perspective, 
as the precarious employment of women prevents them from becoming members and 
compounds their vulnerability (Marco, 2004).
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case of Chile) or stabilization funds;22 (ii) the adaptation of pension models 
to local demographic and financial realities; (iii)  a strategy for increasing 
contributions, acknowledging the importance of improving affiliates’ 
productive capacity, for which human capital formation, productive 
development and employment policies become crucial; and (iv)  the 
solidarity pillar, which completes the cycle of initiatives to ensure the 
use of financially sustainable arrangements to narrow gaps in protection 
coverage. This consists of incorporating solidarity criteria into the savings 
required to finance benefits, while seeking to reward effort by means of 
defined-contribution systems (thus avoiding disincentives), and establishing 
guarantee funds, on an actuarial basis, to provide minimum benefits. 
The core idea is to reconcile the principles of equity and solidarity, while 
ensuring that benefits do not exceed capitalized contributions (Uthoff 2006).
However, the solidarity pillar poses the dilemma of limited scope 
for increasing contributions in Latin America, owing to persistent high 
levels of informal employment and low social security contributions. In 
its 2007 pension reform, Chile opted to supplement contributions with 
benefits financed from general tax revenues, with the result that the final 
pension is the sum total of the self-financed pension and the solidarity 
pillar top-up within a “graduated minimum pension” rationale (Uthoff, 
2008). This solution required consensus and political will and, as this is 
something that cannot be taken for granted in the region, there needs 
to be further debate on alternatives. For example, recently the World 
Bank (Ribe, Robalino and Walker, 2010) called for workers’ social 
security contributions to be increased, including contributions from 
workers outside the formal labour market, by means of incremental and 
voluntary contributions. This would unify traditionally fragmented 
contributory social protection systems and eliminate the factors that 
discourage hiring and more formal employment arrangements (taxation 
and regulations) (Ferreira and Robalino, 2010). This also calls for better 
alignment of incentives and rewards and greater transparency regarding 
subsidies, which should be financed from general revenues.
22 Acosta and Ramírez (2004) point to the adoption of Brazil’s Fiscal Responsibility Law, 
which imposed spending limits to safeguard macroeconomic stability, and the creation 
of targeted funds, such as the Fund for Primary Education Development and for 
Enhancing the Value of the Teaching Profession (FUNDEF) and the Poverty Alleviation 
Fund, with contributions from various levels of government and under budget-sharing 
arrangements. At the same time, the authors highlight the contribution that savings 
funds could make to social protection in other countries in the region for protecting 
their resources, especially those of the poorest sectors, in times of crisis and fiscal 
austerity (Acosta and Ramírez, 2004). The example of Chile’s countercyclical policies is 
cited frequently in this respect. Colombia has also implemented a Social Protection and 
Equilibrium Fund (FEPS) (2002), where funding is amassed on a countercyclical basis, 
by saving additional tax receipts in years when the country’s GDP grows by more than 
4% (Acosta and Ramírez, 2004).
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These proposals have elicited concern from a number of authors 
regarding the room for complementarity that would exist between non-
contributory and contributory pensions (Lo Vuolo, 2009; Ramírez and 
Peñaloza, 2007; Ribe, Robalino and Walker, 2010). This debate is based on 
the recognition that social protection systems are fragmented, dividing the 
beneficiary population on the basis of contributory and non-contributory 
mechanisms, and do not always give access to benefits of equal quality and 
timeliness. Proposals to address these issues have included: universalizing 
non-contributory instruments to tackle the deficits of citizenship arising 
from this fragmentation (Huber, 2006; Lo Vuolo, 2009); promoting 
growth in contributions (Ribe, Robalino and Walker, 2010); or improving 
institutional coordination of the two types of policy (contributory and 
non-contributory) (Acosta and Ramírez, 2004). Undoubtedly this is an area 
that warrants further analysis and debate.
Income protection against job loss is another instance where 
funding comes from several sources. Compensation is usually provided 
by employers, while, in the case of unemployment insurance, there are 
some combinations in which employees also participate, sometimes with a 
public contribution. For example, Chile’s unemployment insurance scheme, 
launched in 2002, is funded through both individual unemployment 
accounts and a Solidarity Severance Fund, to which both employers and 
the State contribute (AFC, 2010; Fajnzylber, 2010).
2. Non-contributory social protection
Funding for the non-contributory social protection component 
comes from three sources: a direct government allocation from the 
national budget; loans from international financial institutions; and grants 
from both private sources and international cooperation agencies, with 
different budget shares.
One example of funding from the national budget is Brazil, where 
the Continuous Benefit Programme (BPC), a non-contributory pension 
scheme for individuals with disabilities and older adults with an income 
below one-quarter of the minimum wage, is paid by the National Social 
Security Institute (INSS) (which is also in charge of contributory pension 
schemes) and financed entirely by transfers from the Federal Treasury via 
the National Social Assistance Fund (FNAS). The main source of funding 
to support this benefit is the Contribution to the Financing of the Social 
Security System (COFINS), a tax enshrined in the 1988 Constitution to 
finance the social security budget. The Federal Government is therefore 
responsible for bearing all costs and for administration (Schwarzer 
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and Querino 2002).23 In Mexico, the Federal District’s non-contributory 
universal pension scheme for older adults is solidarity-based and funded 
entirely by the taxpayers of the Federal District of Mexico.24
In other countries, non-contributory social protection programmes 
are financed by receipts from the exploitation of natural resources, as in 
the Plurinational State of Bolivia, where the Dignity Income is funded by 
proceeds from the sale of hydrocarbons. Chile’s Pension Reserve Fund 
(FRP) bears the cost of progressive expansion in the coverage of the Basic 
Solidarity Pension for old age and disability (PBS) and the solidarity top-
up (old-age and disability) benefit (APS), as well as the system of State-
guaranteed minimum old age, disability and survivors’ pensions.25 The FRP 
follows a structural balance rationale as Chile’s chosen fiscal methodology, 
which seeks to isolate the effects of economic variability in public finance, in 
accordance with economic activity, tax revenues and the price of copper and 
molybdenum. Every year the FRP is credited with the fiscal surplus accrued 
the previous year (no less than 0.2% and no more than 0.5% of GDP) and, 
in extraordinary periods, it may receive contributions from the Economic 
and Social Stabilization Fund (FEES), which accumulates structural surplus 
flows during positive cycles and serves as a source of financing during 
periods of fiscal deficit (Rodríguez and Flores, 2010).
In the case of loans and grants, external financing presents 
both opportunities and drawbacks when it comes to implementing 
non-contributory social protection policies because it brings with it 
conditionalities and an erratic flow of funding. Especially in the case 
of CTPs, a clear contrast can be seen between pilot programmes in the 
poorest countries, which have been conducted using external funds, and 
CTPs in countries with better human development indicators that have 
23 In Brazil there is also a “semi-contributory” rural pension system subject to a minimum 
period of work (12 years) in the agriculture sector and partly financed out of taxes on the 
sale of agricultural products, which has helped to reduce poverty significantly in areas 
such as the north-east of the country (ECLAC, 2006).
24 Annual budget ordinance approved by the Legislative Assembly of the Federal District 
of Mexico, as defined by the law establishing the right to a pension for older adults for 
people aged 68 and over living in the Federal District of Mexico, published in the Federal 
District official gazette on 18 November 2003. See [online] http://www.adultomayor.
df.gob.mx/iaam/LPension.pdf.
25 The PBS is granted to all men and women belonging to the 60% of the population in 
the lower socio-economic sector, who have been resident in Chile for 20 years and are 
aged 65 or over (old-age PBS), or aged between 18 and 65 and suffering from a mental 
or physical disability (disability PBS). The APS consists of a cash transfer to pension 
system affiliates receiving only a small contributory pension (Huepe and Larrañaga, 
2010). The objective of the State Guarantee is to build a revenue base for people who, 
despite having paid contributions for a considerable part of their lives, are unable to 
muster enough resources to match the minimum pension and have no other source of 
income (SP, 2010). It is estimated that the coverage of Chile’s solidarity pension system 
will have increased from a little over 612,000 beneficiaries (at the time of its launch in 
December 2008) to 1,215,000 by December 2012.
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been financed internally. It is common for the terms of reference of loans 
to be at variance with programme objectives (Moore, 2009b), as illustrated 
by Nicaragua and Honduras26 (see box II.2).
Box II.2 
CO-RESPONSIBILITY TRANSFER PROGRAMMES:  
RISKS OF EXTERNAL FINANCING
Loans from international organizations not only contribute financial 
resources and inputs from the teams of technical experts that help to 
implement the programmes and promote their efficiency and effectiveness, 
they also impose conditions on the utilization of such resources and major 
constraints on the timing and deadlines for providing resources.
This is not unique to smaller countries with less of a social policy 
tradition. In the case of Colombia, the Quality Committee of the Families 
in Action programme, which is responsible for proposing adjustments and 
changes to the programme’s operating rules, must request the approval 
of the multilateral bank that funds the programme before it can make the 
proposed adjustments or changes (Acción Social, 2010).
According to Moore (2009b), in CTPs these factors tend to produce 
an environment that encourages the pursuit of short-term objectives, as 
opposed to the objectives of human capital accumulation, for example, let 
alone a strategy of comprehensive social protection. As Levy and Rodríguez 
(2005) point out with respect to Mexico’s Progresa programme, one of the 
reasons for the decision to finance phase one of the programme from own 
resources was to shield it from such conditions and risks. Indeed, institutions 
like the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) only 
began to play an important financing role when the programme was already 
established and had started to expand into urban areas under the new name 
of Oportunidades (Levy and Rodríguez, 2005). Also, while the Solidarity Chile 
system and Chile’s Puente programme initially received a loan from the World 
Bank to finance programme start-up (expenditure on studies, information 
and institutional and personal capacity-building), now it is funded almost 
entirely by the Government of Chile. In countries where financing for non-
contributory social protection policies is mixed, the problems in actually 
implementing any of these programmes are compounded by another set of 
problems posed by the conflicting expectations and positions of government 
representatives and financial institutions.
Source: Social Action (Presidential Agency for Social Action and International 
Cooperation) [online] http://www.accionsocial.gov.co/contenido/contenido.aspx?catID= 
204&conID=157, 2010; S. Levy and E. Rodríguez, Sin herencia de pobreza. El programa 
Progresa-Oportunidades de México, Washington, D.C., Inter-American Development 
Bank (IDB), 2005; and C. Moore, “El impacto no es suficiente: imagen y sostenibilidad 
de las TMC en Nicaragua”, One Pager, No. 79, Brasilia, International Policy Centre for 
Inclusive Growth (IPC-IG), 2009.
26 In the case of Honduras, 60% of funding for the Family Allowance Programme (PRAF) 
in 2010 consisted of internal resources, 21% came from loans from the Inter-American 
Development Bank (IDB) and the Central American Bank for Economic Integration 
(CABEI) and the remaining 19% comprised grants from IDB and the Government of 
Taiwan Province of China, coupled with debt relief from the United States and Germany 
(Republic of Honduras, 2010).
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3. Gender equity
In the context of expanding social protection coverage, discussions 
on the issue of equity in financing social protection have intensified in 
recent years, not only between generations or within same-generation 
groups but also between the sexes. Traditionally it is women who, from 
childhood, have served as caregivers to the region’s dependent population. 
Consideration must therefore be given to a set of prevention measures and 
demands. Among other measures for promoting greater gender equality, 
ECLAC (2010a) and ILO/UNDP (2009) have pledged to promote universal 
access to social services and to social protection, prioritizing investment in 
care services.
With regard to pensions, Bertranou (2006) discusses how to reverse 
the detrimental effects of structural reforms in terms of gender inequality. 
While he highlights the opportunities afforded by fully funded systems to 
recoup the pension contributions of people who contributed to the system 
for only a short period, as is often the case with women, it is essential 
to achieve a better gender balance in the current context. Marco (2004) 
proposes specific measures to eliminate discrimination against women 
in pension systems, which include: establishing common life tables for 
both sexes in calculating benefits; progressively equalizing the retirement 
age for women and men; and adopting positive action measures, such as 
reducing the years of mandatory contribution for women in return for 
time spent on domestic work, caregiving and raising children.
Chile’s pension reform seeks to increase gender equity in pensions, 
as it includes measures to increase women’s pension savings through 
a bonus for each live-born child27 and implementing gender-specific 
premiums for disability and survivorship insurance, which favours 
women owing to their lower claim rate. In addition, in the case of divorce, 
a division of the accumulated balance of the spouse’s individual account 
will be authorized in order to pay the partner economic compensation. 
This generally favours women because they are much more likely to make 
unpaid contributions to the household economy (ILO, 2008c).
E. Social protection as a right
Several Latin American countries have made significant progress with 
the legal and constitutional recognition of social rights. However, 
this recognition should not be construed as paving the way for the 
implementation of rights-based policies, nor as a guarantee of their 
27 Equivalent to 10% of 18 months’ contributions based on the minimum wage for workers 
between 18 and 65 years of age, applicable in the month of the child’s birth.
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immediate incorporation. For example, Brazil’s 1988 Constitution 
enshrined a normative vision of social protection and its components 
(Sposati, 2009), which defined growing State responsibility for financing 
the system and postulated universal access and coverage of social services 
(Guimarães de Castro 2006). However, according to a number of analysts, 
this constitutional recognition was severely constrained when it came to 
transposing it into concrete policies in the 1990s (Sposati, 2009; de Castro 
and Ribeiro, 2003). Even though Colombia’s 1991 Constitution safeguards 
rights to social security and assistance, analysis has revealed significant 
gaps among the different groups of beneficiaries (Mesa-Lago, 2009).28
Second, the integration of a rights-based approach to social protection 
policies in the region has not necessarily resulted in the formal expression 
of social guarantees for the various components (see table II.2). While there 
are exemplary cases, such as Chile, with its universal access to health care 
with explicit guarantees (AUGE Plan, see box II.5), the incorporation of such 
proposals into a rights-based approach to social policy and its extension to 
social protection for all citizens is still a slow process.
Table II.2 











Argentina Yes Yes No The Constitution obliges the State 
to provide social security benefits 
and ensure the right to work, 




Yes Yes Yes The health system establishes 
guarantees of maternal and child 
care.
Brazil Yes Yes No The Constitution recognizes the 
right to health and to a universal 
basic income.
Chile No Yes Yes As part of the reform of the 
health system, explicit healthcare 
guarantees (the AUGE Plan), with 
their own regulations, have been 
defined.
28 In 2008, only 32.4% of workers employed in Colombia were covered by social security 













Colombia Yes Yes Yes The health reform establishes 
free access to health services 
(participation of all citizens in 
the General Health and Social 
Security System (SGSSS)). The 
Constitution explicitly recognizes 
economic, social and cultural 
rights.
Costa Rica Yes Yes No The Constitution defines a set 
of social guarantees in areas 
relating directly to economic, 
social and cultural rights.
Cuba Yes Yes No 
information 
available
The Constitution enshrines 
the right to education, health, 
protection and work safety.
Ecuador Yes No No The Constitution enshrines the 
right to health, education, work 
(including care work) and social 
security. It defines the rights of 
priority individuals and groups for 
health care (including children, 
young people, older adults and 
disabled people).
El Salvador Yes Yes No The Government has begun to 
implement its guided Universal 
Social Protection System (SPSU) 
the definition of which cites the 
rights-based approach.
Guatemala No Yes Yes The health system includes a 
basic package of care at primary 
health care level.
Mexico Yes Yes No The Vivir Mejor strategy is 
structured around an explicit 
rights-based approach.
Panama No No No The text relating to the 
Opportunities Network does not 
explicitly define adherence to the 
rights-based approach.






The Tekoporâ programme does 
not explicitly define adherence to 
the rights-based approach.
Peru No No No The Juntos programme does not 















Uruguay Yes Yes No While it does not define a system 
of explicit guarantees, in practice 
the system operates on the basis 
of the rights guaranteed in the 





Yes Yes No 
information 
available
The Constitution defines the right 
to social security. Articles 22 
and 23 on the powers of the 
Ministry of People’s Power 
for Communities and Social 
Protection gear policies and 
programmes to realizing 
the rights of children and 
adolescents.
Source: Prepared by the author on the basis of revision of official plans on social protection; F. Carbonari 
and J. Vargas, “A bridge to peace through citizenship building: guaranteeing health and education rights”, 
Building Equality and Opportunity through Social Guarantees, E. Gacitúa-Marió, A. Norton and S. Georgieva 
(eds.), Washington, D.C., World Bank, 2009; M. Drago, “La reforma al sistema de salud chileno desde 
la perspectiva de los derechos humanos”, Políticas sociales series, No. 121 (LC/L.2539-P/E), Santiago, 
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 2006. United Nations publication, 
Sales No. S.06.II.G.66; F. Filgueira, S. Georgieva and S. Lijtenstein, “Moving toward comprehensive social 
policy: the case of Uruguay”, Building Equality and Opportunity through Social Guarantees, E. Gacitúa-
Marió, A. Norton and S. Georgieva (eds.), Washington, D.C., World Bank, 2009; A. Sojo, “La garantía 
de prestaciones en salud en América Latina. Equidad y reorganización de los cuasimercados a inicios 
del milenio”, Estudios y perspectivas series, No. 44 (LC/MEX/L.708), Mexico City, Commission for Latin 
America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 2006. United Nations publication, Sales No. S.06.II.G.9.
a  This table excludes Latin American countries that have not introduced such policies or for which no 
recent information has been found (Haiti and Honduras).
There has been much debate regarding the applicability and 
development of mechanisms for prosecuting States for failure to comply 
with economic, social and cultural rights (Abramovich and Pautassi, 2009; 
De Roux and Ramírez, 2004). Although it is to be expected that countries 
will implement economic, social and cultural rights gradually, the 
committee set up to ensure implementation of the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (United Nations, 1966) has 
urged States explicitly to limit this timescale. States that have ratified the 
Covenant are obliged to provide minimum essential levels of each of the 
rights recognized (De Roux and Ramírez, 2004). With regard to the judicial 
recognition of economic, social and cultural rights, De Roux and Ramírez 
(2004) put forward the principle of urgency: prosecution to prevent harm.
This has already been put into practice in Colombia, where article 93 
of the Constitution and case law recognize that international treaties are 
central to its constitutionality (De Roux and Ramírez, 2004). Factors critical 
Table II.2 (concluded)
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to the prosecution of rights violations in Colombia are the relative ease 
of access to constitutional justice and the safeguards established by the 
1991 Constitution, including the tutela action, by means of which anyone 
can apply to a judge to protect their rights (De Roux and Ramírez, 2004). A 
ground-breaking case is Judgment T-025/04 of Colombia’s Constitutional 
Court, which after granting a series of individual protections, declared 
that the precariousness of existing social policy for displaced people 
was an “unconstitutional state of affairs”. With this ruling, the Court 
compelled the national authorities to rethink their policies for displaced 
people to ensure that their basic needs are met. In this case, the ruling 
entailed increasing resources for policies on displaced persons and 
reorienting strategic social policy priorities. The Court has also ruled 
in cases involving the economic rights of individuals and groups, for 
example by annulling laws to increase value added tax on staple goods 
(Judgment C-776/03) or extending pension benefits to previously excluded 
groups (Judgment C-409/94) (Uprimny, 2007).
However, not all countries in the region share the same 
characteristics as Colombia, given the widely varying track record of their 
judicial mechanisms in the realization of economic, social and cultural 
rights. In the case of Argentina, for instance, filing a lawsuit in court for 
infringement of social rights (see box II.3) has not always been successfully 
resolved in the short term.
As table  II.2 shows, in 9  of the 10  reference countries where the 
Constitution recognizes social rights, an explicit rights-based approach 
has been incorporated into social protection policies, whereas in a further 
three countries, the approach is not enshrined in the Constitution. Only 
four of the countries surveyed have policies with explicit guarantees.
So, despite the progress achieved in introducing prosecution 
mechanisms, it is still a challenge for the region to incorporate a rights-
based approach and economic, social and cultural rights into its social 
protection systems. This is because of continuing major shortcomings in 
terms of State commitment and the implementation of concrete actions, 
which gives an idea of the gaps that remain to be bridged. In some cases, 
the establishment of guarantees in one area has not necessarily led to their 
extension to other areas where they are also required. For instance, while 
Guatemala focused health reform on the inclusion of guaranteed benefits 
in a primary health care package, this was not accompanied by an increase 
in insurance levels and the realization of social protection rights (Sojo, 
2006). In Mexico, the impetus given to the Social Insurance voluntary 
health insurance scheme (SPS), and the creation of the System for Social 
Protection in Health (SPSS) in 2004 were an explicit response to the goal 
of universalizing services and strengthening the leadership role of the 
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Ministry of Health.29 However, not only has the funding model failed to 
remedy segmentation in coverage and benefits between population groups 
with greater or lesser resources, the explicit guarantees of access have not 
been implemented either (Sojo, 2006).
Box II.3 
INFRINGEMENT OF RIGHTS AND PROSECUTION FOR THE PROVISION DEFICIT  
IN THE BUENOS AIRES PORTEÑA CITIZENSHIP PROGRAMME
Buenos Aires city’s Porteña Citizenship Programme is an example of 
how large a deficit in social service provision can actually become. It also 
illustrates the need to assess the status of provision prior to implementing 
a co-responsibility transfer programme (CTP) and to explain the procedures 
for remedying the deficit prior to implementation.
The programme was launched in 2005 with the aim of reducing 
inequalities in the city of Buenos Aires. As is typical of a CTP designed 
to supplement a certain level of consumption, this programme imposes 
education conditions for preschool children (aged between  3 and 4) to 
attend nursery school. Breach of the conditions incurs penalties ranging 
from a reduction in the monthly benefit to suspension of transfers or even 
loss of beneficiary status.
In late 2006, a crisis was precipitated by the collapse of State-run nursery 
schools and longer waiting lists for vacancies, which, according to official 
figures, amounted to a shortfall of more than 6,000  places in preschool 
and crèches for 2- to 4-year-olds. A number of civil society organizations 
spearheaded an appeal for protection against the government of Buenos 
Aires city to protect the rights of the excluded children. According to the 
plaintiffs, the lack of vacancies was compounded by severe underutilization 
of the budget for school infrastructure, which they saw as a sign that the 
problem did not stem from insufficient funding.
In 2009, the dispute reached the city’s highest court: the Supreme Court 
of Justice of Buenos Aires. Three years after the first lawsuit had been filed, 
followed by a further two lawsuits on the same matter, eliciting a fine by the 
court on Buenos Aires city’s social development and education authorities, 
an estimated 4,500 children still had no access to the services required to 
meet the programme’s entitlement conditions.
Source: Website of the programme and Página 12, 16 September 2009 [online] http://
www.pagina12.com.ar/diario/sociedad/3-131848-2009-09-16.html.
In the case of CTPs, as with other similar programmes, political 
visibility considerations can interfere with the timeframes, rationale and 
design of programmes seeking to defend and guarantee rights. Such 
29 Mexico’s System for Social Protection in Health (SPSS) includes: a Catalogue of 
Essential Health Services (CASES) based on epidemiological criteria; a Programme to 
Expand Coverage (PAC); an extension of the Health Quality, Equity and Development 
Programme (PROCEDES) in rural and urban areas; and the interventions included in 
federal programmes.
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difficulties can undermine their effectiveness and the achievement of 
their objectives, particularly in countries with weak institutions, limited 
experience of social policy matters and political systems that favour a 
personality-based culture and autocratic leaders. In such contexts, public 
policy tends to be viewed as a government initiative rather than as a State 
policy, with the result that political support for certain programmes can 
lead to their being identified with the people or sectors promoting them. 
This poses a serious challenge to their sustainability beyond electoral 
horizons (Britto, 2006; Cecchini and others, 2009).
However, according to an analysis by Román (2010) of changes in 
core programme areas and priorities that Costa Rica’s Joint Institute for 
Social Aid (IMAS) underwent when it was attached to the Office of the 
President of the Republic in the 1990s, this can happen even in more 
established institutions. This was the case with Mexico’s Oportunidades, 
one of the region’s largest and longest-standing programmes, whose exit 
mechanisms were modified as a result of changes in Government. Banegas 
(2008) blames the introduction of the Differentiated Support Scheme 
(EDA) (see box V.4), which he believes undermined the achievement of the 
programme’s human capital goals.
According to the United Nations (2009a), the absence of clear 
accountability mechanisms that establish the responsibilities and roles of 
both public and private stakeholders prevents CTPs from being viewed 
in terms of ownership and rights and facilitates their interpretation as 
instruments of patronage that can be manipulated by various political 
stakeholders and sectors that have historically enjoyed great bargaining 
power and autonomy.30
F. Current policies in the light of  
conceptual approaches
An analysis of the main policy guidelines governing social protection 
in the region today reveals both an interaction and a distance between 
their theoretical or academic development and the practical problems 
30 When Gruenberg and Pereyra (2009) analysed patronage in the management of 
Argentina’s poverty reduction programmes, they found that: nearly 80% of the complaints 
relating to the Unemployed Heads of Household programme and the Community 
Employment Programme (PEC) were concentrated in the compliance monitoring phase; 
almost half the complaints involved a combination of two or more offences; and the 
commonest offences were charging money and compelling participation in political 
activities. They also show that measures designed to increase the transparency of the 
process, including the introduction of a magnetic stripe card for paying benefits, have 
had limited effectiveness because they have had no impact on the other phases: selection 
of beneficiaries and, in particular, control and monitoring. The authors argue that timely 
and effective access to information is crucial in combating malpractice.
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encountered when promoting the development of comprehensive social 
protection systems. Although a number of countries are endeavouring to 
establish systemic schemes that integrate provision, in practice difficulties 
arise with implementation and legislative processes, where the outcomes 
diverge from those originally intended, leading to separate schemes and 
programmes instead of networks of integrated policies in line with a 
“systems” concept (Bertranou, 2008).
Moreover, current social protection policies and programmes are 
based on differing definitions and concepts of both their components and 
the groups served. While for most countries it is appropriate to speak of 
social protection proper, others, like the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 
Costa Rica and Cuba, apply more traditional social security concepts. In 
other cases, the term “social protection” is considered synonymous with 
social assistance for the poor and vulnerable, separate from social security 
(Levy, 2009).31 The system concept is also interpreted differently from one 
country to another. Colombia’s Social Protection System (SPS) aims to 
create strategies to enable the most vulnerable families to cope with a crisis 
without jeopardizing their accumulated physical, human and financial 
assets (Rentería, 2009). Countries like Chile and Uruguay have adopted 
a comprehensive definition of social protection hinging on the “systems” 
approach to social protection for all citizens, through differentiated and 
universal instruments.
Based on the information currently available32 and on the review in 
chapter I of the four social protection approaches, countries can be divided 
into three groups on the basis of their social protection policies: those that 
are closer to either the approach of “protection as assistance and access 
to promotion” or that of “social protection as a citizen guarantee”, or else 
countries that take an intermediate position between the two (see table II.3). 
No country has adopted an approach focused strictly on “protection based 
on formal employment”, nor do any countries implement a pure safety-
net approach to mitigate and offset risks (emergency protection) with no 
associated actions. The above groups may not match the typologies based 
on indicators of social investment and social protection coverage, health 
and education (see table II.1).
31 This is the case with Brazil. See Ananias (2009).
32 This analysis is based on official documents and government websites presenting 
social protection policies and describing government guidelines for their design or 
implementation. In many cases, there is no detailed information on implementation 
deadlines, associated funding or consideration of the percentage increase in social 
investment in the proposed schemes. However, they do testify to a political will 
to implement certain social protection schemes, identifying areas that need to be 
strengthened owing to low social investment levels and institutional capacity.
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Table II.3 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: SOCIAL PROTECTION  
APPROACHES, AROUND 2009
Approach Main characteristics Countrya
1. Social protection as 
assistance and access to 
promotion.
Non-contributory social protection 




Paraguay, Peru and Trinidad 
and Tobago.
2. Intermediate position 
between social protection 
as assistance/access 
to promotion and social 
protection as a citizen 
guarantee.
Non-contributory social protection 
targeting the poor (CTP).
Other non-contributory social 
protection policies (targeted or 
universal, in the area of pensions 
and health) are incorporated 
alongside CTPs, with the aim of 
linking the various components 
gradually.
Bolivia (Plurinational State 
of), Colombia, El Salvador, 
Mexico and Panama.
3. Social protection as a 
citizen guarantee.
Transfers and benefits as part of 
non-contributory social protection.
Increasing linkages between 
contributory and non-contributory 
social protection policies.
The aim is to build comprehensive 
and coordinated social protection 
systems.
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
Costa Rica and Uruguay.
Source: Prepared by the authors on the basis of official documents and websites of the governments on 
social protection policies at the design stage and in the process of implementation.
a  This table does not include the following countries as no up-to-date information was available: 
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Cuba, Haiti, and Nicaragua.
First, some countries focus on the poor and vulnerable, prioritizing 
the development of policies and programmes of assistance and access 
to social promotion. These are countries with low levels of contributory 
social protection coverage and social investment, weak public institutions 
and a history of excluding huge swathes of the population from non-
contributory social protection policies. CTPs play a key role in this context 
and receive strong support from international cooperation agencies.33
In countries in this first group, such as Guatemala and Honduras, 
contributory social protection policies (pensions and health) were 
established belatedly as, throughout the twentieth century, there was no 
collective and institutionalized management of risk, with the family being 
33 Cooperation may come from international agencies, such as the Inter-American 
Development Bank, in the case of the Mi Familia Progresa programme in Guatemala 
(Cecchini and others, 2009). Alternatively, it may take the form of horizontal (South-
South) cooperation, such as that between Chile and Trinidad and Tobago for 
implementing the Social Transformation and Empowerment Programme: Uplifting 
People (STEP-UP), one element of the Targeted Conditional Cash Transfer Programme 
(TCCTP) in Trinidad and Tobago (OEA, 2009).
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relied upon as the primary agent of welfare (Martínez, 2008b; Mesa-Lago, 
2004a). Both are countries where the pension and health systems were not 
reformed to extend social protection coverage to the bulk of the population 
(Sojo, 2009). In both countries, CTPs have played a major role in extending 
non-contributory social protection to the extremely poor sector of the 
population. In Ecuador, the Human Development Grant has become the 
country’s main social programme (World Bank, 2009).34 Similarly, Peru’s 
Juntos programmme is at the heart of efforts to provide direct support to 
the poorest sectors via conditional cash transfers. In 2010, Honduras set up 
the Bono 10 000 conditional transfer programme for education, health and 
nutrition, the predecessor to which was the Family Allowance Programme 
(PRAF), established in 1990 as a transitional programme to mitigate the 
impact of structural adjustment policies through unconditional transfers 
to poor and extremely poor households.
Countries in the second group adopt an intermediate position 
between social protection as “assistance and access to promotion” and 
as a “citizen guarantee”, where they continue to focus their greatest 
efforts on extremely poor people but have also incorporated broader 
non-contributory arrangements. They take a citizen approach based 
on universal social protection policies, the coverage of which has been 
extended to traditionally excluded segments.
This group includes Mexico, where non-contributory social 
protection has been strengthened over the course of nearly two 
decades, in particular through Mexico’s education, health and nutrition 
programme (formerly called Progresa and now renamed Oportunidades), 
which is the cornerstone of many social assistance and promotion 
initiatives. A set of instruments has been added to this programme 
with the aim of extending social protection to traditionally excluded 
groups. This has enabled Oportunidades to incorporate a group of people 
who were not hitherto included in any health or pension scheme.35 
34 Running alongside the Human Development Grant, the Emergency Social Protection 
Programme consists of a cash transfer without co-responsibility to families living in 
an area where a state of emergency has been declared, and the Solidarity Productive 
Credit programme aims at integrating extremely poor people into sustainable 
microentrepreneurial production processes. In practice, Ecuador’s weak non-
contributory social protection system and lack of other social pensions mean that the 
Human Development Grant acts both as an incentive to children’s participation in 
human capital formation systems and as a welfare pension for poor older adults and 
disabled people.
35 See Rubio and Garfias (2010) for an analysis of the Oportunidades old-age cash 
supplement scheme. The Mexican Social Security Institute (IMSS)-Oportunidades and the 
Oportunidades Retirement Savings Mechanism (MAROP) have also included previously 
excluded people. While the IMSS scheme grants access to the public health system for all 
Oportunidades beneficiaries, MAROP provides access to an individual savings account 
for salaried and self-employed workers in the informal sector, which, in the case of 
Oportunidades beneficiaries, entails a government grant (Regalia, 2006).
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In 2008, Mexico also started to implement its Vivir Mejor strategy, which 
is targeted at coordinating social protection and promotion for poor and 
vulnerable people (see box II.4).
Box II.4 
MEXICO’S VIVIR MEJOR STRATEGY
In a bid to gradually extend social protection policies and the related 
institutional linkages, the Government of Mexico launched the Vivir Mejor 
strategy, which seeks to promote sustainable human development, fostering 
equal opportunities and guaranteeing social rights.
The strategy coordinates the actions of four ministries: Social 
Development; Public Education; Health; and Environment and Natural 
Resources. It takes a multidimensional view of development and a 
capabilities approach, while focusing on the need to coordinate social 
protection and promotion. The strategy includes four main areas of 
intervention: (i) developing basic capabilities; (ii) establishing a social safety 
net; (iii) linking economic development to social welfare; and (iv) improving 
the physical and social environment.
The first of the four areas of intervention —developing basic capabilities— 
seeks to build the human capital of people living in poverty to facilitate their 
full participation in society, in particular via Oportunidades. The aim is to build 
human capital by means of: education (through scholarships and grants for 
the purchase of school uniforms and supplies); health (preventive medicine, 
reproductive health and the prevention and control of chronic diseases); and 
food (by providing nutritional supplements, cash transfers, monitoring child 
nutrition and growth and promoting nutritional education).
The strategy’s second component has involved parallel efforts 
to strengthen the social safety net, in order to promote appropriate 
responses, particularly at times of economic crisis and in individual and 
family contingencies. These efforts have included: developing specific 
strategies to mitigate the impact of the recent economic crisis (the Vivir 
Mejor additional cash transfer for beneficiary families of Oportunidades, 
and the Vivir Mejor food support component); expanding the coverage of 
non-contributory social protection programmes; implementing measures to 
safeguard access to essential staple goods by freezing corn and milk prices 
in certain shops; and increasing the budget of the Temporary Employment 
Programme. This component also includes a set of initiatives to extend 
social protection to traditionally excluded groups by means of the Social 
Insurance health insurance scheme (SPS), the “70 and over” programme for 
the over-70s and disaster relief.
The third component seeks to establish targeted programmes to 
increase the access of poor and vulnerable people to the labour market, for 
example through the Childcare for Working Mothers Programme, support for 
productive projects and training.
(continued)
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The fourth component centres on improving the physical and 
social environment as the cornerstone of human development. In this 
connection, programmes have been developed for urban development 
(Habitat Programme), recovery of public spaces and development of 
priority rural areas.
Source: G. Merino, “Luchando contra la pobreza y la desigualdad: experiencias 
de México”, paper presented at the second conference of Rio de Janeiro on human 
development: “De los derechos a la realidad: logrando un sistema de protección social 
efectivo para todos en América Latina y el Caribe”, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 7-9 June 2010.
The Plurinational State of Bolivia has implemented three non-
contributory social protection instruments: two CTPs with education and 
health conditionalities (the Juancito Pinto Grant and the Juana Azurduy de 
Padilla Mother-and-Child Grant), managed by the Ministries of Education 
and Health respectively, and, since 2007, a universal pension for everyone 
over the age of 60, called Dignity Income.36
Although Panama launched a set of initiatives to extend the 
social safety net gradually, the process has been in transition since the 
Government changed in 2009. The CTP Opportunities Network has 
emerged as the country’s main protection programme and has entailed 
coordinating the work of several institutions to provide lifelong social 
protection to people in the poorest and most vulnerable groups (Arim 
and others, 2009; Rodríguez, 2010).37 With this CTP, which was initially 
consolidated into indigenous regions characterized by high levels of 
exclusion and poverty and poor health and education infrastructure, the 
Government initiated a number of activities to extend social protection 
coverage, especially in the field of health, to all those not covered by the 
Social Security Fund (CSS) (Robles, 2009; Waters, 2009).38 The intention 
is for the Opportunities Network to become the linchpin of a new social 
protection system aimed at protecting the most vulnerable people 
36 The amount of the Dignity Income varies according to whether older adults receive 
a retirement pension (150 bolivianos if they do and 200 bolivianos if they do not). In 
2008, the Dignity Income replaced the Solidarity Grant (BONOSOL), which provided a 
smaller pension to people over the age of 65.
37 In addition to the cash transfer, initially this programme was coordinated with a 
grant scheme for families to buy food, run by the National Secretariat for the Food 
and Nutritional Security Plan (SENAPAN), as well as with existing programmes for 
maternity benefits, health care, unemployment insurance and pensions for formal-
sector workers.
38 An institution that covers workers affiliated to the social security system against the risks 
of sickness, ageing and disability. Since 2003 it has run a programme of comprehensive 
health care packages (PAISS) to improve health care services in rural areas, with Inter-
American Development Bank funding. The goal is to improve the coverage and quality 
of maternal and child health services to prevent malnutrition in indigenous communities 
(Arim and others, 2009).
Box II.4 (concluded)
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(Rodríguez, 2010). The new Government has also introduced a non-
contributory monthly pension of 100  balboas, known as “100 at 70” to 
anyone over the age of 70 with no retirement or other pension.
While Colombia’s Social Protection System prioritizes poor 
and vulnerable people, it is based on a concept that is being oriented 
increasingly towards ensuring coverage for the entire population. The 
system is founded on five pillars, each of which uses specific targeting 
processes to prioritize interventions. These pillars are:
(i) Comprehensive social security: universal, providing insurance 
for the population through private mechanisms or subsidies 
(Rentería, 2009). This system provides protection against 
unemployment, occupational hazards and health problems 
(DNP, 2007) and is coordinated by the Ministry of Finance 
and Public Credit and the Ministry of Social Protection. It 
encompasses a variety of measures, including progressive 
universal social security membership for the population in 
(DNP, 2007).
(ii) System of social promotion: targeted at the poorest and most 
vulnerable sectors of the population in order to expand their 
opportunities. The Juntos Network for overcoming extreme 
poverty plays a pivotal role in this component and includes 
actions for training and vocational skills acquisition and 
proactive guidance (DNP, 2007), through the Government 
Employment Department, together with investment in 
infrastructure and employment.
(iii) System of lifelong human capital formation.
(iv) Social risk management.
(v) Access to assets based on support strategies to help families 
generate income and acquire physical assets.
One of the risks of these initiatives lies in perpetuating the duality 
of social protection, by keeping schemes for poor and vulnerable people 
with no access to the formal labour market alongside schemes for formal-
sector workers with varying abilities to pay. Mexico is typical in terms 
of its social policy fragmentation despite its wide-ranging provision. An 
Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) report (Regalia, 2006) states that, 
while Oportunidades is often perceived as one of the best social protection 
practices in the world, it forms part of a historically fragmented and 
dualist social protection and security system. Whereas the Oportunidades 
Retirement Savings Mechanism (MAROP) has been established as a 
protection instrument to enhance the welfare of those living in extreme 
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poverty, social security reform has been pushed into the background 
(Regalia, 2006). This is a wake-up call to ensure that the expansion of 
contributory systems is promoted through a range of incentives and by 
building the population’s access capacity.
In the third group, there are countries aiming explicitly to build 
coordinated social protection “systems” based on the approach of social 
protection as a citizen guarantee, where targeting is seen as a means for 
ensuring universal access to social protection. In such cases, increasingly 
the contributory social protection component is being linked with the 
non-contributory social protection component by a variety of intra-and 
inter-institutional means. These are countries with an uneven track record 
which, subsequent to the structural economic reforms in the 1980s and 
1990s, began a rapid process of social sector reorganization.
On the one hand, Brazil and Chile are making efforts to expand 
and improve provision of the social services and benefits comprising the 
safety net and to enhance intersectoral coordination for carrying out such 
interventions. On the other hand, Argentina, Costa Rica and Uruguay, 
which were among the first to consolidate social protection systems 
covering the vast majority of the population, now have to cope with gaps 
in coverage, in terms of either income and access to contributory social 
protection (as in Argentina and Uruguay), or access to education services 
(as in Costa Rica). Non-contributory social protection is therefore seen 
as a means for remedying critical situations affecting the universality of 
social rights.
Brazil is a case of the gradual implementation of a diverse 
and coordinated set of social protection policies, which focuses on 
decentralization and openness to social oversight mechanisms (Hevia, 
2010). One of the main achievements of this policy has been to enshrine 
the right of rural workers to social protection, by matching their social 
security benefits to those of urban workers.
As regards policies implemented, the enactment of Brazil’s 
Organization Act on Social Assistance in 1993 marked the start of a bid 
to decentralize implementation of the National Social Assistance Policy. 
It introduced the Continuous Benefit Programme, which consists of a 
minimum wage for older adults and disabled people living in poverty 
(Hevia, 2010). In 1995, it also started to implement a set of transfer 
programmes designed at municipal, state and federal levels (see annex 2) 
(Hevia, 2010; Draibe, 2006; Godoy, 2004).
All social protection policies for poor and vulnerable families are 
currently coordinated via the Unified Social Assistance System (SUAS) 
and include a number of benefits administered by the Ministry of Social 
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Development and the Fight against Hunger.39 These benefits include 
basic and specialized social protection services and are linked with 
the provision of existing social programmes in the various territories 
(Afonso, 2009). In 2007, the CadÚnico single register for social programmes 
was introduced, which identifies all families enrolled in any of the cash 
transfer programmes. As in the case of Bolsa Família, these programmes 
simultaneously promote the principles of contributory social protection, 
productive inclusion, food and nutritional security and cash transfers 
(Mesquita, 2009).
In Chile, the concept of social guarantees has been adopted in 
various social protection areas, in particular explicit health guarantees 
(the AUGE Plan) (see box  II.5). During the period 2006-2009, a set of 
additional coordination initiatives and measures was launched under the 
Solidarity Chile system and the Puente programme, designed to meet the 
requirements of extremely poor people (see annex 2). Protection has now 
been expanded to target all citizens, with a view to the full realization 
of individual rights and to ensuring basic welfare conditions for the 
entire population (Chile Solidario, 2009). All these interventions make 
up what is called the PROTEGE social safety net, which seeks to provide 
security and opportunities to all citizens throughout their lifetimes. 
The safety net includes a set of programmes and benefits: the Solidarity 
Chile programme; the Chile Crece Contigo comprehensive early childhood 
social protection programme; school and higher education scholarships; 
a subsidy for hiring young workers; the AUGE Plan; housing subsidies; 
unemployment insurance; the Basic Solidarity Pension; and a bonus for 
each live-born or adopted child (PROTEGE, 2008). This social protection 
approach involves harmonizing the contributory and non-contributory 
components to form an extensive social protection system, in addition 
to which a set of labour market regulation policies is currently being 
developed (Ministry of Labour and Social Security, 2009). Recently it was 
announced that a new “ethical” family cash transfer would be added to 
the existing battery of programmes.40
39 In addition to the BPC, there are the Social Assistance Referral Centres (CRAS), which 
offer social assistance programmes and services to families and individuals at risk; 
the Comprehensive Family Support Programme (PAIF); Social Assistance Specialized 
Referral Centres (CREAS); the Child Labour Eradication Programme (PETI); and the 
National Youth Inclusion Programme (Projovem Adolescente) (see MDS, 2010).
40 The ethical family conditional cash transfer, announced in May  2010, benefits the 
poorest 20% of the population and entails a minimum income floor of 250,000 Chilean 
pesos for a family of five, equivalent to approximately US$ 500. The estimated cost to 
the Treasury is between US$  1.9 billion and US$  2 billion. See [online] http://www. 
prensapresidencia.cl/discurso.aspx?codigo=6177 and http://www.senado.cl/prontus_
galeria_ noticias/site/artic/20100510/pags/20100510130236.html.
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Box II.5 
REFORM OF CHILE’S HEALTH SYSTEM
The main objective of Chile’s System of Universal Access with Explicit 
Guarantees (the AUGE Plan) is to guarantee the right of all citizens to the 
highest possible level of physical and mental health. This has entailed the 
introduction of explicit mechanisms for ensuring access to health services 
for the entire population and establishes a set of administrative instruments 
to report breaches of the guarantees.
The AUGE Plan involved a major overhaul of Chile’s health system 
to redress the effects of reforms implemented in the 1980s as part of 
the country’s structural adjustment programmes. This consisted of 
privatizing much of the health sector by creating private health insurance 
institutions (ISAPREs) and setting up a National Health Fund (FONASA) with 
contributions from all those treated under the public health system. By law, 
every salaried worker had to contribute 7% of their taxable income to health. 
Whereas unemployed or low-income workers could be treated only in the 
public health-care system, those with higher incomes who could afford an 
ISAPRE plan could be treated by private health-care providers of their own 
choosing. Even though Chile had made significant progress throughout the 
twentieth century in improving such health indicators as maternal and infant 
mortality, the reformed system reproduced the conditions of inequality and 
exclusion in health service access and quality (Dannreuther and Gideon, 
2008; Sojo, 2007).
This is precisely the situation that the AUGE Plan set out to improve, by 
defining a universal level of coverage of comprehensive services, irrespective 
of the contributor’s income level or contribution amount. Discussion of the 
plan in Congress enabled all the sectors involved to explain their points 
of view. As a result, Act No. 19966 of 2004 established the Regime of 
Explicit Health Guarantees, while Supreme Decree No. 228 of 2005 defined 
a list of 40  diseases and health conditions for which appropriate services 
are guaranteed. The list has been supplemented steadily and, in late 
2009, covered a total of 56  high-cost diseases (diagnosis, treatment and 
rehabilitation). The AUGE Plan selected the most important health problems 
in terms of epidemiological burden or public perception and offers four sub-
guarantees: timeliness (maximum waiting periods); access (obligation of 
FONASA and the ISAPREs to guarantee health services); financial protection 
(maximum annual payment per family); and quality (accreditation of health-
care facilities and certification of physicians). The diseases were selected 
on the basis of their frequency, seriousness (number of years of healthy life 
lost and existence of socio-economic inequalities) and the existence of cost-
effective treatments (Infante and Paraje, 2010).
The new system integrates both the private and public sectors into 
the system of health guarantees, limiting adverse selection practices by 
ISAPREs. For those treated in the private sector, the maximum co-payment 
level is 20%  of the total cost and must not exceed the equivalent of one 
month of the household’s average annual income. At the same time, the 
system defines care and treatment protocols, maximum waiting periods 
(continued)
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and complaint mechanisms. A major innovation was the creation of a health 
regulator to coordinate and oversee compliance by public and private health 
institutions with the guarantees. Another important aspect was the Plan’s 
gradual implementation (over a period of three years), which enabled health-
care networks to develop the necessary procedures to ensure the smooth 
operation of the AUGE Plan, and allowed existing supply constraints to 
be determined and the necessary investments in equipment and human 
resources to be made in order to address these constraints properly (Infante 
and Paraje, 2010).
Preliminary results of the reform indicate significant increases in 
coverage of the guaranteed health conditions and in access to complex 
diagnostic and therapeutic procedures. Although the impact of the AUGE 
financial guarantee has evidently been positive, it has not been significant 
for low-income families. Some perception surveys reveal that the public no 
longer fears dying from lack of medical care or becoming impoverished from 
exorbitant costs (Infante and Paraje, 2010).
The system’s weaknesses include, first and foremost, the long wait that 
many AUGE beneficiaries must face to secure the benefits to which they 
are entitled. Another weakness is the lack of political consensus on a social 
contract that would enable broader, higher-impact reforms to be introduced 
that would increase coverage of the diseases included in the plan (including 
a solidarity fund to force ISAPREs to contribute to financing the AUGE Plan). 
The only measure approved by Congress to finance the reform was an 
increase of 1 percentage point in value added tax (VAT) to 19%.
There are also problems regarding the way in which the minima are 
defined and doubts concerning the possible impact of this programme 
in terms of gender inequalities in access to health. In addition, there are 
constraints on undertaking treatments other than those stipulated in the 
protocols and fears that ISAPREs will reduce certain benefits in their plans in 
order to offset the compulsory coverage costs imposed by the AUGE Plan. 
Finally, inequalities between users of the public and private system have 
persisted with respect to diseases not covered by the plan.
Source: C. Dannreuther and J. Gideon, “Entitled to health? Social protection in Chile’s 
Plan Auge”, Development and Change, vol. 39, No. 5, 2008; A. Infante and G. Paraje, 
“Reforma de salud: garantías exigibles como derecho ciudadano”, Las nuevas políticas 
de protección social en Chile, O. Larrañaga and D. Contreras (eds.), United Nations 
Development Programme (PNUD), 2010; L. Moreno and M. Rosenblüth, “Implementing 
social guarantees: the regime of explicit guarantees in health in Chile”, Building Equality 
and Opportunity Through Social Guarantees, E. Gacitúa-Marió, A. Norton and S. 
Georgieva (eds.), Washington, D.C., World Bank, 2009 and A. Sojo “Evolution of the 
link between selective anti-poverty policies and social sectors policies”, CEPAL Review, 
No. 91 (LC/G.2333-P/E), Santiago, Economic Commission for Latin America and the 
Caribbean (ECLAC), 2007.
Argentina is also paving the way towards consolidated access 
to human capital formation and social protection systems. Since the 
economic crisis in the early 2000s, a set of co-responsibility transfer and 
Box II.5 (concluded)
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employability promotion programmes has been created, which have 
succeeded in broadening access to non-contributory social protection 
mechanisms in situations of crisis and severely eroded living conditions.41
Even though Argentina has created instruments to guarantee the 
enjoyment of rights, there is a risk of programme duplication owing to poor 
coordination between the Ministry of Social Development and the Ministry 
of Labour, Employment and Social Security. For this reason, it is not possible 
to speak of a coordinated system of social protection. Several cash transfer 
programmes coexist in the country, both contributory —administered at 
federal and provincial level42— and non-contributory. For the latter, there is 
a non-contributory pension system (administered by the Ministry of Social 
Development and the National Social Security Administration, ANSES),43 
provincial cash transfer schemes (including food distribution and workfare 
policies), the Training and Employment Insurance Programme (SCyE) and 
the conditional transfer for job training and job search (administered by 
the Ministry of Labour, Employment and Social Security) (Ringold and 
Rofman, 2008). In addition, challenges remain to building a comprehensive 
and equitable system that meets the needs of workers in both the formal 
and informal sectors (Ringold and Rofman, 2008) and that provides 
adequate coverage to all those enrolled in a programme.
To remedy this need, Argentina’s Universal Child Allowance 
for Social Protection (AUH) was created in October 2009. It is a non-
contributory benefit for all children and adolescents from households 
whose adult members are unemployed or working in the informal labour 
market (and therefore receive no such contributory child allowance). The 
AUH is financed by the ANSES Sustainability Guarantee Fund (FDS) and 
imposes a set of education and health conditions on beneficiary families 
(Agis, Cañete and Panigo, 2010). The fact that this allowance is solidarity 
based (it is a non-contributory benefit financed from social security 
contributions) and universal (equivalent for all the minors who receive it, 
via both the contributory and non-contributory route) reflects a progressive 
approach to providing social guarantees to all those without access to 
41 They are the Unemployed Heads of Household programme (2001) and the Families for 
Social Inclusion programme (2005), the successors of the Programme for Vulnerable 
Groups (PAGV) (1996) and the Human Development Income Programme (IDH) (2002) 
(Arcidiácono, Fairstein and Kletzel, 2009; Campos, Faur and Pautassi, 2007; Cruces and 
others, 2008; Cruces, Epele and Guardia, 2008). 
42 A comprehensive system of retirement and other pensions (federal), provincial pension 
systems, family allowances (maternity, adoption, children, disabled children, schooling 
and marriage) and unemployment insurance (4 to 12 months) (Ringold and Rofman, 2008).
43 ANSES was established in 1992 under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Labour, 
Employment and Social Security to administer the funds of national retirement or 
pension schemes, family allowances and benefits and the National Employment Fund 
(ANSES, 2009).
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social protection. At the same time, the AUH is a concrete initiative to 
improve the coordination of non-contributory social protection policies, 
as it is incompatible with other social schemes and seeks to eliminate 
duplication between them (Agis, Cañete and Panigo, 2010).
The main historical feature of Costa Rica’s social policy has been the 
implementation of a universal approach with the aim of guaranteeing a 
basic set of social rights and outcomes for all citizens, in order to promote 
upward social mobility and equal opportunities. So, rather than being just 
a core component of the social protection system, the CTP Avancemos is an 
ad hoc mechanism for resolving the specific problem of secondary school 
absenteeism (Román, 2010).
In connection with its universal social policies, Uruguay has also 
undertaken a variety of initiatives to cater for poor and vulnerable families 
(Bonino, Kwon and Peyre Dutrey, 2007; Filgueira, Georgieva and Lijtenstein, 
2009). In response to the acute economic crisis and high unemployment 
rates between 1999 and 2004, entitlement to family allowances from the 
Social Security Institute was extended to include all poor families with 
children under the age of  18 (Filgueira, Georgieva and Lijtenstein, 2009). 
Subsequently, the allowances were redefined and incorporated into the 
National Social Emergency Response Plan (PANES) and Equity Plan.
PANES was a fixed-term scheme (from 2005 to 2007) that 
incorporated a range of benefits and transfers for the most excluded 
sectors of the population, including a universal welfare benefit. PANES 
also incorporated a set of interlinked components, including poverty 
exit mechanisms and social promotion for its beneficiaries: a workfare 
programme and a poverty exit programme called “Building Exit Routes”. 
They are complemented by assistance programmes in the areas of 
education, health and nutrition.
The Equity Plan, which has been in operation since 2008, is one 
more step towards universal access to social protection benefits in 
Uruguay and improves benefit coverage for low-income sectors of the 
population. Other innovations include a cash transfer to households with 
children, resulting from reorganizing the system of family allowances 
and consolidating them as an official component of the social protection 
system. Despite maintaining a rationale of conditionalities and targeting, 
these allowances are distinguished from CTP transfers in the region by 
their degree of institutionalization and guidance (Filgueira, Georgieva 
and Lijtenstein, 2009).44
44 In addition, the Equity Plan introduces an old-age subsidy with cash transfers for 
extremely poor people between the ages of 65 and 70, a food transfer and a range of 
employment actions and education interventions, by extending Comprehensive Infant 
and Family Care Centres for children from 0 to 3 years of age (entitled the CAIF Plan).
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The information discussed in this chapter reflects social protection 
dynamics and variability in the region in both the contributory and non-
contributory components. The proposals and innovations regarding 
the non-contributory component in Latin America have had a knock-on 
effect outside the region, with the result that CTPs can now be found on 
every continent. In view of the importance that CTPs have acquired, the 
following chapter discusses the most characteristic approaches.
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Chapter III
Co-responsibility transfer programmes  
and social protection
Co-responsibility transfer programmes (CTPs) seek to reduce poverty by 
combining a short-term objective (to increase the resources available for 
consumption to meet the basic needs of beneficiary families) with a long-
term objective (to build human capital to prevent the intergenerational 
transmission of poverty) (Britto, 2006; Cecchini and Madariaga, 2010; 
Cohen and Franco, 2006a; León, 2008). Typically, CTPs achieve these 
objectives by three means: (i)  cash transfers, to increase incomes; 
(ii)  making transfers conditional upon the use of certain social services, 
to promote human capital accumulation; and (iii)  focusing on poor and 
extremely poor households. They are intended to address the material 
and cognitive aspects associated with situations of poverty in holistic 
manner, recognizing the importance of combining non-contributory social 
protection with social promotion efforts (Levy and Rodríguez, 2005), in 
addition to implementing cross-sector interventions (Cohen, Franco and 
Villatoro, 2006).
In view of the effort that CTPs have made to incorporate large 
segments of the most disadvantaged population into social policy, coupled 
with the scale and importance they have acquired in several countries 
in the region and their cross-sector approach, this chapter analyses 
the contribution that CTPs can make to building comprehensive social 
protection systems.
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A. Role of co-responsibility transfer programmes  
in Latin American social policy
Whether it is a result of experience-sharing among countries, or the 
similarity of the national solutions applied to similar social problems, or 
else dissemination by multilateral and development cooperation agencies, 
since the 1990s more than 35 CTPs have been implemented in 19 countries 
in the region (see table A.5 of the statistical annex). Twenty-three of these 
CTPs are currently operational in 18 countries and, in 2009, they provided 
protection to 25  million families in Latin America and the Caribbean, 
representing a total of 113 million people. This equates to around 19% of 
the region’s population, and funding for CTPs accounts for 0.4% of the 
region’s gross domestic product (GDP) (see gures III.1 and III.2).
Figure III.1 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (18 COUNTRIES): INVESTMENT IN  




















































































































































































Source: Prepared by the authors, on the basis of Economic Commission for Latin America and the 
Caribbean (ECLAC), Database of non-contributory social protection programmes in Latin America and the 
Caribbean [online] http://dds. cepal.org/bdptc/.
a  Includes the following programmes: Universal Child Allowance for Social Protection (AUH) (Argentina), 
Bolsa Família conditional cash transfer programme (Brazil), Solidarity Chile programme (Chile), Families in 
Action programme (Colombia), Avancemos programme (Costa Rica), Solidarity programme (Dominican 
Republic), Human Development Grant (Ecuador), Solidarity in Communities programme (El Salvador), 
Mi Familia Progresa programme (Guatemala), Family Allowance Programme (PRAF) (Honduras), 
Programme of Advancement through Health and Education (PATH) (Jamaica), Oportunidades 
programme (Mexico), Opportunities Network (Panama), Tekoporâ programme (Paraguay), Juntos 
(Peru), Juancito Pinto grant programme (Plurinational State of Bolivia), Targeted Conditional Cash 
Transfer Programme (TCCTP) (Trinidad and Tobago) and Family Allowances programme (Uruguay).
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Figure III.2 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (18 COUNTRIES): COVERAGE OF  
CO-RESPONSIBILITY TRANSFER PROGRAMMES, AROUND 2009 a 

































































































































Source: Prepared by the authors, on the basis of Economic Commission for Latin America and the 
Caribbean (ECLAC), Database of non-contributory social protection programmes in Latin America and the 
Caribbean [online] http://dds. cepal.org/bdptc/.
a  Includes the following programmes: Universal Child Allowance for Social Protection (AUH) 
(Argentina), Bolsa Família conditional cash transfer programme (Brazil), Solidarity Chile programme 
(Chile), Families in Action programme (Colombia), Avancemos programme (Costa Rica), Solidarity 
programme (Dominican Republic), Human Development Grant (Ecuador), Solidarity in Communities 
programme (El Salvador), Mi Familia Progresa programme (Guatemala), Family Allowance Programme 
(PRAF) (Honduras), Programme of Advancement through Health and Education (PATH) (Jamaica), 
Oportunidades programme (Mexico), Opportunities Network (Panama), Tekoporâ programme 
(Paraguay), Juntos (Peru), Juancito Pinto grant programme (Plurinational State of Bolivia), Targeted 
Conditional Cash Transfer Programme (TCCTP) (Trinidad and Tobago) and Family Allowances 
programme (Uruguay).
Although there have been programmes in the region for several 
decades involving compliance with certain conditions in exchange for 
State-supplied goods and services and demand subsidies, CTPs in their 
current form did not emerge until around the second half of the 1990s.1 
Brazil’s education-linked Bolsa Escola school grant income-transfer 
programme and Mexico’s education, health and nutrition programme 
(formerly called Progresa and now renamed Oportunidades) explicitly 
combined the above-mentioned elements (see annex II).
1 Programmes requiring a specific condition include: nutritional programmes, such 
as Chile’s National Supplementary Food Programme (PNAC, launched in 1954); 
temporary employment programmes, such as Peru’s Programme of Temporary Income 
Support (PAIT, which ran from 1985 to 1987); and school meal grant programmes, such 
as Brazil’s National School Feeding Programme (PNAE, launched in 1955).
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In the decade or more since the Progresa and Bolsa Escola programmes 
came into operation, a series of arguments have emerged both in favour of 
and against such programmes. One of the most important contributions 
that CTPs are said to have made is providing non-contributory cash 
transfers to families living in poverty or extreme poverty, especially 
those with school-age children (ECLAC, 2010a; Veras Soares, 2009a). Even 
though they do not always present it as a specific objective, some CTPs 
have also succeeded in boosting social policy institutionality in terms of 
management, applying a cross-sector approach and capacity-building, as 
well as unifying procedures and eligibility rules (Fiszbein and Schady, 
2009; Bastagli, 2009). CTPs therefore act indirectly to improve conditions 
for the development of other plans and policies and, in some cases, to 
establish platforms for a cross-sector approach to social problems.
However, efforts to promote coordination and a cross-sector 
approach have not always had the most desirable outcomes and, in many 
cases, programmes have become independent of the sectors involved in the 
intervention, and have created heavily patronage-based parallel structure 
that is highly vulnerable to political cycles (Moore, 2009a). This has raised 
a concern to ensure that increased demand for CTP-promoted social 
services is matched by an adequate supply of services (Cohen and Franco, 
2006a; ECLAC, 2006; Fiszbein and Schady, 2009; Cecchini and others, 2009).
From a rights perspective, one of the main debates surrounding 
CTPs has centred on the way in which they tackle poverty reduction 
(Künnemann and Leonhard, 2008; United Nations, 2009a; Standing, 
2007; Freeland, 2009). There have been warnings that setting overly 
strict conditionalities could generate an improper distinction between 
the “deserving” and the “undeserving” poor as regards entitlement to 
assistance, which would countermand the principle of universality of 
social policy and infringe basic human rights in relation to securing a 
minimum standard of living (United Nations, 2009a). This is compounded 
by the fact that there is no clear and unequivocal evidence for the 
effectiveness or efficiency of imposing conditions on entitlement to social 
benefits (Draibe and Riesco, 2009; Veras Soares, Ribas and Osorio, 2007; 
Veras Soares, Ribas and Hirata, 2008).
A number of criticisms have also been levelled at the excessive 
importance that CTPs attribute to targeting. First, it is argued that, even 
though they have laid the foundations for selecting beneficiaries based 
on technical criteria rather than on patronage, this could be achieved 
equally well using universal benefits, which not only reduce opportunities 
for corruption but also help to remove the stigma associated with social 
assistance (Mkandawire, 2005; United Nations, 2009a). A second argument 
is that, in many cases, targeting procedures are so sophisticated as to be 
opaque (Mkandawire, 2005), making beneficiaries unable to understand 
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how the programme functions.2 A further argument is that, in situations 
of widespread poverty, the administrative costs and above-mentioned 
problems could outweigh the benefits usually attributed to targeting 
(United Nations, 2009a; Cecchini, 2009).
Finally, from a gender perspective, despite initial positive assessments 
of CTPs because of their ability to increase women’s empowerment by 
targeting transfers at them, the issue has become increasingly complex 
(Adato and others, 2000). Given that women’s participation in programmes 
is based on their historic role in the sexual division of labour, where they 
are concerned more with meeting the household’s needs than their own 
individual needs, it has been argued that any empowerment that women 
would gain would be weak (Molyneux, 2009). Furthermore, assessments 
fail to consider key dimensions of empowerment such as capacity-building, 
autonomy, equality, voice and greater decision-making opportunities 
(Molyneux, 2009). On the contrary, strong concern has been expressed about 
the potential of conditionalities to reinforce the sexual division of labour 
and increase the burden of unpaid work for women, with a range of adverse 
effects (Molyneux, 2009; González de la Rocha, 2008; ECLAC, 2006).
B. Diversity in co-responsibility transfer programmes
Many co-responsibility transfer programmes have become showpieces 
of poverty-reduction policy and have been disseminated as a model to 
be applied by other countries, even outside the region (Handa and Davis, 
2006; Son, 2006; Aguiar and Araujo, 2002; Morais de Sa e Silva in Hailu 
and Veras Soares, 2008). There has been a strong demonstration effect from 
observing the successes and failures of CTPs currently in operation in 
neighbouring countries, coupled with the influence of multilateral agencies 
on financial, technical and dissemination aspects.3 Nevertheless, they 
have been reappropriated and transposed to suit each country’s particular 
needs and political and institutional landscape. This has made CTPs 
much more responsive than might be assumed to countries’ individual 
institutional trajectories in terms of public policy and the economics of 
social sector reforms.
Despite the basic structure common to all CTPs, in practice their 
parameters differ significantly in terms of: the benefits they provide and 
the way in which they deliver them; the geographic levels where they 
2 In the case of Progresa, this was found to cause potential problems ranging from 
decreased commitment to the programme to conflicts between beneficiaries and non-
beneficiaries and the erosion of local community social capital (Adato, 2000).
3 Some co-responsibility transfer programmes have come to an end because financial 
resources were insufficient, the loans used to set the programmes in motion have been 
expended or political support was lacking (Cecchini and others, 2009; Moore, 2008).
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operate; the proportion of the population they serve; their interinstitutional 
linkages; and the amount of committed investment (Cecchini and 
Madariaga, 2010; Bastagli, 2009). In fact, more and more CTPs are providing 
benefits other than mere cash transfers, such as transfers in kind, 
psychosocial support and follow-up for families, training programmes 
and microcredit. In addition, CTPs transfer money by a variety of means 
other than payment in cash, such as debit cards or vouchers.
In several CTPs, monitoring compliance with conditionalities 
tends to be more a formality than a reality. Some CTPs do not verify 
conditionalities at all, while others experience serious operational 
problems in implementing such verification. For some CTPs, this stems 
from the massive effort required to implement control mechanisms, 
whereas for others the problem is a lack of supply, making it impossible to 
comply with the condition. There are even CTPs where strict verification of 
conditionalities is simply not a central mechanism of the programme.
Based on widely diverse experience, it is possible to consider new 
ways to analyse CTPs and so understand their potential role in different 
social protection contexts. If they are seen as policy instruments rather 
than strictly defined models, CTPs can prove to be versatile tools that 
accommodate a range of ideological standpoints, allowing the instrument 
and its benefits to be appropriated in different ways.
An analysis of how CTPs operate reveals a number of differences, 
suggesting that they assume characteristic structures based on certain 
differentiating criteria. First, CTPs differ in general orientation depending 
on whether the emphasis is on a short-term objective (to provide income 
to meet minimum consumption levels) or a long-term objective (to create 
and accumulate human capital). In line with these general orientations, 
programmes adopt different forms for managing their various components, 
with elements such as beneficiary selection/targeting and exit mechanisms 
defined to reflect these orientations (Handa and Davis, 2006).
A second distinction is the role played by cash transfers in the 
programme’s operating rationale. De Janvry and Sadoulet (2006a) suggest 
two reasons or justifications for cash transfers: to increase the current 
income of beneficiaries or to act as an incentive. Cohen and Franco 
(2006a) propose differentiating between programmes taking an incentive 
approach (where the cash transfer acts as a stimulus to the adoption of 
behaviour conducive to investment in human capital) and programmes 
with a psychosocial approach (where the cash transfer plays a more 
secondary role, intended to change attitudes by working directly with 
family dynamics). Based on the above, programmes are seen to differ 
in areas such as the type of transfer and the calculation of cash transfer 
amounts and ceilings, which relates closely to the first distinction. For 
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example, if the emphasis is placed on the short-term objective of reducing 
poverty, the transfer is designed to increase the current income of 
beneficiaries, whereas if it is placed on the long-term objective, the transfer 
is seen primarily as an incentive to use social services.
The third distinction is the different types or forms of 
conditionalities. The rationale for implementing the conditionalities, 
the means used to implement them (including compliance monitoring 
and penalty systems) and the party bearing the greatest responsibility 
(beneficiaries themselves, the State or service providers) are other features 
distinguishing CTPs (De Janvry and Sadoulet, 2006a; Bastagli, 2008, 2009).
Based on these distinctions, CTPs can be divided into three types, 
making it possible to define their status in the region.4 They are discussed 
below in terms of their definition of the problems they seek to address, 
with their corresponding objectives and beneficiaries, and their operating 
rationale, which, in the case of CTPs, relates to the role played by cash 
transfers and the form and expected outcomes of the conditions, giving 
examples of design alternatives in CTPs currently in operation.
The aim of identifying these three types of programme is to improve 
the design of CTPs and help to ascertain the specific requirements of 
each type of programme and the way in which they can be incorporated 
into wider social policy. Similarly, this differentiation enables CTPs 
to be appropriated under different policy guidelines and to acquire a 
position and importance appropriate to each country’s social protection 
architecture, insofar as they are assigned a functionally coherent position 
in such structures.
1. Income-transfer programmes with soft conditionality
The first type of CTP comprises programmes whose main objective 
is to ensure a basic level of consumption for poor families. This public 
policy response is based on the assumption that the main problem facing 
poor families is lack of income and the inability to enter income-generating 
pathways, especially formal employment (see diagram III.1).
The programme closest to this definition is Brazil’s Bolsa Família 
grant programme, whose paramount objective is to provide a wage 
supplement to the poorest families (Britto, 2008). In this programme, the 
4 As the typology of this chapter is analytical and not empirical, there may be programmes 
that elude the chosen categories or categories that tend to overlap in certain situations. 
In neither case does this undermine the analytical strength of the typology, as it provides 
an insight into how co-responsibility transfer programmes operate in relation to their 
objectives and the instruments used. It also provides a framework for analysing the 
wide range of programmes that have emerged over time and for considering how these 
programmes can be integrated into the social protection architecture.
94 ECLAC
notion of co-responsibility extends to the role of the State, where the cash 
benet is considered as a right of citizenship and the attached health and 
education conditions, as part of a bid to improve access to those rights.
Diagram III.1 
TYPE-1 CO-RESPONSIBILITY TRANSFER PROGRAMMES: INCOME-TRANSFER 
























Source: Prepared by the authors.
Programmes placing greater emphasis on income transfers might be 
assumed to pay little heed to service provision. This is not the case because, 
inasmuch as the provision of benets and beneciaries’ continuance in the 
programme hinge upon compliance with the respective conditionalities, 
there is an obligation to at least ensure that services are available. In 
addition, where a CTP is oriented towards the exercise of people’s rights 
and citizenship, the quality of the services provided becomes crucially 
important, as poor quality services lead to infringement of such principles.
(a) Operating rationale
Given that type-1 CTPs identify the problem as lack of income, the 
chosen means for achieving the programme’s objectives is a cash transfer 
(see diagram III.2).
As the transfer amount is usually intended to cover the lack of a 
minimum income, it is calculated in line with the cost of a basic food 
basket (extreme poverty line). There are two types of transfer: a at-rate 
transfer and a differentiated transfer that varies according to family 
composition. For example, Bolsa Família provides a basic benet to 
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families in extreme poverty, regardless of the number of family members, 
calculated on the basis of the value of the extreme poverty line. In addition 
to this basic benet, families may obtain a top-up transfer, called “variable 
benet”, depending on family composition, up to a maximum number 
of beneciaries. Transfers calculated on the basis of family composition 
provide larger benets to households with a higher number of eligible 
members (children up to a certain age, pregnant or nursing mothers and 
older adults), taking into account families’ consumption needs according 
to their structure and their members’ stage of life.
Diagram III.2 
TYPE-1 CO-RESPONSIBILITY TRANSFER PROGRAMMES:  
OPERATING RATIONALE
Indicadors of poverty 




on the value of the 
food basket
Cash transfer Conditions Expected 
outcomes








Source: Prepared by the authors.
There are arguments to justify both types of transfer. Although 
prioritizing the composition of the family group makes it possible to 
address the specic vulnerabilities faced by different types of household, 
Stecklow and others (2006) point out that a at-rate transfer would avoid 
“perverse incentives” that might encourage large families to keep having 
children. Accordingly, transfers differentiated by family composition tend 
to impose a maximum number of beneciaries or a maximum amount 
per family. In some cases, this capping is combined with a sliding scale 
of diminishing benets for reasons of economies of scale in consumption. 
In Argentina’s Families for Social Inclusion programme, for example, 
the transfer amount began with US$53  per month for families with two 
children under the age of 19 but, as from the third child it increased by 
only around  US$12   per child up to a maximum of six children, with a 
ceiling of  US$101  per family.
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As conditionalities do not play a key role in the operation of type-1 
CTPs, verification tends to be weak, or else penalties for non-compliance 
are moderate. For example, whereas in Oportunidades, non-compliance 
with conditionalities results in immediate cessation of the cash benefit, in 
Bolsa Família, payments are suspended for the month in question but the 
amounts continue to accumulate and are refunded once the family certifies 
resumed compliance with conditionalities. In addition, Bolsa Família 
attaches great importance to supporting families that fail to meet their 
commitments through its teams of municipal social assistance workers, 
who ascertain and try to resolve any issues affecting non-compliance 
(Bastagli, 2009; Mesquita, 2009).5 Where such a scheme of conditionalities is 
supplemented by flat-rate transfers, or where transfers make no distinction 
between education or nutrition and health outcomes, the design of the 
“single transfer-single condition” dyad becomes more complex, further 
compounding control problems.
As some programmes have been extended and institutionalized 
without imposing conditionalities or defining exit mechanisms, they 
tend to resemble other non-contributory social protection programmes. 
A good example is Ecuador’s Human Development Grant, whose main 
objective is to ensure a certain consumption level for the poorest families, 
and which pays an unconditional transfer of  US$35  to older adults and 
people with disabilities. Households with children under the age of 
18 years that satisfy certain education and health conditionalities receive 
the same amount. However, given its control weaknesses, both variants of 
the programme operate in a similar fashion. So, even though the Human 
Development Grant defines itself as a CTP, the fact that it fails to verify 
beneficiary compliance with conditionalities makes it a purely income-
transfer programme.
In other cases, type-1 CTPs have tended to become assimilated 
with the concept of a universal minimum income targeted at the very 
poorest. A case in point is Brazil (see annex II.2), whose basic income law 
establishes the right to a benefit covering basic food, health and education 
costs for all Brazilians. The law has been used as a basis for instilling 
the idea of a universal minimum income revolving around benefits 
from Bolsa Família (Medeiros, Britto and Veras Soares, 2008).6 This also 
explains why Bolsa Família focuses more on minimizing exclusion errors 
5 Social Assistance Referral Centres (CRAS) or Social Assistance Specialized Referral 
Centres (CREAS), via the Comprehensive Family Support Programme (PAIF).
6 Law 10835 of 2004 establishes this right for all Brazilians and for foreigners who have 
been resident in Brazil for more than five consecutive years, irrespective of income. 
However, given the country’s budgetary constraints, the law stipulates that delivery 
of the benefit is subject to sufficient funding being available and proposes a staged 
expansion of benefit coverage, giving priority to the neediest sector of the population 
(Medeiros, Britto and Vera Soares, 2008).
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than on adjusting mechanisms to exclude people who do not fall into the 
beneficiary category, as with the Oportunidades programme (Veras Soares, 
Ribas and Osorio, 2007).
This goes to show that there must be clear objectives for 
introducing conditionalities. The rationale for conditionalities is central 
to understanding the decision to include them rather than to maintain 
non-contributory benefits without conditionalities. Experience of CTPs in 
the region has shown that conditionalities can be established for political 
reasons (to make it easier to obtain financing or to comply with donor 
requirements, persuading those in the middle- and upper-income bracket 
of the programme’s desirability), for ethical and moral reasons (helping 
only the deserving), or for instrumental reasons (to take the opportunity 
to improve basic social indicators).7
In this and the other two types of CTP it is important to 
inform beneficiaries promptly of the meaning and role of programme 
conditionalities. Schady and Araujo (2006) have demonstrated the 
importance of communication campaigns and of informing beneficiaries. 
In Ecuador, it was discovered that some families had not realized that the 
benefits of the Human Development Grant were subject to conditionalities, 
whereas other families had, which led to different responses with different 
outcomes. Families who knew that the transfers imposed conditionalities 
sent their sons and daughters to school, increasing their school enrolment 
rates, which was not the case with families that believed no comitments 
were required in order to receive benefits.
This could support the introduction of conditionalities even where 
verification is weak. Some assessments have shown positive externalities 
associated with the mere existence of a programme in the community, with 
the result that even non-beneficiaries (those not receiving transfers and not 
subject to the conditions) increase the use of social services (Veras Soares, 
Ribas and Hirata, 2008; Lehmann, 2009). This means that beneficiaries’ 
perceptions regarding compliance with conditionalities can often be 
powerful enough to obviate the need for strict systems of control and 
penalties for non-compliance in order to produce an effect on behaviour, 
although it is crucial for the supply of related social services to be large 
enough to cover the increased demand created by the programmes.
Another role that transfer programmes with weak conditionalities 
could play is to insure against emergencies and disasters, whether they 
7 In 2007, when a representative sample of Argentina’s population was asked the question 
“Do you think that people receiving [benefits from] plans should do something in 
return?” for the Survey of Perceptions of Social Policy (EPPS), 93% of respondents 
answered in the affirmative (Cruces and Rovner, 2008).
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be economic crises, or natural or other disasters (Veras Soares, 2009a).8 
Such events typically produce sudden losses of income to which poor 
households tend to respond with strategies jeopardizing the human 
development of their members, especially minors. In the context of the 
recent food price crisis, Lustig (2008) highlights the importance of social 
protection networks to contain the consumption level of households facing 
this kind of shock, in addition to safeguarding them against loss of assets. 
After studying this relationship in relation to the crisis in Nicaragua’s 
coffee sector, which went on to cause an acute economic crisis, Maluccio 
(2005) shows the positive outcomes of the co-responsibility transfer 
programme Social Protection Network (RPS) on household strategies 
for weathering the crisis. The programme was said to have enabled 
beneciary households to: mitigate the decline in consumer spending (and 
even to increase it in some cases); keep its members working the same 
number of hours as before the crisis (unlike non-beneciary households, 
whose members were forced to work signicantly longer hours); increase 
school enrolment rates; and reduce child labour.
Type-1 CTPs can operate in two modes: one continuous, where 
families in situations of poverty and income vulnerability receive constant 
access to benets; and the other temporary, provided only as relief in 
emergencies arising from natural disasters, economic crises or other 
events affecting their economic vulnerability. An example of the second 
mode is Ecuador’s  “Emergency Grant” cash transfer, which is triggered 
whenever a state of emergency is declared somewhere in the country. 
Even though the transfer does not include conditionalities, it is part of 
Ecuador’s Social Protection Programme (PPS), which also includes the 
Human Development Grant. Other emblematic cases of emergency relief 
programmes are Nicaragua’s Crisis Response System (SAC) (for natural 
disasters) and Uruguay’s National Social Emergency Response Plan 
(PANES) (for economic crises). In these CTPs, the underlying idea is that 
a scheme of conditionalities can help to prevent the loss of human capital 
through family strategies of curbing consumption.
Veras Soares (2009a; 2009b) emphasizes that, where they already 
exist as part of public policy, CTPs can be turned into crisis insurance 
mechanisms but that it is unwise to implement them while a crisis is under 
way because of their heavy requirements in terms of installed capacity 
and nancial resource commitment. For CTPs to be useful instruments in 
8 Some co-responsibility transfer programmes, such as Nicaragua’s Crisis Response 
System (SAC) or Ecuador’s Bono de Emergencia emergency cash transfer, were designed 
specifically to address emergencies. Others, such as the Honduran Family Allowance 
Programme (PRAF), Colombia’s Families in Action programme and the Dominican 
Republic’s Solidarity programme, emerged out of economic crisis, but have tended to 
spread and become institutionalized with the long-term aim of attacking poverty.
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such circumstances, their information, beneficiary selection and benefit 
payment structures need to be specially adapted and properly coordinated 
to enable them to operate flexibly enough in an emergency. However, this 
is not the case with many of the region’s existing programmes.9
(b) Expected outcomes
The effectiveness of CTP cash transfers in terms of reducing 
poverty and income inequality differs according to whether the impact is 
measured on national indicators or on programme beneficiaries (ECLAC, 
2010a; Cecchini and Madariaga, 2010). In the case of Bolsa Família, transfers 
have been found to reduce the poverty gap, extreme poverty and the 
Gini coefficient (Veras Soares and others, 2006; Veras Soares, Ribas and 
Osorio, 2007). However, their impact on nationwide poverty levels is often 
moderate and can even worsen poverty where other dynamics exist.10
In view of the above, and in line with other studies (Maluccio, 2005; 
Fiszbein and Schady, 2009), ECLAC (2010a) shows that, while the impact of 
conditional cash transfers and other non-contributory public transfers may 
be insignificant across households as a whole, for the households actually 
receiving them, the impact is great. In rural areas, per capita transfers 
account for an average 37% of the value of the extreme poverty line and 21% 
of the poverty line. In urban areas, transfers average 31% of the extreme 
poverty line and 15% of the poverty line.11 In the case of Brazil (de Oliveira 
and others, 2007) Bolsa Família beneficiaries have been found to have 
significantly higher total household expenditures than those receiving 
no benefit of any kind, especially on clothing and children’s education. 
However, no significant changes in food consumption are apparent, with 
the widest disparities among low-income beneficiaries, which would seem 
to be true of a number of other CTPs (Fiszbein and Schady, 2009).
Nonetheless, consideration should be given to the sustainability of 
cash transfers over time (Bastagli, 2009). Achieving the goal of poverty 
reduction poses a real challenge for any social policy seeking long-
9 Veras Soares (2009b) gives the example of beneficiary selection by proxy means 
tests, which are not sensitive to short-term variations in people’s income and would 
therefore not provide the required flexibility to incorporate new beneficiaries in crisis 
situations. Based on the above, the author shows that, as many co-responsibility 
transfer programmes have been designed for other purposes, their instruments do not 
necessarily conform to the requirements of crisis events.
10 In the case of Mexico, even though evaluations of the Oportunidades programme have 
found positive effects on poverty gap and severity indices (Fiszbein and Schady, 2009), 
its contribution to the incidence of overall poverty or inequality has not been established 
clearly. Even though the programme was fully operational between 2006 and 2008, food 
poverty increased by 5.4% nationwide (Rangel, 2009) while Mexico’s per capita income 
increased by around 7% (ECLAC, 2010a).
11 Based on the maximum amount of transfers.
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term outcomes rather than mitigating poverty at a given point in time. 
A number of authors (Maluccio, 2005; Fiszbein and Schady, 2009; Moore, 
2009b) cite Nicaragua’s Social Protection Network as an example of 
positive outcomes on poverty and inequality indicators, owing to the 
transfer amounts and effective targeting. In addition, this programme 
was reported to have improved consumption by beneficiary households 
in both quantitative and qualitative terms (increased intake of foods 
with a higher nutritional content). However, this lasted only for as long 
as the loan was forthcoming from the Inter-American Development Bank 
(IDB) funding the programme (between 2000 and 2006), after which the 
programme was discontinued, along with its benefits and, as expected, the 
effects turned out to be merely temporary. So, unless CTPs are designed as 
long-term programmes from the outset, the impact on incomes is unlikely 
to last after programmes have ceased.
These considerations about the sustainability of results are relevant 
to the debate on permanent versus temporary support and the design 
of effective exit strategies, where exit is an option (Medeiros, Britto and 
Veras Soares, 2008). To assess the impact of type-1 CTPs, it is not enough 
to measure the impact of transfers on total family income and to analyse 
the extent to which they enable families to rise above extreme poverty 
or poverty lines, or the extent to which transfers help to sustain income 
levels in times of crisis. It is also necessary to assess the effectiveness of 
exit strategies in building the capacity of households and enabling them to 
become autonomous.
Another important factor is the cost-effectiveness of interventions. 
A number of authors suggest that, if income transfer is the sole objective, 
the best option is an unconditional transfer, given the costs associated 
with control measures and other institutional infrastructure elements 
required for a CTP (de Janvry and Sadoulet, 2006a; Samson, 2006; Freeland, 
2009). Evidence shows that there is no clarity regarding the costs of such 
procedures, especially in the stage of verifying conditionalities. A study 
of Honduras, Mexico and Nicaragua (Caldés, Coady and Maluccio, 2006) 
shows that the combined targeting and control costs can total as much as 
60% of the annual budget of a programme like Progresa. However, Fiszbein 
and Schady (2009) warn that these costs depend on the programme 
implementation stage, citing the study by Grosh and others (2008), which 
states that, for 10  countries, the costs of payment implementation and 
verification of conditionalities, plus additional support services, average 
less than 12% of the budget.12
12 These analyses are beset by major methodological problems for making intercountry 
comparisons, stemming from the non-comparability of administrative costs by function. 
Countries’ institutional arrangements and systems for recording administrative 
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2. Demand incentive programmes with  
strong conditionality
A second type of CTP is designed primarily to promote the human 
development of the poorest sectors of the population, which in practice 
means increasing their use of social services by removing barriers to 
entry (see diagram  III.3). CTPs of this type are Mexico’s Oportunidades 
programme and Costa Rica’s Avancemos programme.
Diagram III.3 
TYPE-2 CO-RESPONSIBILITY TRANSFER PROGRAMMES: DEMAND  





















Source: Prepared by the authors.
Type-2 CTPs interpret the problems facing poor families as centring 
on their lack of human capital assets, exacerbated by lack of access to basic 
services stemming from either demand problems (households lack vision 
concerning returns on investment in human capital) or supply problems 
(lack of access to social services). While, in practice, there has been a 
tendency to focus on demand-side problems, that is to say, to encourage 
the use of education and health services by the beneciary population 
(Villatoro, 2008; Parra Côrrea and Perez Ribas, 2008), there is a crucial 
need to increase service provision and quality as a whole, as the greatest 
barriers to entry faced by poor families are deemed to include their 
attitudes or behaviour towards social programmes and services as a result 
costs vary widely, complicating cross-programme comparisons of disaggregated 
administrative costs (Lindert, Skoufias and Shapiro, 2006).
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of persistently inadequate provision. In fact, in the case of Oportunidades, 
the quality of the services available to beneficiaries has been repeatedly 
called into question and is currently one of the main concerns of the 
programme’s administrators.13
(a) Operating rationale
 The chosen solution for type-2 CTPs is to use cash transfers as a tool 
for breaking down barriers to entry and encouraging the use of education 
and health services, with the aim of improving individual and collective 
health and human development by accumulating and enhancing poor 
people’s human capital assets. As the main objective is not to increase 
people’s income levels but to enhance their human development, the 
cash transfer is just one input to financing the cost of access by the 
poor to education or health services. Making the transfer conditional 
would therefore encourage a change in behaviour by beneficiaries and 
possibly make households more willing to invest in human capital. The 
importance of changing behaviour also explains why, in programmes 
like Oportunidades, the information and guidance provided to the various 
family members during health and sanitation talks is considered so 
important that they have been made part of the conditionalities imposed 
upon beneficiaries (see diagram III.4).14
Transfers amounts are therefore calculated on the basis of the 
opportunity costs incurred by families in using the services being 
encouraged. In the case of the second Honduran Family Allowance 
Programme (PRAF II), the transfer for the health component was based 
on the average wage earned by a woman for an annual 12 days of 
employment in the most common agricultural activities (IDB, 2000), 
to compensate mothers for time spent on complying with health 
conditionalities (attending check-ups for children and pregnant women). 
In other cases, transfer amounts are calculated on a differential basis 
for the different population groups and services. In Colombia’s Families 
in Action programme, four groups of different-sized cities were defined 
and, for the education grant, a sliding-scale scheme was established in line 
13 Rangel (2009) points out that, under this programme, in 12.3% of rural clinics the 
structure is of low quality, in 35.5% it is low to average and in only around 7% can it be 
considered high-quality. The same applies to the quality of care by health personnel for 
antenatal, metabolic syndrome and child patients. On the issue of educational services, 
the author states that both national assessments (Enlace) and international assessments 
(Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA)) of State education point to a 
low-quality educational process and poor school performance in rural, indigenous and 
distance-education secondary schools, which is where most Oportunidades beneficiaries 
are enrolled (see also Bertozzi and others, 2008).
14 While other co-responsibility transfer programmes, such as Panama’s Opportunities 
Network, promote attendance of educational talks, this is not a requirement for receiving 
monetary support (Rodríguez, 2010).
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with successive education levels (the largest transfer at the highest level). 
Mexico’s Oportunidades programme and Costa Rica’s Avancemos adopted 
this scheme at an early stage and Jamaica’s Programme of Advancement 
through Health and Education (PATH) adopted it more recently.15
Diagram III.4 
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Source: Prepared by the authors.
Both the Oportunidades and PATH programmes incorporate an 
additional differentiation in transfer amounts based on children’s gender, 
taking the opposite approach: whereas Oportunidades grants higher 
transfers to women, PATH grants higher transfers to men. In both cases, 
the aim is to tackle the gender inequality problem facing men and women, 
from an early age, in terms of opportunities to attend school and continue 
into higher education.
However, there appears to be no conclusive evidence regarding 
which gender should be prioritized, as there are some criteria that 
could be used to justify higher transfers for men and others for women 
(Villatoro, 2007). In the case of men, a higher amount may be justied by 
the need to cover the greater opportunity cost they face in complying with 
conditionalities, as they receive greater returns on alternative activities. 
Higher transfers for women may be justied by the fact that they have 
higher school dropout rates and their expected returns on additional years 
15 Jamaica’s PATH programme is an interesting case because it began with a flat-rate 
transfer, which was granted to each eligible member but, in 2008, it switched to a 
sliding-scale scheme much like that of the Oportunidades programme.
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of education are greater, in addition to the proven fact that, all things being 
equal, parents tend to favour the education of sons. As the opinions of 
beneficiaries themselves are divided on the issue of who should receive 
greater support (Villatoro, 2007), it is even more difficult to judge the 
effectiveness of incentives.
A practical means for calculating cash transfer amounts in line with 
the human development objectives of type-2 CTPs might be to establish 
differentiated amounts according to men and women’s coverage gaps 
and education levels prior to the intervention, which would require a 
preliminary assessment of these indicators both nationally and locally. 
This has been termed “calibration” of conditionalities (De Brauw and 
Hoddinott, 2008; De Janvry and Sadoulet, 2006b).
The study by De Janvry and Sadoulet (2006b) suggests ways of 
increasing the efficiency of conditionalities, targeting them solely at the 
population segment with the lowest levels of the indicator that is to be 
increased. For the education sector, the study proposes defining where and 
on whom to focus conditionalities based on a combination of indicators 
showing who has the lowest initial probability of school enrolment without 
the conditional cash transfer and who has the highest enrolment response 
to a transfer. In the case of Progresa, these elements are determined by 
such variables as age, ethnicity and whether or not there is a school in the 
village (De Janvry and Sadoulet, 2006b). 
In line with the approach where the transfer is seen as an incentive, 
amounts are often limited intentionally so as not to deter families’ own 
efforts to secure income from other sources (Levy and Rodríguez, 2005). 
While much of the literature concurs with this idea, some studies show 
that there may be stronger symbolic reasons why families may wish to 
relinquish their status as beneficiaries of poverty reduction programmes as 
soon as possible, such as the associated stigma (Mattos and Ponczek, 2009).16
Moreover, in type-2 CTPs, there is a close link between transfers and 
conditionalities, in that they require comitments from their beneficiaries, 
termed “strong” conditionalities (Fiszbein and Schady, 2009). The aim 
is to emphasize the central role of conditionalities in these CTPs’ bid to 
change beneficiaries’ behaviour to increase their willingness to invest 
in human development. As they are so important, type-2 CTPs contain 
a set of mechanisms designed specifically to conduct the process of 
monitoring conditionalities and linking them with payment and penalty 
procedures, with the prevailing trend being the “single transfer-single 
condition” model. The most emblematic cases are the Oportunidades 
and Families in Action programmes, which have complex mechanisms 
16 See the influential article by Becker (1965, pp. 493-517) for an economic theory on the 
allocation of time.
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for verifying conditionalities that, in turn, call for systems allowing 
compliance information to be updated quickly for the purposes of 
payments and penalties. Other programmes with strong control and 
heavy penalties include Jamaica’s PATH, Colombia’s Conditional Subsidies 
for School Attendance (in Bogota) and Nicaragua’s two discontinued co-
responsibility transfer programmes (Social Protection Network and Crisis 
Response System) (Fiszbein and Schady, 2009).
Even though other programmes have no control mechanisms, 
they place the same importance on conditionalities and are currently 
in the process of implementing such mechanisms. One example is the 
Honduran Bono 10 000 programme for education, health and nutrition, 
which focuses on human capital and is designed more in line with a 
demand-incentive CTP. However, until recently (prior to the launch of 
its third IDB-funded Family Allowance Programme (PRAF III) in 2007), 
Honduras did not verify conditionalities owing to logistical problems 
and lack of infrastructure (Cecchini and others, 2009). Finally, in other 
programmes, such as Costa Rica’s Avancemos, institutional coordination 
problems pose serious challenges to the verification of conditionalities 
(Román, 2010).
(b) Expected outcomes
The impact of a demand incentive-oriented CTP should be analysed in 
terms of the variation in indicators of use of the services being encouraged.17
In general, co-responsibility transfer programmes are successful 
in promoting wider access to education and health services, as well as in 
improving indirect indicators such as school enrolment and attendance 
(Schady, 2006; de Brauw and Hoddinott, 2008) and coverage of child 
growth monitoring and preventive health checkups.18 However, there is 
no conclusive data on their impact on such aspects as learning (Reimers, 
DeShano da Silva and Trevino, 2006) or child nutritional status (Castiñeira, 
Nunes and Rungo, 2009). Although some programmes with nutrition-
based benefits, such as Oportunidades and the Social Protection Network, 
seem to show improved nutrition indicators (Basset, 2008), these results 
should be viewed with some caution as to their validity and the possibility 
of extrapolating them to other contexts.19
17 Bastagli (2008) calls them “intermediate human capital outcomes”.
18 Improvements in enrolment tend to be more marked in countries with lower enrolment 
levels, in the transitional school grades with higher dropout rates (such as the step from 
primary to secondary school) and in the poorest households.
19 In such cases, it is plausible to assume that the outcomes are the result of specific 
benefits that influence the nutritional component, such as food supplements. Another 
important consideration is the effect of other programmes with a direct impact on 
human capital outcomes (such as nutritional plans), which are difficult to verify in the 
usual experimental and quasi- experimental studies.
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Assessments of the Progresa and Oportunidades programmes have 
shown significant progress in education indicators, including lower school 
dropout rates, increased school enrolment and improved grades (SEDESOL, 
2008). In the area of health, they have been found to increase preventive 
consultations, reduce maternal and child mortality, improve nutrition 
indicators, such as height and anaemia prevalence, and reduce sick days.20
3. Programme coordination systems or networks  
with conditionalities
While the third type of CTP could be considered an extension of the 
previous two —a kind of “third-generation” CTP— it takes a qualitatively 
different approach to the needs of poor and vulnerable sectors of the 
population and the benefits required to support them, in addition to 
serving as a means for uniting and channelling a set of existing benefits 
and entitlements. Rather than a CTP per se, it is more a coordination 
structure designed to ensure or guarantee access to the benefits offered 
by various specific programmes and so create a minimum level of 
social inclusion. This classification is modelled on the Solidarity Chile 
programme, although Colombia’s Juntos network for overcoming extreme 
poverty (Juntos Network) is similar.
The rationale behind such systems is that social vulnerabilities 
stem not only from lack of income or access to specific social services, 
but also from a host of psychosocial, cultural, economic, geographical 
and other factors.21 A combination and accumulation of such factors 
results in situations of social exclusion and rights violations that are 
hard to administer for a public policy accustomed to operating on a 
“waiting list” basis, where families with the most information about 
public benefits and entitlements end up being first in line to receive 
them. The rationale behind type-3 CTPs is that public provision should 
approach families and not vice versa, as part of a coordinated and 
proactive system. This also provides a means for resolving programme 
and institutional fragmentation and laying the foundations for cross-
sector intervention via a single entry point to all social programmes 
and services. This is done by implementing a “one-stop shop” for 
20 Younger, Ponce and Hidalgo (2008) compared the different assessments of Progresa and 
Oportunidades in terms of nutritional outcomes and found that changing information 
sources and the year in which measurements were made, as well as the methods and 
techniques used, could alter the results radically. Veras Soares, Perez Ribas and Issamu 
Hirata (2008) also address the conflicting aspects of impact assessments, stating that, given 
the diversity of results and methods used, it is not possible to make conclusive assertions.
21 For example, a combination of such factors as living in a slum or rural area and suffering 
from malnutrition, poor health and education, problems in securing formal employment, 
low income and poor self-esteem leads to situations of exclusion, with a high likelihood 
of remaining in extreme poverty.
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care, which, in the case of Solidarity Chile, is embodied by its family 
support counsellors (apoyos familiares) (Raczynsky, 2008), that is to say, 
professionals who work on psychosocial aspects aimed at promoting and 
facilitating a match between supply and demand for social services and 
enhancing family dynamics. Through its strategy of caring for families 
and boosting their access to a range of social benets, Solidarity Chile 
aims to promote improvements in areas considered crucial to enabling 
people to escape from marginalization and to establish a minimum level 
of social inclusion (see annex II.3).
Type-3 CTPs rely on the existence of a fairly extended network of 
social programmes and services, which must be of proven quality and 
effectiveness and constantly evaluated to meet the proposed objectives. 
That is why the requirements in terms of service provision are perhaps 
the strictest of all three types of CTP, with not only high-quality services 
available but also a widely varied programme offering (see diagram III.5).
Diagram III.5 
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Source: Prepared by the authors.
Experience with Solidarity Chile has shown that local service 
networks are not always able to meet the user expectations raised by 
family support counsellors or the system’s quality standards (MIDEPLAN, 
2009a; 2009b). The problems of matching supply to users’ specic 
requirements and the expectations raised in them during the support 
period can lead to frustration and regression in the psychosocial work 
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achieved by family support counsellors (Nun and Trucco, 2008). For 
example, job requirements for the positions offered through Municipal 
“Labour-market intermediation” Offices (OMIL) were observed to be 
far in excess of the experience and educational level of members of 
Puente programme beneficiary families (Rangel, 2005). Failure to meet 
beneficiaries’ expectations and their resulting disappointment can 
compound emotional problems and prompt programme participants to 
abandon work (MIDEPLAN, 2009b).
(a) Operating rationale
While, at first sight, such plans might not resemble co-responsibility 
transfer programmes, in a number of ways they share the basic structure 
common to all CTPs. First, they incorporate cash transfers, even though 
the amounts may be low, not to say, insignificant, intended only to 
reduce the transaction costs of entering the other social programmes to 
which the system provides access. This applies to the Solidarity Chile 
programme’s “protection bonus” and “exit bonus” transfers. A second aim 
of type-3 CTPs is to link beneficiaries with other non-contributory social 
protection programmes fulfilling a specific income transfer function, such 
as social grants or pensions. For example, Colombia’s Families in Action 
programme represents the income transfer component of a wider system 
of interventions: the Juntos network. In Solidarity Chile, the Single Family 
Subsidy (SUF) plays a similar income-transfer role. Both incorporate 
conditionalities for the use of education and health services.
Thus, type-3 CTPs include the conditionality concept, albeit to a 
limited extent, in that families must meet certain basic minimum social 
standards. In such cases, the conditions to be met by each family are 
variable and fairly flexible and are established in line with the specific 
work that families carry out in conjunction with support counsellors.22 
In Solidarity Chile, for example, the “protection bonus” provided during 
the support period requires the family to have worked, during the current 
month, on at least one of the seven dimensions considered important 
for improving their living conditions. However, given the programme 
characteristics and intervention dynamics, it seems reasonable, in practice, 
for delivery of the protection bonus not to be linked directly to compliance 
or non-compliance with minimum standards, but rather to the effort made 
by each family to comply with them, as perceived by their family support 
counsellor. By contrast, the “exit bonus” is granted to all families who 
22 The flexibility comes not from the definition of dimensions on which to work but rather 
from allowing families to rank their own order of needs and from their contracts for 
compliance with minimum standards. Another element of flexibility is the possibility of 
gearing the supply of services and programmes to the specific realities of these families 
(see Nun and Trucco (2008) for the case of Chile).
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succeed in meeting the minimum standards established upon completion 
of the support process. This cash benefit and the other grants to which 
beneficiary families are entitled continue to be paid on a monthly basis for 
three years following completion of the psychosocial counselling period, 
with no other conditionalities.
In type-3 CTPs, cash transfers and conditionalities therefore 
play a secondary role, with primary importance accorded to providing 
families with psychosocial guidance and support (see diagram III.6). 
In Solidarity Chile’s Puente Programme the basic objective of family 
support counsellors is to carry out psychosocial work with beneficiary 
households and support them over a 24-month period. During this time, 
families are asked to commit to improving certain aspects of their quality 
of life considered to be minimum social standards in terms of rights of 
citizenship.23 This requires the family support counsellor to facilitate the 
linkage of households with public sector networks of social programmes 
and services and to ensure that they have access to the various benefits 
on offer. The ultimate aim of the support activities is to prepare for the 
family’s gradual exit from the programme. As the family meets the 
successive objectives of the various dimensions, visits from the family 
support counsellor gradually diminish in frequency, while the transfer 
amount (protection bonus) shrinks. As a coordinating unit, the Solidarity 
Chile system is responsible for ensuring that supply meets incremental 
demand, managing inter-agency agreements and administering the 
transfer of funds.
The “social administrators” in Colombia’s Juntos Network play 
a similar role in focusing public provision of social programmes and 
services around families and work in order to attain certain basic goals.24 
In its coordinating role, the Juntos Network does two things. First, it sets 
a baseline for identifying family demand for services and programmes 
in order to meet minimum social standards. Second, it administers the 
necessary supply and coordinates the different sectors in order to ensure 
that beneficiaries have access to the various services and programmes, 
while increasing municipal institutional capacity and supply.
23 These are 53 aspects grouped into 7 dimensions forming the basis of the programme’s 
poverty reduction goal. These aspects are addressed jointly by the family support 
counsellor and individual households in line with each household’s priorities, 
capabilities and needs (see annex III.3).
24 The dimensions tend to coincide with those of Solidarity Chile, except for the addition 
of “insurance and banking” and “legal support”. Even though these two are not among 
the dimensions required to meet the minimum standards of the Puente programme, 
Solidarity Chile allows linkages with public programmes that do address these 
considerations, such as access to the Support for Entrepreneurship programmes of the 
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Several CTPs in the region have incorporated the family guidance 
and support component for a variety of reasons. In Panama’s Opportunities 
Network it is used to inform beneciaries about programme characteristics 
and the transfers and services to which they are entitled, as well as to 
facilitate compliance with conditionalities. In practice, its family liaison 
ofcers (enlaces familiares) have been used as a social auditing instrument, 
as well as to provide feedback to the programme on the beneciaries’ 
conditions and unmet needs (MIDES, 2008; Rodríguez, 2010).
In Paraguay’s Tekoporâ programme, family support counsellors are 
required to achieve a range of objectives, from informing and training 
families in various human capital areas (including education, nutrition 
and sanitation) and in family dynamics (domestic violence and alcoholism) 
to evaluating compliance with health and education conditionalities. 
They must also devote much of their time to discussing with families 
strategies for boosting both household and community productive 
capital (Veras Soares and Britto, 2008). Assessments suggest that, even 
though the family support component is considered a key element in the 
programme’s operation, lack of infrastructure and resources are obstacles 
that constrain its response capacity (Veras Soares and Britto, 2008). 
However, it is acknowledged that incorporating and coordinating social 
protection, social promotion and economic inclusion activities into a single 
programme is no easy matter (Veras Soares and Britto, 2008). Another 
Paraguayan programme, Abrazo, is a special form of CTP that includes the 
family support component. Abrazo focuses its intervention on reducing 
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child labour by targeting family dynamics, in particular by encouraging 
the restoration of family ties and ensuring that fathers and mothers take 
more responsibility in their respective roles and participate in the process 
set in motion when a child returns to education. This intervention entails 
regular family visits, case tracking and training workshops (SAS/ILO, 
2007a). Finally, El Salvador’s Solidarity in Communities programme 
includes non-governmental organizations (NGOs) for family support 
and follow-up, which are responsible for verifying the conditionalities of 
beneficiary families and, in so doing, act as the link between families and 
service provision. NGOs work with families to identify the causes of non-
compliance. They are also active in promoting community participation 
and organization by means of training seminars.
(b) Expected outcomes
The impact of type-3 CTPs should be analysed on the basis of 
variations in the specific indicators of each dimension, addressed via 
the concept of “minimum social standards” (including identification, 
nutrition, health, education and housing), as well as via indices that 
integrate different aspects of poverty.
The outcomes to be expected from type-3 CTPs are evident from 
the experience of Solidarity Chile. An assessment of the first cohorts to 
enter the programme in the period 2002-2005 reveals that, by the time they 
exited, half the families had met all the minimum conditions, while 85% 
had managed to comply with at least 50 of the 53 conditions (Larrañaga and 
Contreras, 2010). Other quantitative assessments of the programme indicate 
that it took some years before improvements were observed in the various 
areas —especially employment, incomes and poverty— which is consistent 
with the programme’s long-term approach (Galasso, Carneiro and Ginja, 
2007). However, there was a tendency for these improvements to diminish 
or disappear altogether when compared with a control group (Larrañaga, 
Contreras and Ruiz-Tagle, 2009), raising doubts about the programme’s 
effectiveness. Two of the possible explanations put forward are that Chile’s 
general context of economic growth during the programme start-up 
period enabled non-participant families to achieve similar improvements 
in their living standards (Galasso, Carneiro and Ginja, 2007), or that the 
improved overall provision of public services as a result of introducing the 
programme had a positive spillover effect onto non-beneficiary families 
(Larrañaga, Contreras and Ruiz Tagle, 2009; Lehmann, 2009).
From another standpoint, the qualitative assessments have 
provided important insights into the development of the Solidarity 
Chile intervention process. Assessments reveal that Puente programme 
family support is considered to be the most successful component of 
Solidarity Chile, especially in improving beneficiaries’ quality of life by 
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meeting minimum social standards (Nun and Trucco, 2008; MIDEPLAN, 
2009b). In addition, benefits from the psychosocial work emerge in the 
space of reflection opened up in families and act as a catalyst for their 
own self-development initiatives (Nun and Trucco, 2008; MIDEPLAN, 
2009b). However, there are still some problems with the Solidarity Chile 
intervention model, such as the need for minimum social standards 
to be considered from a perspective that takes explicit account of the 
interdependence of achievements in the various dimensions and the 
flexibility and adaptability of the minimum conditions. Even though 
multidimensionality is a pillar of the Solidarity Chile intervention, 
the method used by support counsellors to address compliance with 
minimum social standards has tended to focus on individual dimensions, 
to the detriment of improving them across the board (Nun and Trucco, 
2008). As the everyday reality of families is sometimes far removed from 
the rigid minimum social standards that they must meet, the standards 
should be made more flexible.
It is also important to highlight the family support counsellor’s 
role in sustaining improvements in households’ quality of life, as well 
as in conveying the programme’ social promotion objectives correctly, 
to prevent families from interpreting them as welfarist or paternalistic 
(MIDEPLAN, 2009a). Improvements in dimensions such as employment 
and housing have been found to be concentrated in the family-support 
period and to decline in subsequent years (Larrañaga, Contreras and 
Ruiz-Tagle, 2009; MIDEPLAN, 2009b). Problems have also emerged with 
the sustainability of the link between beneficiaries and the provision of 
public programmes and services once the family support counsellor’s 
intervention is complete (MIDEPLAN, 2009a). The way in which family 
support counsellors appropriate the programme’s guiding principles is 
therefore crucial in ensuring sustainable outcomes (MIDEPLAN, 2009a; 
2009b; Nun and Trucco, 2008) —a concern that extends to the other 
actors involved in providing services to programme beneficiary families 
(Arriagada and Mathivet, 2007; MIDEPLAN, 2009a; 2009b).
Follow-up of families that have exited the Puente programme shows 
those that were in a better situation at the start of the intervention, in terms 
of both socio-economic vulnerability and family dynamics, experience the 
most positive outcomes in terms of successful completion of the support 
period (MIDEPLAN, 2009b). By contrast, families that were in a worse 
situation at the outset tend to have difficulties in meeting the minimum 
standards or simply abandon the programme before the end of the support 
period (Nun and Trucco, 2008). A large proportion of the latter consist of 
single-parent households headed by women or poorly educated young 
people (MIDEPLAN, 2009b) or families with domestic violence, alcoholism 
or substance abuse issues (MIDEPLAN, 2009b).
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Finally, adverse effects on social capital have been reported, owing 
to lack of community-level interventions (Nun and Trucco, 2008). To 
overcome this and help to foster collaboration and collective decision-
making, Colombia’s Juntos Network has incorporated a “community 
support” phase into its psychosocial support component, consisting of 
organizing meetings between beneficiary families to enable them to share 
experiences and learning relating to their family work plans.
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Chapter IV
Towards a comprehensive social  
protection system
Previous chapters have discussed a number of issues relating to the 
development of social protection in Latin America, including the various 
conceptual approaches and frameworks that have shaped it in recent 
decades, existing proposals for consolidating broader access to social 
protection instruments and some of the main initiatives and policies that 
countries have designed and implemented in the area of social protection. 
This chapter explores the components, scope and prospects for building 
comprehensive social protection schemes in the region, identifying their 
role within the wider set of social policies. After presenting the social 
protection components guided by this approach, this chapter goes on 
to review some of the central tenets underpinning social protection 
management and implementation, bringing to light a number of challenges 
and unresolved issues.
A. Social policy: protection, promotion  
and sectoral policies
Social policy includes the design, financing, implementation, monitoring 
and evaluation of strategies and activities for improving the quality of 
life of residents of a country, region or area. It therefore encompasses all 
interventions —primarily by the State but also by other actors such as 
civic and community organizations or the market— that have a direct 
impact on people’s welfare, institutions and their relations: health and 
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education services; subsidies and cash or in-kind benets; social security 
and pensions; labour market measures; progressive tax collection; and 
redistributive policies (Franco, 2010; Mkandawire, 2006).
The components of social policy are social protection, social 
promotion and sectoral policies, such as education and health. Social 
protection, whose primary objective is to provide a minimum level of 
social and economic welfare to all members of society, is central to social 
policy but is distinctive in terms of the social problems it addresses. Social 
promotion encompasses all policies relating to capacity-building, by 
building human capital (education and training) or improving conditions 
in the environment where human capital is required to operate (labour 
intermediation, promotion of production, nancing and technical 
assistance to micro- and small enterprises and the identication and 
promotion of business start-ups). In short, social promotion includes all 
policies and programmes intended to improve people’s quality of life 
through increased productivity and independently generated incomes. 
The third component —sectoral policies in such areas as education, health 
and housing— contributes directly to enhancing human development and 
building human capital, as well as, indirectly, to fostering social cohesion. 
Clearly, in such a framework, each component must be coordinated with 
the others in order to achieve social policy objectives (see diagram IV.1).
Diagram IV.1 

























Source: Prepared by the authors.
Social protection systems, in particular, make it possible to link 
social protection and promotion policies, assigning them —and sectoral 
policies— with the role of managing and delivering services. Social 
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protection is therefore responsible for protecting and securing income 
and fostering decent work, as well as for identifying unmet demand 
(and critical points in existing public provision). It is also responsible 
for ensuring that the entire population has access to social services and 
making sure that the services are adequate in terms of coverage and 
quality. However, social protection is not responsible for service delivery, 
which requires specialist management.
Social protection systems should not be viewed merely in terms 
of the recipients in the population segment which is vulnerable to the 
social deficits of economic development, crises and/or market failures, but 
as proactive agents for providing people with access to better economic 
and social conditions. Social protection systems therefore play a key role 
in identifying new needs and assessing the scale and characteristics of 
demand, becoming facilitators of the quality management of other policies.
For the smooth operation of social policy and, hence, social 
protection policy, it is also crucial to consider its relationship with 
economic policies (micro and macro) and its impact on the promotion of 
productive, rural and infrastructure development, as well as on improving 
the quantity and quality of employment. All these elements impact heavily 
on existing capabilities for lifting people out of their critical condition of 
poverty and responding to the risks facing families.
B. Functions of a comprehensive social  
protection system
The roles that social protection is called upon to play in broader social 
policy, in terms of protecting and securing income, ensuring access to 
promotion policies and other social services and fostering decent work, 
find their substantive basis in economic, social and cultural rights (see 
annex  I). Below is a list of social protection functions and the specific 
rights they seek to ensure.
(i) To guarantee an income that makes it possible to sustain the 
basic quality of life deemed essential for personal development. 
This function includes two components:
 – Facilitating the minimum socio-economic conditions that 
ensure the basic rights of individuals in such matters as 
income, food, health, education, housing and essential social 
services. This means safeguarding certain minimum social 
standards and basic needs, in line with articles  22, 25  and 
26  of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (United 
Nations, 1948) and articles  10 and  11 of the International 
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Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)
(United Nations, 1966), to make it possible to eradicate critical 
conditions of extreme poverty and to provide protection and 
care to economically inactive people.
 – Offsetting a fall in incomes below the agreed essential 
standards. This entails ensuring access to mechanisms 
of continuous insurance against varying types of critical 
events in order to curb sudden drops in income that threaten 
people’s ability to meet the costs of a minimum level of 
welfare. Such events include loss of independent income 
and labour constraints imposed by health problems (either 
of employees themselves or their dependents), pregnancy 
and childbirth, natural disasters, armed conflict and other 
factors. That is to say, this function is intended to ensure a 
minimum income level by a variety of means, as indicated 
in articles 22 and 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (United Nations, 1948) and articles  9 and  10 of the 
ICESCR (United Nations, 1966).
(ii) To identify unmet demand and ensure access to social services 
(including health, education and housing), as well as to 
promotion services to build people’s human capital and self-
reliance. The aim of promoting access to basic social services 
that improve quality of life and the ability to accumulate assets 
is consistent with article  25 of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights and articles 11, 12, 13 and 14 of the ICESCR. This 
includes providing care to children, older adults and sick and 
disabled people.1
(iii) To foster decent work by promoting better labour policies to 
help overcome labour market risks, ensuring the realization 
of workers’ rights and progressively integrating into the 
formal labour market the bulk of a country’s economically 
active population.2 This function includes issues related to: 
(a)  the formalization of employment by means of clear and 
informed contracts with just and favourable conditions (pay 
1 Care provision is not the sole province of social protection. Sectoral policies, such as 
education, also make a significant contribution to care. For example, the full school day 
not only benefits pupils’ learning, it also relieves the burden of parental care, making it 
easier for parents to participate in the labour market.
2 The “decent work” concept, introduced in 1999 by the International Labour Organization 
(ILO), reflects the broad goal of providing women and men with opportunities to obtain 
productive work in conditions of freedom, social justice, security and human dignity. 
It therefore includes the need to protect workers’ health, as well as to provide workers 
with adequate pensions (ECLAC, 2009a).
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commensurate with work performed; equal conditions for men 
and women; occupational health and safety regulations; access 
to opportunities for career advancement; working hours and rest 
periods); (b)  access to vocational guidance, technical training 
and training programmes for the promotion of economic, 
social and cultural development and productive employment; 
(c)  the right to form and join a trade union, to strike, to form 
trade union confederations and to join international trade union 
organizations; and (d) the eradication of child labour and labour 
exploitation. All these aims figure in articles  23 and  24 of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in articles 6, 7, 8, 
9 and 10 of the ICESCR.
Social protection should be universal in scope, meaning that it 
includes people working in the formal labour market as well as those 
outside it. This does not preclude the implementation of targeting 
mechanisms to allow social protection to address the resource shortage 
and prioritize those in situations of greatest poverty and vulnerability.
Social protection can therefore contribute significantly to alleviating 
the most urgent symptoms of poverty by building permanent pathways 
for overcoming it (although this is not enough on its own to eliminate 
poverty altogether) and to enhance the coping capacity to the risks of a 
sudden drop in income, favouring the development of a more inclusive 
society that promotes equal access to opportunities.
A key consideration that needs to be borne in mind when 
implementing comprehensive social protection systems is to ensure that 
they are sustainable financially and over time. One of the biggest criticisms 
levelled at the concept of protection as a citizen guarantee is that it could 
jeopardize the fiscal ability to defray its cost. Each country must therefore 
define the quantity and quality of the social protection components that 
it considers important to guarantee, in keeping with its own financial 
capacity. This leads to the establishment of a system of incremental 
guarantees, access to which must continue to be universal. In compliance 
with the ICESCR, preference is given to ensuring a minimum level for all 
(accessed through the State and/or the market), rather than high levels for 
just a handful of people with no protection for the rest.
The functions described above, which are rights-based, can be used 
to define standards and explicit guarantees of security in each area that 
can be translated into concrete instruments. While these instruments 
can be geared to meeting the specific needs of certain population groups, 
including people living in poverty or extreme poverty and highly 
vulnerable groups such as indigenous peoples, in principle they are 
available to all citizens.
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C.  Axes of social protection integration 
Conceptually, the comprehensiveness of social protection systems can be 
considered from two standpoints: that of policies, plans and programmes 
(supply) and that of individuals, families and communities (demand). 
As regards the supply of policies and programmes, there are two axes of 
integration that should be given special consideration during the design, 
implementation and operation of social protection systems: horizontal 
(or sectoral) integration and vertical integration (according to the 
administrative levels at which policies and programmes are implemented) 
(see diagram IV.2).
Diagram IV.2 






































Source: Prepared by the authors.
The horizontal axis represents coordination between the different 
sectors of social policy action (such as social development, work, health and 
education), which has become necessary as a result of the role played by 
social protection policies in forging links with sectoral and social promotion 
policies (such as education and health or labour-intermediation services 
and active labour market policies). The vertical axis represents coordination 
between the different administrative levels (from central level down to 
States, provinces or departments (depending on the country) and, lastly, 
municipalities) and may or may not incorporate components of coordination 
with other stakeholders (private sector and civil society). With regard to 
the vertical axis, there has been a signicant increase in the participation of 
different jurisdictions in the region’s policy formulation and implementation 
as a result of institutional reforms leading to greater decentralization 
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and regionalization (Franco, 2010; Martínez Nogueira, 2010; Ramírez 
and Peñaloza, 2007) (see the case of Colombia in box  IV.1). However, the 
importance of the different levels of jurisdiction varies greatly depending 
on country size and the actual degree of decentralization achieved.
Box IV.1 
CHALLENGES OF INTEGRATING COLOMBIA’S SOCIAL POLICY
The Colombian experience provides a good example of the challenges 
in integrating social policy across different administrative levels (Zapata, 
2009). In Colombia, every department and each municipality within it has the 
autonomy to define its own social programmes alongside national policies, 
allocating own funds and prioritizing social investment in line with its own 
specific needs and interests. Wide capacity disparities between the various 
departments and municipalities, coupled with differing visions by authorities 
at the two levels, can lead to completely different situations from one area to 
another. For instance, the department of Antioquia has successfully pursued 
its own social plans and programmes focusing on housing and food security, 
by deploying a policy strategy based on the principle of universality and on 
the development of a social policy institutional framework that has even 
transcended changes in national government (Zapata, 2009). Departments 
in a totally opposite situation include Santander and Cundinamarca, 
which are both more dependent on national funding and where there are 
marked disparities between the municipalities within them, forcing these 
departments to target investment and prioritize the poorest areas.
Although the flexibility with which these Colombian departments operate 
is auspicious in terms of tailoring social policy to the requirements of citizens 
of a local area, there are obvious challenges in terms of vertical and horizontal 
coordination. According to Zapata (2009), there are few linkages between 
peer institutions (municipalities). In addition, policies defined at central 
level (sectoral policies) and those defined at local level are not coordinated 
seamlessly. Cunill (2008) also points to a deficit in the linkage between 
social programmes and services. Even though programmes such as co-
responsibility transfer programmes are gradually incorporating a rights-based 
approach providing guaranteed access to social services, they are not always 
available in practice because local social services have little or no funding.
Source: N. Cunill, “Contraloría y derechos sociales: el desafío de la igualdad”, Gestión y 
política pública, vol. XVIII, No. 1, 2008; J. Zapata, “Coordinación y gestión territorial de la 
política social en Colombia”, Políticas sociales series, No. 148 (LC/L.3101-P), Santiago, 
Chile, Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 2009. 
United Nations publication, Sales No. S.09.II.G.83.
Social protection systems must also ensure that social policies and 
programmes —coordinated with one another in the two dimensions 
described— meet in full the requirements identified after analysing 
demand from individuals, families and communities. To do this, they 
must take into account the needs of both “crosswise” integration and 
“longitudinal” integration (see diagram IV.2). Crosswise integration relates 
to the requirement to provide and coordinate differentiated benefits to 
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meet the differing social protection and promotion needs of extremely 
heterogeneous population groups. These groups may be defined in 
different ways, depending on such factors as area of residence, income, 
activity, type of employment or ethnicity. Crosswise integration therefore 
refers to the incorporation of families into social protection system 
through participation in various specific programmes, as well as to the 
management aspects associated with building the institutional capability 
to coordinate such interventions across sectors. In the case of poor families, 
this type of integration has been promoted fairly successfully through a 
number of co-responsibility transfer programmes (CTPs).
Longitudinal integration takes into account the requirements that 
arise throughout the life cycle of individuals and families —from early 
childhood to old age— and draws attention to the need to follow social 
protection interventions through the various programmes. This gives 
prominence to the pathways by which families and individuals reinforce 
their rights and their ability to access areas of contributory social protection 
or, where this is not possible, non-contributory social protection mechanisms 
to cover these needs with differentiated actions tailored to their profile.
So, for a protection system to be truly comprehensive there must be 
a sustainable linkage over time between demand and supply, as well as 
between the axes in which demand and supply are integrated.
D.  Social protection: universal rights tailored  
to people’s differing needs
The conclusion to be drawn from the above points is that there needs to 
be an inclusive social protection policy catering simultaneously to: people 
in a situation of poverty who require guaranteed income and access to 
promotion mechanisms; people who, while not poor, are vulnerable and 
require policies of continuous insurance; and people who are more self-
reliant but who believe that a guaranteed minimum level of protection —
in conjunction with public and private  insurance mechanisms— provides 
a common basis for social citizenship. By being guaranteed for all citizens, 
these minimum levels are universal and establish a framework in which 
citizens not only demand and consume services, they are also holders and 
subjects of rights, with the capacity to demand that these rights be realized.
From a rights-based perspective, inclusive social protection therefore 
relies on an appropriate combination of universal social policy, which 
includes the provision of compensatory protection, and an economic policy 
that addresses social objectives explicitly (ECLAC, 2008a, p. 35; Mesa-Lago, 
2000; Barrientos and Santibáñez, 2009), in addition to interventions that 
incorporate different population groups and build capacity to overcome 
the risk situations to which they are vulnerable (Serrano, 2005). This type 
of social protection does not set ceilings for protection or insurance but, 
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rather, incremental minimum levels that can be extended in accordance 
with the social and fiscal covenants established by each society.
From the perspective of crosswise integration (see diagram IV.2), the 
fact that the social protection requirements of the various population groups 
differ both qualitatively and quantitatively means that protection must 
be tailored to this diversity in order to realize their economic, social and 
cultural rights.3 A key challenge is therefore to meet each group’s specific 
requirements to reduce their vulnerability, particularly where they have 
little self-reliance, while at the same time protecting the system’s financial 
sustainability in line with each country’s budgetary constraints (see VI.B).
Box  IV.2 describes an interesting case for analysis (which has 
also been the subject of harsh criticism) because of its implications for 
differentiated responses to the social protection needs of different poor 
and vulnerable population groups: the reform of Argentina’s Unemployed 
Heads of Household programme, following recovery from the crisis that 
had prompted its implementation (Pautassi and Zibecchi, 2010).
Box IV.2 
ARGENTINA’S UNEMPLOYED HEADS OF HOUSEHOLD PROGRAMME: 
DIFFERENTIATION OF POPULATION GROUPS BY EMPLOYABILITY
The Unemployed Heads of Household programme was implemented 
by merging a number of workfare programmes to address the economic, 
political and social crisis that struck Argentina in late 2001. Signs of recovery 
in around 2004 made it necessary to seek differentiated social policy 
solutions for the heterogeneous population group that was receiving benefits 
under the programme (Golbert, 2004).
Based on the profile of programme beneficiaries, it was found that they 
could be ordered into four groups according to their likelihood of finding 
a job (depending on their employment history, current status in terms of 
educational capital and age group, and other factors), for which three sets 
of differentiated policy solutions were established. Training and Employment 
Insurance was introduced for those best placed to find employment (young 
people with a medium to high level of education and some job skills) and 
was modelled on traditional temporary unemployment insurance (Golbert, 
2004). This was supplemented by formal re-employment measures through 
employment agencies and sectoral agreements. 
3 For example, the protection requirements of a street child will differ from those of an 
adult covered by formal insurance mechanisms who suffers an industrial accident. 
While the street child requires increased access to human capital formation systems, 
along with care and income guarantees to help raise his or her living standards to an 
agreed minimum and enable the child to accumulate long-term assets, in the case of the 
adult, the State will assume the role of regulating the operation of the pledged social 
insurance instruments, where necessary supplementing income and other assets to 
guarantee minimum social protection levels.
(continued)
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Those who were deemed to have major problems but some chance 
of returning to the labour market (young adults and older adults with low 
educational capital and no skills) were considered for entitlement to Training 
and Employment Insurance but with an emphasis on re-employment 
measures, especially job training. The Families for Social Inclusion programme 
was set up for the third group of people, classed as “unemployable” and 
“socially vulnerable” (comprising mainly women with care duties in the home). 
The measures for the first two groups remained under the Ministry of Labour, 
Employment and Social Security (MTEySS), while those for the third group 
were transferred to the Ministry of Social Development (MDS).
Although this experience was confined to a specific period in time, 
it reflects the intention to design differentiated strategies geared to the 
specific needs of different groups. However, doubts were raised about the 
appropriateness of the specific solutions offered and the opportunities open to 
each group. First, there was criticism of the designation used by the Ministry of 
Labour, Employment and Social Security to classify programme beneficiaries 
as “employable” or “unemployable” because it might serve to entrench a 
set of socio-economic differences historically produced and reproduced by 
inequitable and non-inclusive social structures (Campos, Faur and Pautassi, 
2007). Second, there were misgivings that the “unemployable” category 
comprised mainly women of childbearing age with dependent children, which 
tended to divide exits from the programme along gender lines. Third, the fact 
that the solution for the “unemployable” group entailed a requirement to meet 
certain conditions, unlike the solutions offered to the other two groups, was a 
matter of concern from a rights standpoint. Campos, Faur and Pautassi (2007) 
stress that this discriminates against poor women in that it fails to ensure equal 
opportunities for inclusion through employment and job training programmes.
Against this background, in late 2009 the Government announced that it 
was establishing a new co-responsibility transfer programme, the Universal 
Child Allowance for Social Protection (AUH), to cover vulnerable families 
with children under the age of 18 and no other source of social protection 
(especially those where the head of household is unemployed or employed 
in the informal sector).
Source: L. Campos, E. Faur and L. Pautassi, Programa familias por la inclusión 
social. Entre el discurso de derechos y la práctica asistencial, Buenos Aires, Center 
for Legal and Social Studies (CELS), 2007; L. Golbert, “¿Derecho a la inclusión o 
paz social? Plan Jefas y Jefes de Hogar Desocupados”, Políticas sociales series, 
No. 84 (LC/L.2092-P/E), Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean 
(ECLAC), 2004 United Nations publication, Sales No. S.04.II.G.30; Organization of 
American States (OAS)/Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean 
(ECLAC)/International Labour Organization (ILO), Protección social y generación de 
empleo: análisis de experiencias derivadas de programas de transferencias monetarias 
con corresponsabilidad, LC/W.398, Santiago, Chile, May 2011; L. Pautassi and C. 
Zibecchi, “Límites y desafíos en la superación de la pobreza infantil en el marco de 
los programas de transferencias condicionadas in Argentina. Una aproximación desde 
los protagonistas”, Políticas sociales series, No. 159 (LC/L.3198-P/E), Santiago, Chile, 
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 2010. United 
Nations publication, Sales No. S.10.II.G.10.
Box IV.2 (concluded)
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Below is an analysis of some of the dimensions considered 
crucial to guiding an inclusive social protection system catering to a 
heterogeneous population.
1. Poverty and vulnerability
The diversity of social protection needs is evident from the coping 
capacity of different population groups, which is lower among those in 
poverty and higher, albeit precarious, among those who are vulnerable 
to poverty. It is possible to differentiate between people living in poverty 
or extreme poverty based on their income and consumption capacity, 
identifying minimum income levels for each of these cases. Moreover, 
there are differences between the chronic poor and the transient poor, 
based on the period of time during which individuals have experienced 
“significant capability deprivations” and where they stand in relation to 
the poverty line (Hulme and Shepherd, 2003, p. 405). However, a particular 
obstacle to estimating and identifying those in the region who are in a 
situation of chronic or transient poverty and, on that basis, developing 
strategies appropriate to each context, is the lack of panel surveys to 
improve understanding of the socio-economic changes experienced by 
families over time (see box IV.3).
In all these groups, the risk may trigger a further decline in their 
living standards, pushing into extreme poverty people who are already 
under the poverty line, or into chronic poverty those in a situation of 
transient poverty (see diagram IV.3).4 Similarly, for households that have 
only recently escaped from poverty or whose income lifts them slightly 
above the poverty line, a critical event can be enough to tip them back 
below the line. Such households are referred to as vulnerable to poverty 
(ECLAC, 2010a). Finally, a group of less vulnerable households can be 
identified, either because they have more assets and/or revenue streams or 
because they have better access to contributory insurance schemes. They 
are referred to as self-reliant non-poor households.
4 Mexico has been developing a working methodology for characterizing multidimensional 
poverty that adopts a similar analytical framework (see Cortés, 2010). The methodology 
focuses on characterizing the population according to two sets of dimensions: their level 
of income (or welfare) and the realization of their social rights (levels of deprivation 
in six dimensions: education, health, social security, housing, basic services and food). 
Cross-referencing the two sets of dimensions allows population groups to be defined 
according to their degree of vulnerability: the income-vulnerable group, which is 
subdivided into the moderately poor and extremely poor; and the socially vulnerable 
group. These dimensions are applied to different population groups (according to 




PANEL SURVEYS IN LATIN AMERICA
Panel surveys are used to track a number of families over time, exploring 
the causes and consequences of their successive entries into and exits from 
poverty over a given period. Despite the usefulness of panel surveys, most 
Latin American countries are not yet using them.
When Chile began to conduct panel surveys in 2001, it identified high 
mobility around the poverty line in the country in two periods (1996-2001 
and 2001-2006), which had not been revealed by cross-sectional data. It 
was found that around half of those living in poverty in 1996 had exited by 
2001. In contrast, 9.7% of those who were not poor in 1996 had become 
poor by 2001. At the same time, 7 out of 10 people who were poor in 2001 
were no longer poor by 2006. In the 2001-2006 period, 23.5% of Chile’s 
population was living in poverty. Even though the National Socio-economic 
Survey (CASEN) indicated that poverty had declined by nearly 10 percentage 
points between 1996 and 2006, in actual fact a total of 3 out of 10 people 
entered transient poverty at some time during that period, pointing to high 
vulnerability among the population. Another qualitative finding was that most 
of those who were poor during all three panel waves (chronic poverty) were 
women and children under the age of 15 in 1996. Despite these findings, the 
panel has been implemented in only four regions of Chile so far.
Argentina’s Permanent Household Survey (EPH) is conducted by the 
National Institute of Statistics and Censuses (INDEC) three times a year 
and covers 28 urban centres. It has a short rotating-panel design in which 
each household remains in the survey for four waves, totalling 18 months. 
In Mexico, the National Survey of Household Living Standards (ENNVIH) has 
implemented a panel survey since 2002.
Peru is the only country in the region to have incorporated ongoing panel 
surveys into its National Household Survey (ENAHO), conducted by the 
National Institute of Statistics and Informatics (INEI). The samples have been 
included in the Permanent Employment Survey of Metropolitan Lima, held 
since 2001. The ENAHO has included fixed panel surveys with a partial time 
overlap since 1996.
Source: Prepared by the authors on the basis of information from the National Survey 
of Household Living Standards (ENNVIH), 2010; National Institute of Statistics and 
Informatics (INEI), 2010; Ministry of Planning of Chile (MIDEPLAN), Gestión de calidad 
en las redes locales de servicios, Santiago, Chile, Executive Secretariat of Chile’s 
Intersectoral Social Protection System, 2009; Social Observatory of the Alberto Hurtado 
University (OSUAH), “Minuta. La Encuesta Panel CASEN 1996, 2001, 2006: primera 
fase de análisis”, Fundación para la Superación de la Pobreza, Ministry of Planning of 
Chile [online] http://www.mideplan.cl/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=
235&Itemid=9, 2007 and L. Gasparini, M. Marchionni and W. Sosa, “Characterization 
of inequality changes through microeconometric decompositions: the case of greater 
Buenos Aires”, La Plata, Universidad Nacional de La Plata, unpublished, 2002.
Apart from the above criteria, it is also possible to identify 
population groups that are in a special situation of structural impairment 
as a result of spatial segregation dynamics, discrimination or other forms 
of social exclusion that can lead to lower asset availability at certain times 
of life or throughout a person’s a lifetime (World Bank, 2005; Filgueira, 
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2007). Ethnicity, disability or the fact of living in a rural or deprived urban 
area can undermine the coping capacity of individuals and families, 
which necessitates the development of appropriate strategies within social 
protection schemes. This entails identifying the unequal risks facing 
different groups and analysing them based on available instruments. 
Other particularly vulnerable groups are migrants and people displaced 
by violence or armed conicts.
Diagram IV.3 
POPULATION GROUPS AND RISK
Poverty line
Extreme poverty line
They have been unable to 
develop sufficient assets 
over time to cope with 
short-term risks.
Chronic poor: they always 
receive a low return on their 
productive activities. They 
may or may not have been 
vulnerable in the past.
Without protection 
mechanisms they may sink 
into chronic poverty.
Transient poor: they have 
insufficient assets, resources 
or opportunities to cope with 
a risk situation and fall below 
the poverty line.
Vulnerable non-poor: a critical event can tip 
them below the poverty or extreme poverty line 
into transient or chronic poverty.
Self-reliant non-poor: they can mobilize more 
assets to cope with risk and have greater ability 
to access the social opportunity structure.
Source: Prepared by the authors on the basis of Economic Commission for Latin America and the 
Caribbean (ECLAC), Social Panorama of Latin America 2009 (LC/G.2423-P), Santiago, Chile, 2010. United 
Nations publication, Sales No. E.09.II.G.135.
Providing differentiated social protection does not contravene the 
principle of universality of rights; on the contrary, it can enhance the 
exercise of rights and reduce inequality. So, targeting social protection 
services at those most vulnerable (or positive discrimination) may be an 
appropriate way to move incrementally towards the universalization of 
economic, social and cultural rights, as part of a process of progressive 
realization of rights based on individual countries’ level of development 
and budget availability (United Nations, 2009a). Targeting is therefore 
seen as a means for advancing towards universal access, where it is crucial 
to focus on minimizing errors of exclusion (failing to provide benets to 
families or individuals in the target population), rather than on errors of 
inclusion (granting benets to those who are not in the target population) 
(United Nations, 2009a).
128 ECLAC
2. Formal and informal employment
A further dimension that needs to be borne in mind when analysing 
the diversity of people’s needs and their social protection requirements is 
work and employment. Special consideration should be given both to the 
duality of a labour market that separates formal and informal sectors (see 
II.A) and to population dynamics and the technological and social changes 
that are altering it, in turn placing new demands on social protection.
It would seem necessary to broaden the old approach of protection 
based solely on formal employment (see I.B) to include people who are 
outside the formal sector temporarily or permanently, either because they 
work in the informal sector of the economy or in the formal sector without 
a contract, or because they play different roles within the structure of 
the care economy.5 Therefore, to ensure universal access to protection, 
available instruments and public provision must be tailored to meeting 
the requirements arising from differing needs.
Although there are wide disparities between countries, half 
the region’s employed workers are not affiliated to social security (see 
diagram II.1 and table 4 of the statistical annex). Similarly, in urban areas, 
an average of one third of the region’s workers are covered for retirement 
or other pensions, which, when broken down by country, ranges from 
double that figure to half (see table II.1). This shows how much contributory 
social protection coverage varies, posing different challenges for different 
countries and economic sectors.
It should therefore be borne in mind that contributory social 
protection coverage is linked not only to the existence of employment 
contracts, but also to the type of coverage provided by such contracts. 
Lack of a contract is closely associated with poor-quality employment 
and informal work, comprising the majority of workers without 
social protection, and is concentrated among the poorest sector of the 
population, which is the customary target population for non-contributory 
social protection programmes. Unpaid family workers are classed as 
employed in the informal sector, as they work under the wing of the head 
of household’s productive activity, with no protection at all. Addressing 
the situation of unpaid family workers requires support for formalizing 
production units combined with access to a non-contributory scheme.
5 According to the ILO (2006 and 2007b), informal activities can coexist in both low-
productivity and high-productivity sectors, and the informal employment sector 
includes workers whose employment relationship is not subject to national labour laws, 
income tax, social protection or specific job-related benefits, whether they work in firms 
in the formal sector or the informal sector, or in households.
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Contracts that do not provide social protection coverage are more 
likely to be filled by workers belonging to the middle class. This population 
sector is sufficiently self-reliant to cover its own needs in periods of 
economic growth but is highly vulnerable to crises and loss of employment 
and has no access to pension systems to ensure an adequate retirement 
income. So, although their protection requirements may be somewhat less 
urgent than those of informal workers, the fact that their only independent 
means of protection is voluntary individual savings means that they also 
require the support of protection systems to help them to mitigate the 
impact of crises and to fund their retirement in old age.
3. Families, life cycle and demographic change
The unit of intervention for implementing social protection should 
be defined on the basis of the heterogeneity of the population. The most 
basic unit should continue to be the person, although this can be accessed 
either directly as an individual or as a family member. Although the latter 
option does not always ensure that social protection services are delivered 
equitably among members, it does maximize the synergies and economies 
of scale that exist within a family. Thus, inclusive social protection takes 
a family-oriented approach, as it offers an ideal space in which to build 
social capital (Barrientos and Santibáñez, 2009, p. 11; ECLAC, 2010a) and 
has the ability to break the intergenerational transmission of poverty. 
However, it does not preclude the use of larger spaces of intervention, such 
as specific human settlements (e.g. the neighbourhood), the community 
(indigenous or other) or other groupings that allow the distribution of 
goods and services. While the synergies and cohesion can be even greater 
in larger spaces, the risks of dispersion and poor targeting also increase.
As mentioned earlier, another important consideration when 
implementing the proposed comprehensive approach is that there must 
also be a system for delivering differentiated responses throughout the 
human life cycle (Barrientos and Santibáñez, 2009; Serrano, 2005), in order 
to meet the differing needs that arise at different stages of development 
of individuals and families. This axis of integration is referred to as 
longitudinal integration (see diagram IV.2).
To consider the specific needs of each member of a family group 
at his or her particular stage of life it is first necessary to recognize that 
such needs exist and that they differ. While children and adolescents 
require care and access to education and health services, adults require 
employment and income protection and promotion, while older adults 
require income protection, by means of retirement or other pensions 
and care and health services. So, each household and each family needs 
a different set of social protection services depending on its composition. 
Moreover, these needs are not static but change constantly, not only as 
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people progress through the life cycle but also as the family structure and 
its members’ respective roles change. In this respect, the current speed of 
demographic change poses new challenges.
Another important consideration is that poverty is not evenly 
distributed among age groups. According to recent ECLAC studies (2010a, 
2010b), there is a marked trend towards a higher incidence of extreme 
poverty, poverty and vulnerability among children and adolescents. Older 
adults are more likely to belong to the “self-reliant non-poor” in most 
countries in the region, particularly those that introduced social security 
systems early (Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay) and those where this age 
group is better covered by pension, retirement and health insurance 
regimes (ECLAC, 2010b).
Nevertheless, many people experience greater vulnerability when 
they become older adults, particularly those who have spent their working 
lives in the middle-income bracket and have had no access to sustainable 
social protection systems to provide them with an adequate retirement 
pension. This is compounded by changes in family structure: on the one 
hand there is a steady increase in the number of nuclear families that 
divest themselves of older adults and, on the other hand, the period of 
dependence when young adults live at home with their parents is growing, 
extending the period during which older adults have dependents even 
though their direct incomes and retirement or other pensions are not 
sufcient to even support themselves under proper economic conditions.6
Changes in family structure and the diversity of families that now 
make up society in countries in the region, including traditional nuclear 
families, extended families (comprising three or four generations), single-
parent families, single-person households of economically active adults, 
single-person and two-person households of inactive older adults and 
residential care homes (Arriagada, 2007) are altering demand for social 
protection.7 Each of these family types poses specic challenges that go 
far beyond the classical “breadwinner” model, where one family member 
is employed (usually the man) and extended social protection is provided 
through benets from social insurance and pension schemes.
On the other hand, the demographic dividend, where birth rates 
are reducing the proportion of dependent children in the total population, 
represents a window of opportunity because it modies and temporarily 
reduces demand for social protection. However, the process is of limited 
6 The reasons for young people choosing to postpone leaving the nest can be fear of 
greater (real or perceived) vulnerability or a change in their need for independence.
7 The nuclear family refers to the most conventional type of family structure, consisting of 
two parents and their offspring. Single-parent families are those where only one of the 
parents is present. Families with a woman head of household working outside the home 
are termed single-person households of economically active adults (Arriagada, 2007).
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duration owing to steadily declining mortality rates, which increases life 
expectancy and hence the number of dependent older adults. Even though 
several countries in the region have progressed with social protection 
policies designed to meet this demand, the future scenario is complicated 
by the higher cost of providing older adults with social protection for an 
ever greater number of years as life expectancy increases and by greater 
diversity, particularly in the areas of health, care and recreation. It is 
therefore vital to take advantage of this window of opportunity opened 
by the demographic dividend to establish adequate protection provision in 
the coming decades (see box IV.4).
Box IV.4 
LIFE CYCLE, DEMOGRAPHIC PATTERNS AND VULNERABILITY:  
CHALLENGES FOR SOCIAL PROTECTION
The vast majority of Latin American countries are reaping the benefits 
of the so-called “demographic dividend”. This is a result of changes in 
the age structure of the region’s population, where the relative weight of 
the population aged between 0 and 14 years diminishes while the adult 
population increases at an even higher rate than the older adult population 
(ECLAC, 2009a, p. 143). Accordingly, the overall fertility rate fell from 5.9 
children per women in the 1950-1955 period to 2.4 children per woman 
in the 2005-2010 period. By the 2045-2050 period, the overall fertility rate 
is projected to have fallen below the replacement rate, to 1.9 children per 
woman (ECLAC, 2009a, p. 140). At the same time, by 2045-2050 average 
life expectancy is projected to have risen to nearly 80 years and the child 
mortality rate to have fallen to 7.9 in every 1,000 births.
The demographic dividend is conducive to development and poverty 
reduction owing to sustained growth in the working-age (and potentially 
economically active) population, falling birth rates, which are pushing 
dependency ratios to a historic low, and rising per capita income (ECLAC 
2010a, chapter 3, p. 6). Estimates indicate that, between 2001 and 2040, 
the dependency ratio will remain at less than two dependents for every three 
people of working age (ECLAC 2009a, p. 142).
The demographic dividend therefore brings opportunities which, if used 
wisely, would increase possibilities for savings and investment in economic 
growth and social development. For example, a decline in the region’s 
younger population (which Wolf and Gurría (2005 in ECLAC, 2009a) expect 
to shrink from 67.8 million in 2000 to 63.2 million in 2015) will allow for 
increased investment in access to primary education, a prediction that is 
already being borne out in the region.
However, this dividend will not last indefinitely. By 2015, the 
dependency rate is expected to have begun to climb gradually as a result of 
population ageing (ECLAC, 2010a, chapter 3, p. 136). This is compounded 
by poverty-related risk among children in the under-15 age group and the 




According to ECLAC data (2010a, 2010b), the incidence of poverty in the 
0-14 age group is far greater than in the adult population, a trend that has 
worsened in the past two decades. In 2008, the incidence of poverty in the 
0-14 age segment in countries like Argentina, Brazil, Panama and Uruguay 
was twice that of adults (ECLAC, 2010b, p. 195). This creates a complex 
scenario in terms of intergenerational transmission of poverty and raises 
doubts about the covenants underpinning current State and civil-society 
support to families for the care, skill development and protection of children 
(ECLAC, 2010b).
This has led to the suggestion that, to harness the opportunities afforded 
by the demographic dividend, as well as to reduce future health and 
productivity costs arising from child poverty, malnutrition, infant mortality 
and illiteracy, it is crucial to implement cash transfer policies, as well as to 
boost investment in nutrition and education.
In addition, population ageing inevitably creates pressure on social 
security spending. The challenge is further complicated by the fact that people 
who are extremely poor or highly vulnerable to extreme poverty have very 
little access to retirement or other pensions (in most countries in the region, 
the proportion is only around 5% or less). At the same time, social security 
coverage (the percentage of employed workers paying contributions) is under 
40% (ECLAC, 2006, p. 45). In view of this trend, ECLAC (2010b, pp. 201-202) 
estimated the impact that a transfer equal to the poverty-line value might have 
on reducing poverty among those aged 65 and over. If this transfer were to be 
targeted at all over-65s living in vulnerable households, it would cost between 
0.3% of Brazil’s gross domestic product (GDP) and 4.2% of the GDP of the 
Plurinational State of Bolivia. It would reduce poverty by 5 percentage points 
in Ecuador and Paraguay and by at least 0.6% in Brazil. If the transfer were to 
be targeted at everyone aged 65 and over, the measure could cost up to an 
additional 3% of GDP (ECLAC, 2010b, pp. 201-202).
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Social 
Panorama of Latin America, 2009 (LC/G.2423-P), Santiago, Chile. United Nations 
publication, Sales No. E.09.II.G.135, 2010; Time for equality: Closing gaps, opening trails 
(LC/G.2432(SES.33/3)), Santiago, Chile, May 2010; Social Panorama of Latin America, 
2008 (LC/G.2402-P), Santiago, Chile, 2009. United Nations publication, Sales No. E.08.
II.G.89.
a  This figure refers to the percentage of households with a member aged 65 or over 
receiving a retirement or other pension, by income level, in around 2007 (ECLAC, 
2010b, p. 216). In 10 of the region’s 18 countries, this percentage is around 5% or 
under in households living in a situation of extreme poverty or high vulnerability to 
extreme poverty.
4. Care provision
An issue of particular relevance to the social protection of children, 
older adults and sick or disabled people, who have only recently begun to 
receive greater attention within comprehensive social protection schemes, 
is the social structure of care, which shows an unequal distribution 
Box IV.4 (concluded)
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of responsibilities within the family and cuts across all social policy 
dimensions and components.
ECLAC (2010a) has stressed the need to consider the effects of 
the “care crisis” that has emerged at a juncture when patterns of paid 
employment and unpaid domestic work are shifting. Whereas the sexual 
division of labour in the household and gender-based segmentation in the 
labour market remain firmly entrenched, demand for care is increasing (as 
a result of demographic transition in Latin America), while at the same 
time the proportion of people available to provide such care (up to now, 
mainly women) is decreasing. In the main, it is low-income women who 
are hardest hit by the combined impact of a heavy burden of domestic 
work and increased demand for care, while at the same time they are 
entering a labour market where jobs are unstable (ECLAC, 2010a).
These dynamics place specific demands on the region’s emergent 
social protection systems in terms of access to social services and care 
policies. For social protection, addressing the changes triggered by the care 
crisis entails considering the assistance needs of individuals and families 
in terms of care for the dependent population (children and older adults) 
and occasional care, by expanding public coverage and cash transfers 
(ECLAC, 2010a).
E. Social protection components and instruments
After reviewing the objectives and characteristics of a rights-based social 
protection system, this section goes on to discuss the lines of policy and 
programme intervention that shape such a system. As stated earlier, the 
functions of social protection are to guarantee a sufficient income to 
sustain a decent quality of life, facilitate access to social and promotion 
services and foster decent work (see IV.B). It is possible to identify 
three key social protection components that fulfil these functions: 
non-contributory social protection (commonly referred to as social 
assistance); contributory social protection (known as social security) 
(ECLAC, 2006 and 2010b; Cetrángolo and Goldschmit, 2009) and labour 
market regulation. These components aim, to varying degrees, to cover 
the heterogeneous social protection requirements of the aforementioned 
population groups (see diagram IV.4).8
8 These three components of social protection are also identified in Barrientos and Hulme 
(2008) and Barrientos and Santibáñez (2009).
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Diagram IV.4 
SOCIAL PROTECTION COMPONENTS AND INSTRUMENTS
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Source: Prepared by the authors.
As diagram  IV.4 shows, a variety of instruments can be 
distinguished in each social protection component, which in turn can be 
combined to form a range of alternatives. Indeed, it is by their interaction 
—rather than individually— that these instruments contribute to realizing 
the rights underpinning the notion of inclusive social protection.
As the notion of protection has been linked historically with social 
security, this is the component that has been studied the most extensively 
and has been included in a variety of pension schemes and health and 
welfare systems in Latin America (Bertranou, 2008; J. Martínez, 2008a, 
2008b; Mesa-Lago, 2004a, 2008, 2009). Meanwhile, non-contributory social 
protection, which is associated more closely with mitigating poverty risks, 
has received less attention and, in recent years, has often been identied 
with CTPs (León, 2008; Mesa-Lago, 2009). Labour market regulation 
has only recently begun to be included in the social protection debate 
in relation to concrete lines of action for Governments (Espinoza, 2003; 
OECD, 2009; ILO, 2008d).
1. Non-contributory social protection
Non-contributory social protection can be dened as a set of transfer 
and public subsidy programmes, normally nanced from general tax 
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revenue (Bertranou, Solorio and van Ginneken, 2002) under the principle 
of solidarity. Its benefits are unrelated to previous contributions (ECLAC, 
2006; Cetrángolo and Goldschmit, 2010).
These programmes are often targeted at those living in extreme 
poverty, poverty and vulnerability, to meet the most basic needs of 
individuals and households, providing a minimum income to those 
living in poverty or halting the decline in the incomes and consumption 
capacity of those in vulnerable situations (Grosh and others, 2008). At 
the same time, they play a key role of liaison and facilitating access 
to social policies and services and to social promotion policies and 
services for human capital formation. Their interventions are aimed 
mainly at transferring resources or building assets and preventing their 
loss, as well as promoting resource and asset accumulation. However, 
non-contributory social protection may also be universal in nature, 
as exemplified by general food or energy subsidies and some social 
pensions or the proposed universal (or “citizen’s”) basic income, for 
instance (see box IV.5).
Box IV.5 
A UNIVERSAL (OR “CITIZEN’S”) BASIC INCOME
In Latin America, the debate on the possibility of introducing the concept 
of income transfers as a universal right to a basic income, with citizenship 
as the only eligibility criterion, began in Brazil in the 1970s. It gained further 
prominence in the 1990s, when proponents stressed its potential to further 
the realization of social rights and remedy the inefficiency of some social 
programmes (Godoy, 2004). Senator Suplicy’s 1991 draft Minimum Income 
Warranty Programme (PGRM) proposed to provide an income to anyone 
with an income below a certain threshold (45,000 Brazilian cruzeiros). Since 
then, proposals for a universal (or “citizen’s) basic income (Isuani, 2006) have 
continued and gained momentum over time, spreading to other countries in 
the region.
A number of authors (Standing, 2007; Suplicy, 2009; Suplicy, no date) 
confirm the feasibility of a non-conditional universal cash transfer such 
as the basic income and its potential for enhancing people’s citizenship, 
dignity and freedom. Not only would a basic income do away with the 
paternalistic approach where aid is conditional upon certain consumption 
patterns, it would also remedy the segmentation and stigmatization 
associated with mechanisms designed specifically for the extremely 
poor, while removing the costs and bureaucratic problems of targeting 
and verifying compliance with conditionalities. In addition, a permanent 
income such as this would allow people to start up a productive enterprise 
without fear of forfeiting the benefit as their earnings increase. This basic 
income therefore “makes work worth the effort” (Suplicy, 2009, p. 30) and 




According to this proposal, the amount of the basic income should 
be estimated on the basis of a set of basic needs that a person must 
meet in order to live decently (Isuani, 2006). This is a major problem in 
itself, as the precise method of defining this set of needs is in dispute. 
However, assuming that society agreed on this point, the next step would 
be to determine how to finance a regular benefit of this sort. One of the 
funding sources proposed by Suplicy (2009) in the case of Brazil is a tax 
on natural resource extraction, much like that of Alaska, where, since 1982, 
all Alaskan inhabitants have received an equal dividend financed 50% from 
oil royalties.
The main objections to the basic income proposal are its cost, the 
difficulty in achieving the necessary political consensus and the possibility 
of it creating dependency among beneficiaries (Bertranou, Solorio and van 
Ginneken, 2002). Another aspect little explored in literature is the potential 
of such an across-the-board injection of resources to cause inflationary 
economic cycles, which could reduce or even neutralize the positive impact 
of this resource injection, particularly in rural sectors or small urban areas 
with limited capacity for growth and competitiveness in the supply of goods 
and services.
Source: F. Bertranou, C. Solorio and W. van Ginneken (eds.), Pensiones no contributivas 
y asistenciales. Argentina, Brasil, Chile, Costa Rica y Uruguay, Santiago, Chile, 
International Labour Organization (ILO), 2002; L. Godoy, “Programas de renta mínima 
vinculada a la educación: las becas escolares en Brasil”, Políticas sociales series, 
No. 99 (LC/L.2217-P), Santiago, Chile, Economic Commission for Latin America and 
the Caribbean (ECLAC), 2004. United Nations publication, Sales No. S.04.II.G.137. E. 
Isuani, “Importancia y posibilidades de un ingreso ciudadano”, Universalismo básico. 
Una nueva política social para América Latina, C. Molina (ed.), Washington, D.C., Inter-
American Development Bank (IDB), 2006; G. Standing, “Conditional cash transfers: 
why targeting and conditionalities could fail”, One Pager, No. 47, Brasilia, International 
Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth (IPC-IG), December, 2007; E. Suplicy, Renta básica 
de ciudadanía: la respuesta dada por el viento, Brasilia, Senado Federal, 2009; “De la 
renta mínima a la renta básica en Brasil: la reciente evolución de un instrumento de 
combate a la pobreza y a la desigualdad” [online] http://www.ingresociudadano.org/ 
Publicaciones/RB.Brasil.pdf.
The main instruments of non-contributory social protection include: 
(i)  cash transfers, as in CTPs and social pensions; (ii)  transfers in kind; 
(iii)  consumer subsidies (e.g. for energy or water), which are frequently 
introduced to cope with emergencies stemming from high inflation rates 
or high prices on specific goods; (iv) workfare programmes, which, while 
they can also be seen as an active labour market policy, play a primary role 
in protecting income in times of high unemployment; and (v) promotion 
mechanisms via existing social services, including a range of educational 
scholarships and specialized bonuses designed to protect the poorest 
and most vulnerable sectors and ensure their access to human capital 
formation systems (see table IV.1).
Box IV.4 (concluded)
Inclusive Social Protection in Latin America: A Comprehensive... 137
Table IV.1 
NON-CONTRIBUTORY SOCIAL PROTECTION INSTRUMENTS
Instruments Criteria Areas covered Examples
Cash 
transfers




Access to the full 
range of social 
services, benefits 





Child Allowance for Social 
Protection (AUH) established 
in Argentina in October 
2009, which delivers a non-
contributory benefit to families 
with children whose members 
are unemployed or working in 
the informal economy
Social pensions: Mexico’s “70 
and over” pension programme 
implemented by the Federal 
Government since 2007, 
which provides economic and 
social promotion support to 
older adults living in towns of 
fewer than 30,000 inhabitants
Transfers in 
kind
Targeted in line 
with income level or 
category: territorial 
unit, stage of life cycle 
(children, older adults, 
etc.), specific causes 
of vulnerability (e.g. 
women, indigenous 
peoples)
Food Emergency food aid 
programmes (Nicaragua): 
daily delivery of food for six 




Granted mainly to 
poor and vulnerable 
households, although 






Subsidy on electricity and fuel 
gas for lower-income users 
of services distributed via 
the physical grid (Colombia), 
financed through the Solidarity 
Fund for Subsidies and 
Income Redistribution (FSSRI)
Workfare Unemployed heads of 
household
Unskilled workers
Incomes Employment in Action 
(Colombia): supplements 
the incomes of those in 
the poorest 20% of the 
population through temporary 
employment schemes 





Targeted mainly at 
poor households, 
although in some 









Source: Prepared by the authors.
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As a result of limited access to contributory social protection 
through the formal labour market, one instrument of non-contributory 
social protection being incorporated increasingly into Latin American 
social protection schemes —apart from the CTPs mentioned earlier (see 
chapter III)— is the social pension.9 Although pensions have traditionally 
been included in the wider set of social security policies, in that they are 
closely linked with the contributions paid during an employee’s working 
life, it has become necessary to introduce non-contributory (or “solidarity”) 
pensions owing to the duality of the production and employment structure 
and the weakness of contributory social protection (cf.  Bertranou, 2008; 
ECLAC, 2006, 2008a; Filgueira, 2007; Ribe, Robalino and Walker, 2010; Sojo, 
2009, 2003). Social pensions are transfers (defined benefits) for old age or 
disability, which the State provides to those who have not worked in the 
formal labour market or who have paid no contributions during their 
working lives. They consist of a solidarity benefit paid for by society as a 
whole, as they are usually funded from general, consumer or income taxes 
(ECLAC 2010a, p.  108; Uthoff, 2006, p.  29). Furthermore, they are pay-as-
you go (PAYG) pensions, that is to say, they are funded from taxes on the 
current generation of people.
In some countries, social pensions also cover the risk of illness 
and may become a vehicle for other benefits (such as family allowances) 
(Bertranou, 2008). Countries with social pensions include Argentina, 
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Cuba, Mexico, Panama, Plurinational State of Bolivia and Uruguay 
(Barrientos and Hinojosa-Valencia, 2009; Bertranou, Solorio and van 
Ginneken, 2002; ECLAC, 2010a, p.  165). Social pensions can be either 
universal (as with the Plurinational State of Bolivia’s Dignity Income) or 
targeted in line with criteria such as income or specific categories (for 
example, pensions for war veterans or victims of human rights violations, 
as in Argentina and Chile).
The implementation of non-contributory pensions calls for an 
analysis of their complementarity with the contributory pension systems 
discussed in the next section. There are misgivings about their ability to 
operate in conjunction, in that generous non-contributory benefits could 
act as a disincentive to paying contributions, which in turn could affect 
the long-term funding of minimum pensions (Filgueira, 2007).10 Another 
9 According to Kidd (2008), social pensions should be considered as contributory, in 
the sense that all citizens have contributed to funding them to varying degrees. Kidd 
says that one of the main advantages of social pensions is that they induce families to 
invest more in child care and education, in the knowledge that the parents will have a 
guaranteed old-age pension.
10 Uthoff (2006, p. 29) believes that the private sector should be included as a key player 
in the design of any pension solidarity pillar, planning a system of voluntary top-up 
savings for anyone seeking higher benefits than those guaranteed by the State.
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concern is that non-contributory pensions may, in the long term, be used 
as a way to avoid discussing labour market reforms that would improve 
the contributory structure from the private sector (Levy, 2009). It is also 
possible to identify mixed (semi-contributory) models that are based on 
a worker’s history of contributions but where a significant portion of the 
benefits are non-contributory (Bertranou, Solorio and van Ginneken, 2002). 
However, given that the region’s employment structure is marked by high 
levels of informality and insecurity, non-contributory instruments are 
clearly key to reducing inequality and preventing the exclusion of vast 
sectors of the population.
2. Contributory social protection
Traditionally, contributory social protection (social security) includes 
all programmes designed to provide workers and their dependents with 
current and future insurance to enable them to maintain a minimum 
quality of life during their active and inactive stages of life, for example in 
times of unemployment, retirement, illness or disability. This component 
also includes health insurance, the set of maternity-related benefits and 
safeguards and, in some cases, other benefits, such as family allowances.11 
Basically they are contributory benefits, although the contribution amount 
may vary significantly —and may or may not be offset by non-contributory 
State contributions— depending on workers’ socio-economic status and 
their length of time in the formal labour market.
This component encompasses a wide variety of instruments 
(including insurance, security plans and other forms of contribution), 
stakeholders (private, public and mixed) and areas covered (access to 
health systems, pension schemes and unemployment, disability and 
survivors’ insurance). According to Mesa-Lago (2008), the two most 
important social security programmes —based on the number of affiliates 
and beneficiaries and the percentage of investment involved— are old age, 
disability and survivors’ pensions and maternity/paternity, sickness and 
health care benefits.12
11 In recent years some countries have begun to provide non-contributory family 
allowances. One such is Uruguay, where family allowances have been incorporated into 
its Equity Plan (see II.F).
12 There is often confusion between the concepts of pension and retirement. Retirement 
refers to the action of a person claiming a benefit upon ceasing their work activity. 
Retirement benefits can be defined as deferred payment for work performed in the past, 
based on a system of contributions to a social security fund managed by the State or the 
private sector (ECLAC, 2010a, p. 98). A pension includes a set of benefits that may or 
may not provide a direct return to the employee and that may be contributory or non-
contributory (referred to in this book as “social pensions”). The use of both terms varies 
among countries in the region. Pensions may be based on contributory mechanisms (such 
as dependants’ pensions and old-age pensions funded by the spouse’s contributions) 
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A number of organizations and authors have pointed to the weakness 
of contributory social security systems in Latin America (Bertranou, 2008; 
ECLAC, 2006, 2008a; Filgueira, 2007; Sojo, 2009, 2003) and, to remedy this, 
increasing attention is being paid to various types of non-contributory 
social protection. The issue of expanding access to unemployment and 
health protection mechanisms should also be given urgent consideration, 
as social protection analysis has focused little on it to date.
In recent years, countries such as Argentina, the Bolivarian Republic 
of Venezuela, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay have implemented a series of 
unemployment insurance reforms aimed at supporting redundant workers 
in finding work, while protecting income levels in the event of dismissal. 
The reforms are designed to improve the efficiency and coverage of 
unemployment insurance and boost affiliates’ access to a set of active 
labour market policies (including training and labour intermediation). 
Apart from unemployment insurance, a number of associated instruments 
are important in protecting workers in the event of redundancy, including 
severance pay (which operates as a disincentive to dismissal), individual 
savings accounts (allowing workers to accumulate cash resources while 
they are employed), notice of termination (prior notification of dismissal 
in order to prevent sharp falls in income) and early retirement benefits 
(Bertranou and Paz, 2007; Velásquez, 2010).
Thus, strategies must be developed to extend coverage in every area 
of social security to groups that are particularly hard to reach. Among 
such groups, Mesa-Lago (2009) identifies those working in the informal 
sector or on their own account in urban areas and, in particular, rural 
areas. The inequalities created by the structure of care, which affect 
women disproportionately, should be addressed with special urgency.13 
As for indigenous peoples, in a number of Latin American countries they 
or on compensation between private agents (such as alimony and child support), or 
else they may be solidarity- or welfare-based or both (ECLAC, 2010a). For example, 
Chile has created a privatized “system of old-age, disability and survivors’ pensions” 
based on pre-funded individual accounts (article 1 of Decree Law No. 3500), which is 
administered by entities called “pension fund managers” (AFPs). The system defines 
old-age and disability pensions and survivors’ pensions for the children and spouse 
of the person affiliated to the system. In Mexico, there is the Pension and Retirement 
Regime (RPJ) (Mexican Social Security Institute, 2009).
13 According to Mesa-Lago (2009, p. 229), in around 2000-2003, women had lower social 
insurance coverage than men in 8 of 14 countries; only in Costa Rica and Uruguay did 
they have higher coverage. In the case of health, women are often at a disadvantage 
compared with men in terms of the length of time they are covered by health insurance 
schemes, having lost coverage during the years they spent outside the labour market 
to undertake care work, while health coverage as dependents of their male spouse is 
often indirect and, in some countries, impartial and likely to be forfeited in the event 
of a divorce or abandonment (Mesa-Lago, 2009). The costs of private health services 
are higher for women and, in the public system, women and their children have to pay 
higher user fees because they use the services more often.
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are almost totally excluded from social security schemes (Patrinos and 
Skoufias, 2007; León, 2008; Mesa-Lago, 2009, pp.  238-239). The ongoing 
challenge is to explore ways of incorporating these groups into current 
social protection schemes.
3. Labour market regulation
The third component of social protection is labour market regulation. 
This is a particularly sensitive area that has received little attention in the 
debate on social protection, in a region where formal sector employment is 
in short supply and there are many deep-seated problems in expanding it.
Labour market regulation refers to the protection of workers’ 
individual and collective rights and plays a key role in reducing and 
mitigating the risks associated with unemployment and the decent work 
deficit (Barrientos and Hulme, 2008). This component of social protection 
encompasses a set of regulations and standards designed to promote and 
protect decent work, that is to say, work in conditions of freedom, social 
justice, security and human dignity (ILO, 2008d). This set of regulations 
includes those aimed at formalizing contractual relations, guaranteeing 
rights to form and join trade unions and to occupational safety, regulations 
and prohibitions on child and adolescent labour and regulations on 
employment and the minimum wage (World Bank, 2001b), as well as 
regulations to prevent discrimination at work, especially against women. 
The existence of this set of regulations is crucial to overcoming the risks 
that contributory and non-contributory social protection policies seek to 
resolve. Indeed, in a region marked by persistent structures of inequality, 
it is essential to focus more attention on incorporating employment 
discrimination measures to boost the labour force participation of women, 
indigenous peoples and other vulnerable groups (ECLAC, 2010a).
It is therefore critical to address the issue of informal-sector and 
own-account workers. As Bertranou and Saravia (2009) point out, own-
account work is particularly complex to conceptualize and measure. 
Some argue that own-account workers are fulfilling a personal desire for 
entrepreneurship and believe that many own-account workers engage in 
informal employment of their own volition (IDB, 2004). In contrast, others 
hold that own-account work is mainly the result of situations of crisis 
or severe vulnerability to poverty and that the great majority of own-
account work and self-employment is associated with inadequate working 
conditions and protection (ECLAC, 2009a). While benefits for own-account 
workers have been seen as a key element in guaranteeing rights, they 
are also a factor inhibiting growth of the formal employment sector by 
erecting major budget-related barriers that hinder the formalization of 
employment relationships, particularly in smaller firms.
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This not only points to a need to develop appropriate strategies for 
protecting unemployed and informal-sector workers against risks and for 
guaranteeing them a minimum income, it also shows what an important 
role labour and labour market regulation policies play in social protection. 
While Ribe, Robalino and Walker (2010) call for the development of systems 
for labour market risk management, authors like Bertranou (2009) and 
Uthoff (2006) stress the importance for social protection of strengthening 
labour market regulation.
Bertranou and Saravia (2009) echo Tokman (2001) and Daza (2008) in 
acknowledging the need to distinguish between informality and illegality, 
arguing that illegality and non-compliance with labour regulations is 
just as much a feature of the formal sector as it is of the informal sector. 
The first step is to increase compliance with these regulations, labour law 
and workers’ rights. This is an area where social protection systems can 
play a coordinating role between the entities directly in charge of labour 
matters (ministries of labour, welfare and social security, as the case may 
be) and those responsible for designing social policies, by strengthening 
the necessary link between the two. At the same time, it is necessary to 
identify the dynamics of labour market exclusion and of protection benefits 
associated with formal employment (Bertranou and Saravia, 2009, p. 14).
The challenge lies in determining which institutions and management 
processes should be used to implement this component. Weller (2008, 
p. 21), describes labour-market institutions as “mechanisms with differing 
degrees of formality that establish the rules of behaviour for participants 
in the labour market”. The ultimate goal of labour-market institutions is to 
generate high-quality employment by means of labour market regulation, 
unemployment protection systems and active labour market policies (which 
are not part of social protection per se). To achieve this goal, institutions must 
meet two objectives: “they must ensure an efficiently functioning labour 
market, i.e. the optimal allocation of resources, and they must guarantee 
protection and support for the weakest players in a market characterized by 
structural inequalities among participants” (Weller, 2008).
All this calls for regulations on the implementation of certain 
standards and for monitoring compliance with labour regulations, 
a process that requires the extensive participation of the institutions 
responsible for defining social protection instruments and programmes.
F. Institutions and social protection
As mentioned in the introduction, the State plays a key role in social 
protection provision, although this does not mean that it is the sole 
provider. The market, families and civic and community organizations 
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also provide protection and any comprehensive social protection system 
must take into account the interactions among these different stakeholders. 
At the same time, to maintain the coherence of social protection policies 
there needs to be coordination among the various State institutions, as 
well as information systems for monitoring their actions and oversight 
and conflict-resolution mechanisms.
1. Institutional coordination
Compartmentalized thinking on social protection in the region 
has resulted in lead institutions belonging to separate sectors, depending 
on the approach or component developed and/or implemented by each 
institution (see II.C). For instance, non-contributory social protection 
programmes are often managed by public social development institutions 
(such as ministries of social development, social investment funds 
or specialized programmes). Responsibility for contributory social 
protection, as it relates to retirement or other pensions, tends to fall to 
specialized organizations (such as social security institutes, retirement 
and pension fund managers or insurance companies), or else ministries of 
health or other organizations for matters relating to the health of workers 
and their families (public funds, insurance companies). Responsibility 
for labour market regulation normally lies with ministries of labour 
(with more or less autonomous agencies specializing in oversight, such 
as regulatory authorities or prosecutor’s offices) and the judiciary (labour 
courts). In some cases, the Treasury or ministries of finance and specialist 
development agencies play a role —to the extent that their guidance to 
the productive apparatus enhances or constrains the development of 
workers’ rights— as well as ministries of education, housing and other 
matters. In all these components, there is clear involvement by public and 
private organizations, the importance and authority of which varies from 
country to country.
The participation of such an assortment of entities in social 
protection design and implementation also reflects the wide-ranging 
dimensions of the poverty and vulnerability problems that social 
protection seeks to address. Their individual specialism can be seen as an 
asset for guaranteeing quality and matching people’s specific needs more 
closely. However, for economic, social and cultural rights be exercised to 
the full, it is essential to promote a management model that maximizes 
the efficiency and effectiveness of the various components through 
the synergy of a cross-sector approach. In other words, if the issue is 
multidimensional and the population heterogeneous, there needs to be a 
varied and coordinated supply of cross-sector interventions, which this 
book terms the axis of “horizontal integration” (see diagram IV.2).
144 ECLAC
The challenge is how to move forward from rhetoric on the 
importance of cross-sector coordination to actually linking actors together. 
There is no single solution for achieving this, although one prerequisite 
is to share a future vision of society and, hence, of “the priorities and 
chronological sequence as part of a medium- to long-term strategic action” 
(Acuña, 2010, p.  1). As regards improving the political conditions for 
progressing towards better social protection, Repetto (2010a) states that “at 
the very least, it requires a basic consensus on the strategic direction that 
a society should take in order to get to the crux of the ‘social issue’, that 
is to say, which social problems should be prioritized and which political 
and symbolic capital in the social protection system should be invested”. 
Repetto adds that it is at this level of the political and cultural dispute that 
“the real (not just discursive) substance of a comprehensiveness designed 
to address the multidimensionality of social problems, as well as a rights-
based approach, comes into play”.
The lesson learned from the most successful cases is that not only 
is it important to move gradually towards expanding social protection 
for all citizens, it is also crucial to progressively build political and social 
consensus. Another lesson learned is that the introduction of universal 
social protection models and instruments relies on the cumulative effect of 
social policy experiences.
Accordingly, a number of basic elements appear to be key to the 
successful implementation of a cross-sector approach:
(i) Policy coordination at the highest level.
(ii) Participatory analysis and design of policies and their 
components, procedures and challenges. This must be based 
on a clear overview of the characteristics of the population 
and their current and future demands and needs, as well as 
of supply, areas of intervention, products, coverage, installed 
capacity and projections.
(iii) Establishment of formal working bodies and responsibilities, 
by means of clear agreements on participation, the designation 
of interlocutors and specialist focal points for specic issues and 
the denition of each party’s functions, including objectives 
and roles.
(iv) Clearly established and agreed communication channels and 
ways for resolving doubts and differences.
(v) Joint evaluation and analysis bodies dened from the design 
stage.
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The organizational structure required in each country depends 
on its own particular institutional framework; it is pointless to hold up a 
single role model, as the structure must always be tailored to the specific 
environmental conditions of that country. Some of the options used so 
far include the formation of fronts or consortia of lead ministries and 
institutions, the formal establishment of coordinating ministries and the 
creation of task forces at various administrative levels (central, regional 
and local).
Repetto (2010b, pp. 33, 35) identifies three different levels of policy 
coordination and linkages to achieve comprehensiveness: macro, meso 
and micro. The macro level relates to the definition of social policy and its 
general guidelines, which is embodied, for example, by “social cabinets”. 
The meso level refers to a specific field of social policy (such as education 
policy) or a combination of sectors guided by a common purpose, which 
apply to social protection systems. The micro level refers to specific 
programmes that require the coordination of different sectors. Repetto 
emphasizes how successful CTPs have been at the micro level, adding that 
this is this level where such interventions face the least problems, unlike 
the macro and meso levels.14
Similarly, this book proposes to discuss coordination according 
to the notions of horizontal and vertical integration (see section  IV.C), 
based on the location of the various bodies on the technical and policy 
axis. Three levels can be identified, none of which can stand alone without 
the other two. The first is the policy level, at the pinnacle of the State 
organizational structure, namely the Office of the President, ministries 
and departments responsible for prioritizing and designing social 
policies, including those of social protection analysed in this book, such 
as the aforementioned social cabinets and the coordinating ministries. The 
second is the technical level, which brings together those responsible for 
implementing policies in the form of specific programmes and projects, 
usually senior managers and professionals in ministries, programme 
technical secretariats, subnational entities, local government associations 
and others. This level includes agencies in charge of CTPs and social 
security institutions. The third is the operational level and brings together 
actors responsible for implementing programmes and projects at local 
level, interacting directly with the target population, which are therefore 
14 Repetto (2010b) explains that such interventions are less problematic because they act 
as an incentive to different administrative levels as, politically, they are valued greatly 
by the upper echelons (i.e., the Office of the President, the Treasury, or the ministry of 
economy or finance). Also, despite being important in terms of visibility and coverage, 
they do not require the involvement of the full range of interventions in each sector. 
A final factor in their favour is that most co-responsibility transfer programmes have 
their own resources and fairly well defined operating rules for promoting coordination 
among various bodies.
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also in charge of coordinating with demand; in many cases they are joined 
by private organizations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and 
others, multiplying the number of actors involved. Other major players at 
the operational level are beneciary selection and registration instruments 
and service coordination initiatives, such as the one-stop shop, which 
are not necessarily conned to social protection programmes but, on 
the contrary, may encompass a range of different social services and, in 
conjunction, are synergistic in terms of effectiveness and/or efciency.
A prerequisite for the success of any comprehensive system is 
therefore to have coordinating bodies at every level. Technical coordination 
is not feasible without the support of the political authorities responsible 
for the sectors and institutions involved and, in many cases, securing this 
support requires extensive negotiations. At the same time, agreement 
on objectives, responsibilities, communication mechanisms and other 
matters is not enough if it is endorsed only at the highest political level. 
The greatest constraints often arise in the intermediate structures of 
organizations, which are the ones that really need to be coordinated and 
where different working rationales and cultures must be adapted in order 
to share information and knowledge and to work in a coordinated fashion 
towards common goals, without neglecting responsibilities to their own 
organization. The experience of social cabinets, CTPs and beneciary 
information systems provides a promising basis for building inter-agency 
coordination in the region, although this is not without risks and will 
require a special effort.
Finally, as regards the implementation of a comprehensive social 
protection policy and its institutional challenges, it is not just the rules 
and explicit written procedures that are important, but also the informal 
rules and the practices and historical ties between stakeholders; leadership 
and political will also play a pivotal role (Repetto, 2010b). In this respect, 
perhaps one of the biggest challenges facing a comprehensive social 
protection policy in terms of its institutionalization is to create synergies 
between political support, technical capabilities and available resources. 
Crucial to this are proposals to develop framework agreements for 
social policy access, funding and solidarity by means of scal and social 
protection covenants encompassed within the concept of entitlement to 
rights, as suggested by ECLAC (2006, 2008a).
2. Management information
None of the above social protection proposals can be implemented 
with a minimum of effectiveness, efciency and transparency in the 
absence of proper information systems for monitoring management and 
impact assessments. Moreover, for any information system intended to 
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make a comprehensive analysis and evaluation of the management of 
social policy in general and social protection policies in particular, a further 
step is required: the information derived from monitoring programmes 
must be supplemented with information on the corresponding social 
investment, with specic indicators on people’s social status, disaggregated 
by geographic area and administrative level, to enable the various 
components to be linked reliably (Martínez and Collinao, 2010).
The management performance indicators should come from 
beneciary registration and monitoring systems, process assessments and 
impact assessments of specic programmes and projects, in all of which 
areas the region has made great progress but where major challenges 
remain. Progress with social protection is ascertained by means of data 
from censuses, household surveys, specialized surveys and administrative 
records, and this must be coordinated on the basis of each country’s 
conceptual framework and policy components. While partial data is 
available in most countries, it needs to be further systematized and 
coordinated with management indicators.
For more than two decades there have been moves in the region to 
include monitoring and evaluation systems in social policy management. 
Chief among the various methodology-development initiatives are the 
cost-impact analysis developed by ECLAC for selecting the option that 
maximizes the impact at the lowest possible cost (Cohen and Franco, 2006b, 
2005; Cohen and Martínez, 2004) and the performance-based management 
models tailored to social programmes promoted by the Inter-American 
Development Bank (IDB), World Bank and international cooperation 
agencies. National Governments are also evincing growing concern 
about the issue and have developed systems for evaluating government 
programmes, performance-based programming and management 
improvement awards.15
In the specic eld of social protection programme evaluation, 
a milestone in the region for its wide-ranging analysis (González de la 
Rocha, 2010) is Mexico’s experience in evaluating its education, health 
and nutrition programme (formerly called Progresa and now renamed 
Oportunidades), with assessments by the International Food Policy 
Research Institute (IFPRI) (Adato, 2000) and the National Council of 
Evaluation of Social Development Policy (CONEVAL) since its inception 
in 2005 (CONEVAL, 2010). This is not the only experience as, albeit 
15  Examples of systems for evaluating government programmes include: the Management 
Evaluation and Control System of Chile’s Budgetary Affairs Bureau (DIPRES); the 
National System for Evaluation of the Results of Public Management (SINERGIA) of 
Colombia’s National Planning Department (DNP); and Mexico’s National Council of 
Evaluation of Social Development Policy (CONEVAL).
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differing in design, assessments have also been made of the following 
CTPs among others: the Social Protection Network (RPS) and Crisis 
Response System (SAC) in Nicaragua; the second tranche of the Family 
Allowance Programme (PRAF II) in Honduras; the Human Development 
Grant in Ecuador; the Bolsa Família conditional cash transfer programme, 
Bolsa Escola school grant and Bolsa Alimentação food grant in Brazil; 
Colombia’s Families in Action; Solidarity Chile; and Jamaica’s Programme 
of Advancement Through Health and Education (PATH) (Schady and 
Milazzo, no date; Fiszbein and Schady, 2009).
Despite the progress represented by these experiences, there are 
still some weaknesses to be remedied, especially with respect to the link 
between assessments and programme design. First, it is unclear how 
the results are incorporated as information for decision-making and for 
implementing modifications to programmes. Second, most of the reported 
results come from assessments of Mexican programmes, especially phase 
one of Progresa (Schady, 2006), which limits the ability to generalize the 
findings to other programmes.
Beneficiary selection and registration systems have been fairly 
well disseminated throughout the region, facilitating progress in the 
implementation of integrated information systems. Social investment 
data are compiled by countries themselves but there are wide conceptual 
and coverage disparities, which limits the ability to make comparisons. 
The challenge therefore is to implement a system where government 
finance statistics (GFS) and statistics from systems of national accounts 
(SNA) can be exploited jointly to take advantage of the functional 
classification approach of GFS and the greater disaggregation capacity 
of SNA, incorporating not only general government investment but 
also funds from other agents, particularly non-profit institutions and 
international agencies, as well as public funds that do not come from the 
central Government’s general budget but are owned by regional or local 
governments (Martínez and Collinao, 2010).16
3. Conflict management and resolution systems
The implementation of a rights-based social protection system 
requires a proper verification mechanism to ensure that such rights 
are actually realized and to make decision-making transparent. This 
16 In addition to the regular publication of official data in Social Panorama of Latin America, 
since 2006, ECLAC, with the support of the German Agency for International Cooperation 
(GIZ) and the Spanish Agency for International Development Cooperation (AECID), has 
been engaged in a methodology and technical assistance effort to enhance the analysis 
and use of social investment information for policy management. For more information, 
see the ECLAC social spending website: www.cepal.org/dds [Spanish only].
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mechanism must be present not only in programmes themselves, but also 
in any outside bodies where the public may request information, file a 
complaint if they feel their rights have been breached or settle disputes.
In addition to making management more effective and efficient, 
process supervision and monitoring systems make management more 
transparent to the public. For the proper use of such systems, it is also 
necessary to make explicit the management processes and decision-
making criteria used for target-population identification and beneficiary 
selection, as well as for service production, delivery and evaluation. 
Thus, the implementation of such systems and regular dissemination of 
management results are elements to be considered in this connection.
Placing an autonomous institution in charge of proper enforcement 
of service standards and quality allows disputes over breaches of 
established rights and standards to be resolved efficiently and effectively, 
guaranteeing the transparency of processes. Several countries in the 
region already have institutions of this nature, such as oversight offices, 
consumer protection services, civic watchdog organizations or regulatory 
authorities, making it easier to consider implementing them in social 
protection systems.
One example is Chile’s System of Universal Access with Explicit 
Guarantees (AUGE Plan), which has mechanisms that help to refine the 
balance between State commitments to gradual progress in the area of 
social rights and their technical and budgetary feasibility. The AUGE 
Plan encompasses a set of legally valid administrative mechanisms 
for assessing compliance with the guarantees, with a health regulator 
(Office of the Superintendent of Health) responsible for settling disputes 
between the system’s users and providers (public and private) (Red 
Salud, 2009). Nonetheless, complaints are filed before the judiciary when 
the aforementioned bodies fail to meet citizen demands. This makes it 
possible to move forward in resolving such claims (Drago, 2006), filtering 
out those which, by their very nature, require the intervention of higher 
judicial authorities.
It is also necessary to consider a third level in the judiciary that can 
settle disputes which other judicial authorities have been unable to resolve, 
so as to ensure compliance with rights. Abramovich (2009, p. 42) identifies 
the following decisive factors for such legal proceedings to produce 
results, although there are many more: “the constitutional interpretation 
of the obligations they create; the capacity of the relevant stakeholders to 
act in the interest of groups that are discriminated against or excluded; 
the physical, material and cultural accessibility of the courts; civil society’s 
power and degree of organization and its experience and technical 
capacity to make use of legal instruments; the greater willingness of 
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courts to deal with such issues; more open or closed procedural systems 
and the type of remedies or orders that judges are authorized to use; 
judge-selection mechanisms and the independence and impartiality of the 
courts with respect to the political power and to certain stakeholders in 
these cases; the level of development of social security systems and the 
ability of Government, Congress and State bureaucracies to meet demands 
for the benefits promised in legal texts”.
Despite the potential it offers for the realization of economic, 
social and cultural rights, prosecution also poses a number of risks and 
difficulties. Uprimny (2007) states that one such risk is overloading the 
justice system, together with the possible political prominence that judicial 
bodies may gain. There also remains a question of roles and areas of 
competence, particularly in financing (as well as social policy design), as 
the responsibility for deciding where to allocate public investment lies 
with the executive and legislative powers and not the judiciary (Basombrío, 
2009, p. 44). Added to this is the potentially high individual and social cost 
of prosecution based on rights-related universal benefits, which may lead 
to unenforceability of the regulations and/or the inability to meet the 
challenge in an economically sustainable manner. Furthermore, a gap in 
access to judicial dispute settlement may be foreseen, with the poorest and 
most vulnerable population sector facing the greatest constraints, both 
economic and cultural.
An intermediate instrument for quasi-judicial dispute resolution 
is the ombudsman. In Latin America, many complaints are referred to 
the ombudsman concerning rights linked directly to social protection 
citing an alleged violation of health, education or social security rights. 
There have also been a number of ombudsman’s reports and explicit 
recommendations on matters relating to social protection.17
Other bodies that play a key role in monitoring compliance with 
rights are non-judicial mechanisms, such as national independent and 
international human rights organizations, including the Human Rights 
Committee of the United Nations and the Inter-American Commission 
17 For example, based on requests received concerning the Universal Child Allowance for 
Social Protection (AUH), Argentina’s National Ombudsman made a recommendation 
to the Cabinet Chief to extend the scope of this allowance for the benefit of children 
and adolescents attending private schools with low fees whose families earn below the 
minimum wage, ending the exclusion from AUH entitlement for beneficiaries of other 
programmes (Decision  36/10: http://www.dpn.gob.ar/areas.php?id=01&ms=area5). 
Also, in the case of the Office of the National Ombudsman of the Republic of Colombia, 
there is a specific social security and health programme to safeguard the progressive 
realization of these rights in Colombia. For example, in 2001, the Ombudsman 
handed down a decision regarding problems detected in Colombia’s social insurance 
(Ombudsman’s decision N° 008: http://www.defensoria.org.co/red/anexos/pdf/02/ 
res/defensorial/defensorial8.pdf).
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on Human Rights (IACHR) of the Organization of American States (OAS). 
These bodies can help to channel citizen demands to the courts (United 
Nations, 2009a, p. 15).
As Artigas points out (2005, p. 22), the universality of rights-based 
benefits is not necessarily guaranteed by the individual cases in which 
judicial mechanisms and court rulings intervene, but rather it requires 
specific social and fiscal covenants that are binding on society as a whole. 
Without such covenants, it would be difficult to maintain a system based 
on guarantees. It follows that the more transparent, effective and efficient 
the first two mechanisms are, the less intensive the work assigned to the 
judiciary will be and the cheaper, clearer, closer at hand and easier to 
process the demands and claims will be for the public and the State (cf. 
also De Roux and Ramírez, 2004).
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Chapter V
Co-responsibility transfer programmes  
as a gateway into social protection
A. Introduction
This book refers throughout to co-responsibility transfer programmes 
(CTPs), considered as just one of a battery of tools used in social policy. It 
also sets out to show that, even though inclusive social protection does not 
begin and end with CTPs, they can be useful and effective because they 
are assigned with specific functions and objectives and clearly defined 
tasks and responsibilities. Nevertheless, the trend towards broadening the 
scope of CTPs, both quantitatively (by increasing the population covered or 
transfer amounts) and qualitatively (by matching benefits more closely to 
the target population or adding new benefits) is causing growing tensions.
Clearly CTPs are not infallible instruments to which a growing 
number of new benefits can be added —rather they must seek the best 
way of achieving the required synergies for conducting simultaneous 
interventions in different spheres. This has led to links being forged 
between CTPs and the rest of the poverty-reduction policy, as well as with 
other sectoral policies targeting poor and vulnerable groups (Cecchini and 
Madariaga, 2010). While CTPs may contribute to social protection, they 
should be viewed not as its only instrument but as part of a wider system.
In particular, we propose to consider CTPs as a “gateway” for the 
poorest and most vulnerable families and individuals into comprehensive 
social protection systems, in the light of the three functions assigned 
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to CTPs (see chapter  IV). The term “gateway” refers to the process for 
ensuring that a family’s or individual’s linkage with CTP activities enables 
them to access a new level of social protection.
1. Protecting and securing income
CTPs seek to ensure minimum social and economic conditions by 
providing an income to people traditionally excluded from the region’s 
social policy because they are not connected with the formal labour market 
and contributory social protection. CTPs have been effective in providing 
a non-contributory cash income to families living in poverty and extreme 
poverty, especially those with school-age children (ECLAC, 2010a).
Transfers can have a significant short-term impact on the income 
of beneficiary families, although amounts vary from one programme to 
another. In urban areas, the minimum per capita transfer may be close to 
1% of the extreme poverty-line value, while the most generous transfers 
can be as high as 73% of the extreme poverty line and 38% of the urban 
poverty line (Cecchini and Madariaga, 2010).
Supplying cash to poor families improves their productivity 
by endowing them with the means to improve their nutritional status 
and mobility. CTPs “have also placed more cash in the hands of poor 
communities, and this has encouraged the emergence of local markets and 
businesses supplying goods and services” in the poorest areas (ECLAC, 
2010b, p. 182). As they are instruments guaranteeing a basic income, CTPs 
can be seen as a key alternative for meeting the basic needs of those with 
insufficient self-reliance, as their graduation procedures are linked with 
the attainment of self-reliance and do not make graduation subject to 
funding or institutional constraints.
2. Identifying demand and ensuring access
CTPs are designed to improve the access of the poorest groups to 
social services and programmes and include the tools required to increase 
the supply of social services to meet rising demand, which facilitates the 
identification of needs and boosts local management, as the activities 
being promoted rely on the sectors involved working simultaneously 
with the relevant administrative bodies. While traditionally the aim 
has been to improve the access of children of beneficiary families to 
education services and the access of children and their mothers to health 
services, there is now a growing trend towards linking various kinds of 
service and programme to family members of different ages, ranging 
from counselling, educational talks and workshops on health and other 
matters to programmes for improving neighbourhood infrastructure 
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or housing (Cecchini and Madariaga, 2010). This can be observed in a 
variety of programmes, including type-1 CTPs (via the “complementary 
programmes” in the Bolsa Família conditional cash transfer programme, 
for instance), type-2 CTPs (Mexico’s Oportunidades programme) and type-3 
CTPs (Solidarity Chile and Colombia’s Juntos Network).
Of particular interest are CTPs offering free access to more inclusive 
health service schemes, such as the Solidarity Chile and Oportunidades 
programmes, which guarantee their beneficiaries access to a set of 
specific and defined benefits. Solidarity Chile allows them to participate 
in the National Health Fund (FONASA) where they receive free treatment 
for 56  illnesses (System of Universal Access with Explicit Guarantees 
(AUGE Plan), see box II.5), with guarantees and maximum waiting times 
for treatment, in addition to preferential access to other public health 
programmes. Through Oportunidades, Mexico offers 13  health services 
targeted at different household members.1
3. Fostering decent work
The aim of some CTPs is to contribute actively to the promotion 
of decent work, fostering the sustainability of poverty reduction in both 
the short and medium term, which can reduce beneficiaries’ vulnerability 
significantly (OAS/ECLAC/ILO, 2010). To this end, CTPs incorporate a 
variety of employment-linked instruments and strategies, such as job 
training, remedial primary and secondary education, direct or indirect 
job creation, promotion of self-employment and microbusinesses, and 
employment and labour intermediation services.
Examples are Brazil’s Next Step programme (also known as 
PlanSeQ, a sector vocational training plan for the beneficiaries of Bolsa 
Família), the Solidarity Chile Bonus Programme for Labour Recruitment 
and the registration of unemployed adults in job placement agencies in 
Trinidad and Tobago’s Targeted Conditional Cash Transfer Programme 
(OAS/ECLAC/ILO, 2010).
Owing to their multidimensional nature, their linkage with different 
sectors and programmes and the demands this places on the coherence of 
social policy-driven interventions, CTPs represent a concrete mechanism 
for integrating both demand for social protection (cross-wise and 
longitudinal integration) and supply (vertical and horizontal integration).
1 The services are as follows: basic sanitation; family planning; antenatal, delivery, 
postnatal and newborn care; nutritional and child growth monitoring; immunization; 
home management of diarrhoea; parasite treatment; management of acute respiratory 
diseases; prevention and control of pulmonary tuberculosis; prevention and control of 
high blood pressure and diabetes mellitus; accident prevention; and initial management 
of injuries.
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CTPs are therefore able to create synergies for the establishment of 
a minimum base from which to provide a set of interventions intended to 
protect individuals and families in the successive stages of the human life 
cycle, taking into consideration their own particular needs and ensuring 
the exercise of rights and social promotion. In conjunction, CTPs are able 
to coordinate the rest of public provision to meet the specific needs of 
poor families and facilitate capacity-building and self-reliance. In turn, 
this triggers appropriate responses from relevant public services in terms 
of both social protection and social promotion. Participation in CTPs 
and any graduation strategies implemented should also seek to forge 
the necessary links between beneficiaries and other social protection 
programmes and policies.
Below is an analysis of the important role CTPs can play in 
integrating non-contributory social protection programmes and policies. 
Some of the requirements to be met and the remaining challenges in 
these areas are examined, with particular regard to ensuring the overall 
coherence of the CTP intervention model, not only in the performance of 
CTP functions, but also in terms of inter-agency coordination.
B. Integration to address heterogeneous demand  
for social protection
As already mentioned, the target population of social protection, in 
particular CTP beneficiary families living in poverty and extreme poverty, 
is far from a homogeneous and readily identifiable group and its members’ 
needs and deprivations vary.2 They stem from a vast assortment of cultural, 
age, spatial, economic, gender and other factors and give rise to just as 
disparate an array of survival and crisis-coping responses developed 
by these groups to address the structural constraints they face, as well as 
situations exacerbating these constraints as a result of various disruptions.
1. Cross-wise integration: meeting the needs  
of different population groups
Through the cross-wise axis of integration, CTPs can provide highly 
diverse population groups with access to a varied supply of public services 
for improving and protecting welfare levels, building assets and forging 
links with specific activities to enable them to exercise their economic, 
social and cultural rights and so foster their social inclusion. The first 
stage in this process is to identify the needs of beneficiary families so that 
2 See Kaztman’s seminal study (1989) on stratification of the poor population in the 
Montevideo metropolitan area (Uruguay).
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they may be met with benefits tailored to their specific situation. This 
entails promoting the development of appropriate responses by public 
programmes and services and organizing interventions on the basis of an 
intersectoral platform.
CTP instruments that contribute to achieving these aims include 
family support and follow-up components, which, to a greater or lesser 
degree, have improved feedback on the needs and aspirations of beneficiary 
families. Interesting examples of CTPs in this area are Solidarity Chile 
and Colombia’s Juntos Network for overcoming Extreme Poverty (Juntos 
Network), which have incorporated into family support the verification of 
families’ specific needs and the status of local supply, ensuring a proper 
linkage between the two (see section E).
A complementary strategy is to establish differentiation criteria 
(in terms of benefits or CTP rules of operation) to address the particular 
characteristics of population groups within the universe of beneficiaries, 
such as place of residence (urban or rural) or ethnicity. For instance, El 
Salvador’s Solidarity in Rural Communities programme has an urban 
variant that provides not only the same benefits as in rural areas (health 
and education allowances), but also access to a Programme of Temporary 
Income Support (PATI) for improving the labour force participation of 
young people and female heads of household (Ávalos, 2010; FISDL, 2010). 
Whereas the basic utilities component of Solidarity in Rural Communities 
gives priority to the expansion of basic social infrastructure in rural areas, 
including drinking water, sanitation and electrification, the urban variant 
addresses problems specific to cities through programmes for violence 
prevention and neighbourhood improvement (integral improvement 
of urban informal settlements) (Ávalos, 2010; FISDL, 2010)). Mexico’s 
Oportunidades introduced a similar urban variant when, in 2009, it launched 
a pilot programme called Oportunidades Urbano, which will be extended to 
all cities nationwide. This new scheme implements different targeting rules, 
increases the amount of cash support, incorporates new transfers to reward 
school performance, tailors all health services to urban needs and imposes 
new conditionalities (Programa de Desarrollo Humano Oportunidades, 
2009). Oportunidades is considering introducing a management and care 
model that takes an ethnic approach, after the programme’s successive 
impact assessments showed that the existing model has less of an impact 
on indigenous communities (Robles, 2009). Other examples of CTPs with 
an ethnic approach are Colombia’s Families in Action programme (Robles, 
2009) and Panama’s Opportunities Network (SENAPAN, 2008).
The different types of CTP described in chapter III present specific 
challenges in terms of cross-wise integration. In the case of CTPs that select 
beneficiaries based on lack of income (type-1 CTPs), the fact that income 
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poverty tends to be dynamic and fluctuates widely between boom periods 
and economic recessions calls for the use of definitions that also incorporate 
the population group perceived as vulnerable to such fluctuations and not 
just those who are below the poverty line at a given point in time (ECLAC, 
2009a, chapter III). This poses yet more challenges to beneficiary-selection 
mechanisms, specifically the consideration of less restrictive cut-off points 
and their ability to capture variations. In the case of CTPs designed to 
resolve situations of acute social exclusion (type-3 CTP), a special effort 
should be made to find and adapt a variety of targeting methods by 
such means as indices and approaches that incorporate a broad notion of 
vulnerability and make it possible to identify population groups whose 
needs are invisible to traditional social policy mechanisms.
2. Longitudinal integration: meeting the needs of different 
stages in the human life-cycle 
Through the longitudinal axis of integration, CTPs can also play 
an important role in improving access to social protection and related 
services, in view of their experience in developing a life-cycle approach. 
To ensure that social protection tailored to the CTP target population is 
provided, special measures must be taken for recognizing specific needs at 
different stages in the life cycle of individuals and families.
Even though CTPs have focused primarily on families with 
children, which excludes working-age adults without children,3 some are 
taking measures to incorporate benefits extending to other age groups, 
particularly elders. Although such benefits can be found in Chile, the 
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El  Salvador, Jamaica, Mexico, Paraguay 
and Peru, lifelong protection ought to be extended still further, especially 
protection targeted at infants (Cecchini and Madariaga, 2010). Particular 
consideration should be given to the preschool age group in nutrition 
and education schemes, according high priority to long-term human 
development and social promotion (type-2 CTPs) in order to exploit the 
opportunities that exist at that stage of life (León, 2008; Villatoro, 2007) 
and to establish graduation criteria and strategies that consider the entire 
educational cycle (Villatoro, 2008). CTPs in the region that take a life-cycle 
approach include Chile’s PROTEGE social safety net,4 which includes 
health, housing, education, planning and employment services, and El 
Salvador’s Universal Social Protection System (SPSU).
3 Jamaica’s Programme of Advancement through Health and Education (PATH) is an 
exception in this respect, as it includes a transfer (a health benefit for unemployed poor 
adults aged between 18 and 64).
4 As part of its social safety net, Solidarity Chile helps families in extreme poverty to 
access the benefits associated with each stage of life, according to their members’ 
characteristics.
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C. Integrating the supply of social protection  
policies and programmes
Even though serious supply-side problems persist, CTPs play an important 
role in promoting cross-sector coordination (horizontal integration), 
as well as coordination activities by the different levels of government 
(vertical integration), helping to enhance the coherence of poverty 
reduction policies.
This is an essential means of improving the effectiveness and 
efficiency of social protection policies targeted at the poor and vulnerable 
sector of the population, in addition to generating positive externalities 
that permeate the whole of social policy. As CTPs, especially type-3 CTPs, 
are a gateway not only into social protection but also into wider social 
policy, their effectiveness in this area depends precisely on existing 
coordination capacity, especially at policy level. That is why a clear 
definition of the sphere of operation of CTPs and their interaction with 
other components in the social protection system and with basic social 
services is seen as vital.
1. Horizontal integration: strengthening  
cross-sector coordination
On the horizontal axis of integration, the multidimensional approach 
to poverty taken by CTPs and coordination of income- and consumption-
related interventions, as well as human capabilities, make it necessary 
to develop better linkages between the various social policy sectors. In 
particular, conditionalities requiring coordination with ministries of 
health and education act as an incentive for cross-sector collaboration, not 
only in programme-coordination systems or networks (type-3 CTPs) but 
also in type-1 and type-2 CTPs (see chapter III).
As mentioned earlier, there must be cross-sector collaboration at 
and between the different administrative levels, from central level (among 
ministries and departments) down to local level, as well as among the 
different sectors and actors operating at local level, in direct contact with 
beneficiaries or users. Such political coordination can be found in the work 
of the Executive Secretariat of the Solidarity Chile system, the Intersectoral 
Coordination Committee of the Dominican Republic’s Solidarity 
programme and the Interministerial Management Council of Brazil’s Bolsa 
Família programme. Moreover, the information systems on beneficiary 
selection and registration, such as Brazil’s single register for social 
programmes (CadÚnico), and the Dominican Republic’s Single System for 
the Identification of Beneficiaries (SIUBEN), are examples of the significant 
contribution made by CTPs to cross-sector linkages at operational level. 
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Their work is crucial to maintaining the flow of information and resources 
among the different actors, as well as to speeding up payments and 
suspending or cancelling benefits where applicable.
Even though a key aim of many CTPs has been to coordinate 
public interventions targeted at poor and extremely poor families, there 
is still no effective coordination between CTPs, on the one hand, and 
sectoral structures and their intervention mechanisms, on the other. 
There are major problems to be addressed in this area, not only because 
of the complexity and duplication of structures operating in the different 
public administration spheres, which could be solved by rationalization 
and more clearly defined procedures, but also because it is difficult 
to implement measures that do not always lead to net gains for the 
sectors as they may affect the control of their budget allocations or their 
operational and decision-making independence. Therefore the challenge 
lies in ensuring that the multisectoral nature of CTPs does not reduce 
social protection specificity as this would run the risk of fragmenting 
objectives and diluting priorities, limiting their potential impact and 
efficiency in the process.
Moreover, the cross-sector concept itself causes nebulous situations 
that need to be clarified. For instance, the sectoral components of 
interventions need to be maintained, as it is precisely in sectors like 
education, health and employment where there is greatest awareness 
of the public provision rationale and related demand for services and 
where the interventions required in each area are most clearly identified. 
However, it is also necessary to transcend sectoral rationales, owing to the 
multidimensional nature of CTP interventions, and to take action in areas 
that are difficult to influence, such as the historical practices used by the 
sectors, different levels of government and local actors, whose organizational 
cultures are not always consistent with programme objectives.
Another key aspect of horizontal integration is found at local level. 
As several authors have shown (Kaztman, 2001; Rodríguez and Arriagada, 
2004), historically it is at the local level where inequalities and barriers to 
integration have arisen and been structured, causing such phenomena 
as residential segregation, which makes territorial management one of 
the major challenges to integrating social protection (ECLAC, 2008b). 
This necessitates the creation of basic institutional conditions to enable 
CTPs to operate at local level in such areas as managing resources and an 
integrated supply of services.
Finally, organizational aspects specific to individual sectors 
and their different operating rationales pose another major challenge 
to horizontal integration. Not only must CTPs successfully link 
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beneficiaries with existing public programmes and services and ensure 
that they are suitable, the providers of these services must understand 
the CTP operating rationale, whose conceptual basis differs from that 
traditionally applied to non-contributory social protection programmes 
and public services (Cohen and Franco, 2006a; Nun and Trucco, 2008). 
The extent to which officials in the relevant services take ownership of 
a CTP’s operating rationale and the way in which they do so can impact 
heavily on the quality of such services, as well as on meeting specific 
objectives (see box V.1).
Box V.1 
PROBLEMS WITH SECTORS TAKING OWNERSHIP OF  
CO-RESPONSIBILITY TRANSFER PROGRAMMES 
Roberts (2006) shows that access by beneficiaries of Jamaica’s 
Programme of Advancement through Health and Education (PATH) to the 
health and education services stipulated as conditionalities has placed 
an extra workload on institutions, especially in relation to compliance-
monitoring mechanisms. The institutions running them view them as an extra 
burden unrelated to their core activities, causing a problem of “ownership” 
of the programme and its beneficiaries. In the case of Solidarity Chile, Nun 
and Trucco (2008) show that the programme’s intervention rationale faces 
problems in terms of unifying the interpretation of its guidelines and objectives 
among the many stakeholders (including sectors, municipalities and 
government agencies). This results in a poor perception of the programmes 
by beneficiaries, who are unable to absorb the fact that access to the services 
is a right and instead they see them as “handouts” or “benefits given to 
them by somebody (not the system)” (MIDEPLAN, 2009b). As a result, the 
“rights-based rationale” that is supposed to govern the programmes tends 
to be replaced by a welfare-type assistance or by the traditional guidelines 
that social policy implementers have always used, which can undermine the 
priority that ought to be given to “social promotion”.
Difficulties with ownership of programmes can pose a huge problem 
when service providers’ attitudes end up affecting demand for the services 
and compliance with the conditionalities. In the case of Solidarity Chile, for 
example, families graduating from the Puente programme have reported 
that service officials used “indecipherable language” that made it difficult for 
them to understand the information provided, that they were treated with 
scorn and disregard for their status as beneficiaries, and some families even 
pointed to explicit abuse by administrative officials (MIDEPLAN, 2009b).
Source: Ministry of Planning of Chile (MIDEPLAN), Trayectorias familiares al egreso 
del programa Puente, Santiago, de Chile, Executive Secretariat of the Intersectoral 
Social Protection System, 2009; E. Nun and D. Trucco, “Informe de sistematización 
de evaluaciones cualitativas del Programa Puente y sistema de protección Chile 
Solidario”, Revista latinoamericana de desarrollo humano [online] http://www. 
revistadesarrollohumano.org/temas125.asp, 2008; C. Roberts, “Seguimiento del 
desempeño: Jamaica”, paper presented at the Third International Conference on 
Conditional Cash Transfers, Istanbul, 26-30 June, 2006.
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2. Vertical integration: strengthening coordination 
between management levels
In terms of vertical integration, CTPs have established budgetary 
procedures and rules for resource transferral to different management 
levels and have defined shared responsibilities and specific functions and 
powers, making them a valuable asset for developing a comprehensive 
system such as the one proposed in this book.
A noteworthy example is Bolsa Família (see box V.2), owing to the 
importance accorded by the programme to decentralized management and 
the creation of voluntary “agreed decentralization” mechanisms that abide 
by the constitutional principle of autonomous organization of States and 
municipalities (Cunha, 2009). Another example worthy of note is Solidarity 
Chile, which has grown and developed steadily from a single nationwide, 
centrally implemented model of programme supply management to a 
social protection system that can be reproduced effectively at local level 
(Salinas, 2007). To do this, it had to define strict responsibilities and develop 
appropriate skills and competencies at the different levels to ensure that 
each level supports the one immediately following it (Toro, 2009).
Box V.2 
VERTICAL INTEGRATION IN BRAZIL’S BOLSA FAMÍLIA PROGRAMME
From the outset, Bolsa Família has operated on the basis of 
administrative decentralization between Brazil’s central Government 
and municipalities (Hevia, 2009b), with a number of mechanisms being 
established to enhance the programme’s implementation at national, federal, 
State and municipal levels. The programme regulations (Decree No.  5209 
of 17 September 2004) stipulate that its implementation and management 
require the combined efforts of the various levels of government, as well 
as a cross-sector approach, social oversight and transparency. To this 
end, working agreements were signed with Brazilian municipalities without 
political distinction, in order to prevent bias in the allocation of benefits. As 
regards transparency mechanisms, it was decided to reorganize the single 
register for social programmes (CadÚnico) and hand over its administration 
to an independent financial institution (Hevia, 2009b).
With regard to decentralization, the municipalities are directly responsible 
for managing the programme and CadÚnico locally. Each municipal 
government must elect the programme manager in charge of identifying and 
registering beneficiary families. In turn, the municipal managers must ensure 
that families are provided with proper support and that they comply with the 
conditionalities (MDS, 2010), in addition to linking the supply of health and 
education services and coordinating the relevant intersectoral relationships 
and accompanying measures to expand the supply of social policies and 
programmes for beneficiary families. Managers can also manage benefits 
directly (freezing, unfreezing, payment and refunds) through a benefit-
(continued)
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management system, and play a key programme oversight role through 
the intermediary of social oversight bodies. For all these reasons, municipal 
managers are key players in implementing Bolsa Família and in vertical 
coordination of the supply of social protection programmes.
With regard to promoting the programme’s decentralized and transparent 
operation, a further two areas are crucial to vertical integration of Bolsa 
Família supply: funding; and management and evaluation.
With regard to funding and the commitment to State management of 
Bolsa Família, individual agreements were signed between the central 
Government, States and municipal governments. The Bipartite Interagency 
Commission (Comissão Intergestores Bipartite, CIB/SC) is a representation 
and coordination body of States and municipalities set up specifically to 
conclude agreements on the Unified Social Assistance System (SUAS). The 
Commission promotes the conclusion of agreements on implementation and 
operation of the programme, the adoption of criteria for State co-financing 
of social assistance services developed by States and municipalities and the 
establishment of Social Assistance Referral Centres (CRAS).
Furthermore, in 2006 the programme began to use the Decentralized 
Management Index (IGD), a support mechanism for managing social 
programmes and assessing the quality of municipal management of Bolsa 
Família (MDS, 2010). The IGD varies between 0 and 1 and was constructed 
on the basis of four variables, each with a 25% weighting: (i)  quality of the 
information contained in CadÚnico; (ii) periodic updating of CadÚnico 
(at least every two years); (iii) verification of compliance with education 
conditionalities (school attendance); and (iv) attendance of health checks. 
The IGD makes it possible to assess: compliance with the conditionalities at 
local level; support work with Bolsa Família beneficiary families; registration 
of new families (based on continuous data updating); and implementation and 
potential incorporation of new programmes into existing ones (Guimarães, 
Nogueira and Magalhães, 2008).
The IGD results are used to calculate monthly transfers to be paid by 
the Ministry for Social Development and Fight Against Hunger (MDS) to 
municipalities with a minimum compliance score of 0.4, which have been 
authorized for municipal management of social assistance and have signed 
up to Bolsa Família (Guimarães, Nogueira and Magalhães, 2008, p. 10). Thus 
the index is applied using a performance-based management approach.
Source: F. Hevia, “Mecanismos de participación ciudadana y control social en los 
programas de transferencia condicionada de renta en México y Brasil, un análisis 
comparado”, Revista crítica de ciencias sociales y jurídicas, vol. 2, No. 22, 2009; 
“Relaciones directas o mediadas? Participación ciudadana y control social en el programa 
Bolsa Familia”, Brasilia, International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth [online] http://www.
ipc-undp.org/mds.do?active=3, 2009; A. Guimarães, M. Nogueira and R. Magalhães, “A 
intersetorialidade no programa Bolsa Família: reflexões a partir de uma experiência local”, 
National School of Public Health (ENSP)/FIOCRUZ [online] http://www.ipc-undp.org/ 
publications/mds/25M.pdf, 2008; Ministry for Social Development and Fight Against Hunger 
(MDS) “Gestão municipal”, http://www.mds. gov.br/bolsafamilia/gestaodescentralizada/ 
tipos-de-gestao/gestao-municipal/gestao- municipal, 2010; Guia para acompanhamento 
das condicionalidades do programa Bolsa Família, Brasilia, 2008 and C. Mesquita, “Programa 
Bolsa Família”, paper presented at the international seminar ”Sistemas de proteção social:  




D. Matching social service supply and quality  
to the requirements of co-responsibility  
transfer programmes 
One aspect of CTPs on which there appears to be clear agreement in the 
literature is the importance of improving the supply of public services 
(Cohen and Franco, 2006a; ECLAC, 2006; Fiszbein and Schady, 2008; 
Cecchini and others, 2009). While CTPs have placed special emphasis on 
demand for social services, the fact that transfers are subject to compliance 
with a condition makes it necessary to ensure an adequate supply.
CTPs supply social services and programmes, most of which have 
human capital objectives, that is to say they are mainly (but not exclusively) 
health and education services. However, to match social services to the 
requirements of CTPs it is not enough to simply expand coverage. The 
quality of services influences their public appeal, helping to either boost 
or diminish the programme’s effectiveness. In Mexico’s Oportunidades 
(González de la Rocha, 2008) and Panama’s Opportunities Network 
(Rodríguez, 2010), for instance, one of the main factors preventing families 
from complying with the conditionalities imposed in certain rural areas is 
not lack of schools but lack of teachers or the fact that teachers give classes 
only a few days a week.
This makes it necessary to consolidate the operating rationale of 
CTPs to include verifying the minimum conditions of service availability 
and quality (Parra Côrrea and Perez Ribas, 2008). One strategy used 
by some countries is to temporarily suspend programme start-ups in 
areas with insufficient service provision. While such a strategy may be 
appropriate for scaling up coverage, in cases where there are no clearly 
defined procedures for carrying out the process and the required financial 
resources have not been secured, it can become a two-edged sword that 
perpetuates historical inequalities between geographical areas or exclusion 
of the poorest and most vulnerable population sectors. That is why it is 
paramount to identify and implement the most appropriate mechanisms 
for boosting supply, establishing explicit forms of cooperation and 
coordination among the government agencies involved, and to consider 
incorporating the private sector and the “third sector” (the voluntary 
sector or civil society organizations).5
Support for expanding supply can take a variety of forms: public 
direct support consisting of the transfer of funds from each programme’s 
budget to the sectors involved; indirect public support consisting of 
5 This requires a management model that incorporates not just the resources but also the 
interventions of different actors with the necessary expertise to provide the required 
services.
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tendering contracts to private entities that are required to meet certain 
service delivery standards; or private support proper, such as a voucher 
system, where beneficiaries can use these supply-stimulating transfers 
in any programme. One example of public direct support is Brazil’s 
municipal and State Decentralized Management Index, which is used as 
a means for allocating resources to the various administrative levels (see 
box V.2). In Mexico, State institutions are responsible for strengthening 
existing infrastructure in all regions where Oportunidades operates 
and for meeting the additional demand for services arising from the 
programme’s implementation.6 Where final service providers are private 
entities, transfer amounts are calculating using a variety of methods that 
consider explicitly the increased demand produced by CTPs, for example 
by paying a specific sum per beneficiary served or enrolled. The most 
representative examples of CTPs using this method are tranche two of 
the Honduran Family Allowance Programme (PRAF II) and Nicaragua’s 
Social Protection Network (RPS) and Crisis Response System (SAC) 
(Moore, 2008; 2009; Cecchini and others, 2009) (see box V.3). While the 
voucher option has the advantage of favouring beneficiaries’ freedom of 
choice, in many cases concentration of supply at local level results in a 
complete lack of user freedom.
Pautassi and Zibecchi (2010) describe an interesting example of 
supply-deficit coverage in Buenos Aires, where a number of civic and 
community organizations provide preschool care under CTPs. The supply 
deficit (see box II.3) has led to the emergence of civic and community 
organizations specialized in the provision of services by community 
childminders and educators. While these organizations differ in their 
degree of institutionalization and professionalism, the authors agree 
not only that they are able to absorb unmet demand but also that their 
services are well suited to the specific needs of the children receiving 
assistance. However, these organizations have no official recognition, their 
relationship with public education provision is informal (recommendation 
or contact through a teacher) and they have no stable institutionalized 
linkage with the education sector.
6 The Oportunidades National Coordination Agency must notify the ministries of health and 
education of the targeted annual number of beneficiaries it plans to cater for. In turn, 
the ministries must incorporate into their annual budget the resources required to meet 
Oportunidades operating costs, as well as the estimated costs of full compliance with 
programme objectives and targets. As from 1998, the intervention strategy was boosted 
by a Social Infrastructure Contribution Fund (FAIS), which transfers resources to improve 
infrastructure in the most marginalized communities by building schools, clinics, rural 
roads and other facilities. The Federal Government transfers these funds directly to local 
governments, which decide how to spend them (Levy and Rodríguez, 2005).
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Box V.3 
TRANSFERS FOR EXPANDING SUPPLY IN CO-RESPONSIBILITY  
TRANSFER PROGRAMMES IN HONDURAS AND NICARAGUA
To supplement the demand-linked benefits typical of CTPs, an 
innovative benefit was included in tranche two of the Honduran Family 
Allowance Programme (PRAF II), funded by the Inter-American Development 
Bank (IDB), and in Nicaragua’s Social Protection Network (RPS) and Crisis 
Response System (SAC) (which ended in 2006), consisting of transfers 
linked to the supply of health and education services.
In the case of PRAF  II, the amounts allocated to each health or 
educational facility were calculated on the basis of physical capacity and 
infrastructure requirements, on the one hand, and the number of beneficiaries, 
on the other. The education sector received a transfer per student enrolled, 
in addition to resources for parents’ associations (administration and training 
costs), students (school supplies), classrooms (school equipment) and 
teachers (teaching aids, training costs and performance bonuses). Each 
educational institution receives an average US$ 4,000 per year, ranging from 
US$ 1,600 to US$ 23,000. The resources allocated to the health sector are 
for infrastructure, equipment and supplies, as well as cash incentives for 
volunteers and staff in each healthcare facility. The average sum received is 
US$ 6,000, ranging from US$ 3,000 to US$ 15,000.
Nicaragua’s former Social Protection Network established a closer link 
between service provision and payments to providers. In the health sector, 
for example, payment to communities receiving demand-linked transfers 
was proportional to achievement of specific coverage targets, whereas in 
communities not receiving these benefits, providers were paid strictly per 
person served. Transfers to the health sector were capped at US$ 90 per 
household served per year, while those to the education sector amounted 
to US$  8  per year per child enrolled. Similar provisions were adopted in 
Nicaragua’s former Crisis Response System.
In both cases, conditionalities were imposed on such aspects as: service-
provider participation in quality-improvement programmes; compliance 
with the standards and coverage targets set by the relevant ministries; and 
beneficiaries’ participation in parents’ associations and user committees.
These transfers were not the only means used in Honduras to match 
public provision to programme requirements. Some of the actions included 
community organization and participation, such as organizing committees 
of health-service users and parents’ and guardians’ associations (Parents’ 
Association) to decide how transfers were to be spent and monitor 
their use for training community health and nutrition extension workers 
(Comprehensive Care Strategy for Children in the Community (AIN-C)) and 
setting up teachers’ professional development programmes (In-service 
Teacher Training Programme). In addition, the non-profit private sector was 
involved actively in the local management of loan funds and in monitoring 
the actions of parents’ associations and committees.
Source: C. Moore, “Nicaragua’s Red de Protección Social: an exemplary but short-
lived conditional cash transfer programme”, Country Study, No. 17, International Policy 
Centre for Inclusive Growth/United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), January 
2009; “Assessing Honduras’ CCT programme PRAF, Programa de Asignación Familiar: 
Expected and unexpected realities”, Country Study, No. 15, Brasilia, International 
Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth/United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 
April 2008; Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), “PRAF. Programa de Asignación 
Familiar, Fase II”, technical description of the project, presentation, 2000.
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This leads to a conclusion of crucial importance to the debate on the 
role of CTPs in social protection: it is not feasible to implement a CTP in 
areas where no relevant supply exists. To remedy this, it is necessary either 
to secure the required resources to cover the deficit (considering aspects 
of availability, quality and variety) or to adopt a solution that imposes no 
conditionalities for access to non-existent services (such as unconditional 
transfers) (Samson, 2006; Freeland, 2009).
Based on the above, it could be argued that, if the aim is to match 
supply with demand and CTPs perform their requisite role in the social 
protection properly, in addition to analysing the supply of social services 
to determine a CTP’s relevance and feasibility prior to start-up, the 
scale of the actions and resources required to meet the future increased 
demand generated by the CTP will need to be quantified and a cost-impact 
assessment will need to be made of the most effective types of action in 
terms of supply or demand.
According to Parra Côrrea and Perez Ribas, assessments should 
provide empirical evidence on access to social services and on institutional 
capacity for managing programmes better and covering their costs. Not 
only would this improve the planning and management of CTPs in terms 
of setting priorities and managing financial resources, it would also 
provide information on such matters as potential beneficiaries and their 
perception of current access levels (whether they are adequate or whether 
there are gaps in coverage), as well as the profile of the population without 
access to the programme and what barriers they face (Parra Côrrea and 
Perez Ribas, 2008). Oportunidades and Families in Action are examples of 
CTPs that have included a stage in their targeting process for verifying 
service availability.7 8
As for the cost-impact ratio of interventions, a number of authors 
(Parra Côrrea and Perez Ribas, 2008; Handa, 2001; Handa and Davis, 2006) 
suggest that, where the aim is to increase levels of human capital (for 
7 In 2004, Mexico’s Oportunidades programme was extended to include all municipalities 
nationwide. Prior to that, the targeting procedure included a process of validating 
selected communities to check whether the local health and education services had the 
necessary capacity to meet the future increased demand generated by the programme’s 
incentives and co-responsibilities. Where municipalities did not have the required 
services or where services were saturated, programme start-up was delayed until it was 
confirmed that the municipality had a sufficient sectoral supply (Cohen, Franco and 
Villatoro, 2006).
8 Colombia’s Families in Action continues to exclude municipalities without the necessary 
infrastructure, both in terms of basic services (health and education) and in all matters 
relating to the payment process (availability of a bank or equivalent). Despite this, the 
programme currently covers 1,093 of Colombia’s 1,098 municipalities, corresponding to 
geographic coverage of 99.5%.
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example, by building a school in the community), demand-side measures 
(such as income transfers) might be less effective than measures for 
modifying supply.9
E. Matching demand for protection with the supply  
of services: family support
As mentioned earlier, any protection system should provide for 
mechanisms to integrate the demand and supply of social services, 
which is a key to ensuring the impact of the social protection offered by 
CTPs. By monitoring compliance with the conditionalities and compiling 
information on families’ living conditions and needs, the family support 
provided by type-3 CTPs is seen as one of the most effective means 
for matching public provision with poor families’ demand for social 
protection, as these CTPs link families with the supply of programmes.
The commonest problem is not lack of services but that of supply 
failing to reach specific population groups for a variety of reasons. In the 
case of Bolsa Família complementary programmes, for example, the fact 
that enrolment is voluntary means that only the best-informed families 
gain access to them. It was found that where no concrete actions are in 
place to link beneficiaries with benefits, programme quotas are not filled.10
This calls for measures to address the need for linkage and 
coordination among the different components of supply to ensure that 
they reach their intended beneficiaries. Two good examples are Solidarity 
Chile and Colombia’s Juntos Network, where professionals specifically 
dedicated to the task are responsible for ensuring that beneficiary families 
are linked with the supply of public services and programmes (family 
support counsellors and social protection officials respectively).
Nevertheless, based on observations of Solidarity Chile it is 
clear that, while family support has achieved much, it also faces great 
challenges. Family support can become such a key component of the 
family social-inclusion process that it can have serious effects on families 
where the approach used by the professional in charge encourages 
dependency. Publications by the Ministry of Planning of Chile 
(MIDEPLAN) report that some of the adverse effects of dependency stem 
from the “mystification” of support, especially the figure and role of the 
9 Handa and Davis (2006) argue that there are no studies on the region to indicate 
whether a transfer designed to stimulate demand is more effective in cost-impact terms 
than one to stimulate supply. The only study that draws such a conclusion appears to 
present methodological problems that may explain the results in favour of demand-side 
interventions (Coady and Parker, 2004, pp. 440-451).
10 For a description of the Bolsa Família PlanSeq programme, see OAS/ECLAC/ILO, 2010.
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family support counsellor, to the point of undermining trust in the rest 
of social policy and institutions in general when the support period ends 
(MIDEPLAN, 2009a; 2009b).
F. Support for institutional capacity-building: the role 
of beneficiary selection and registration systems
The mere fact of imposing conditionalities means that CTPs must have 
information systems and procedures to monitor compliance, imposing 
penalties where appropriate, the means for reinforcing these penalties, 
and so forth. This has prompted a number of authors to underline the 
opportunity offered by CTPs to promote institutional development via 
social policy, especially in low-income countries with weak institutions 
(Bastagli, 2009; Fiszbein and Schady, 2009). They argue that CTPs 
would have the positive externality of creating better conditions for the 
development of other programmes and policies, although in practice this 
has not happened in every case.11
Beneficiary selection and registration systems therefore play a key 
role in enabling CTPs to serve as a gateway into social protection, as well as 
facilitating the passage of families and individuals to other programmes. 
One virtue of such systems is precisely that they can be extended to all 
public programmes and so provide full information on the population 
served by social policy and programmes by integrating the databases of 
all the various public sectors and institutions into a single register.
However, there are downsides too, especially as regards the 
standardization of eligibility procedures and rules and the establishment 
of beneficiary registers, as some elements pose a threat of exacerbating 
the residual and exclusive nature of interventions. This is the case where 
CTPs are based on temporary structures that are poorly integrated into 
the bureaucratic State apparatus and at the mercy of political change (see 
chapter II, section D.1).
G. Graduation from co-responsibility transfer 
programmes and social protection
For CTPs to act as a gateway into social protection, families’ exit from 
programmes should not be seen as grounds for suspending benefits 
after they have complied with certain requirements or exceeded certain 
11 See the differences between CTPs in two countries with similar budgetary and 
institutional constraints: El Salvador’s former Solidarity Network (now Solidarity in 
Communities) and Paraguay’s Tekoporâ programme (Veras Soares and Britto, 2008).
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thresholds and, hence, as grounds for exclusion from social protection. On 
the contrary, CTPs should serve as a link with the other social protection 
and promotion measures provided for in social policy. The notion of 
graduation and the establishment of appropriate strategies should be seen 
as a passage through different stages in a continuum of interventions 
tailored to various basic needs and linked to risk protection and the 
exercise of rights. From this standpoint, graduation from CTPs should 
signal the end of socio-economic vulnerability and a higher level of social 
protection, by means of either other non-contributory instruments or 
contributory social protection.
1. Exit rules
CTPs have faced an ongoing challenge in implementing sustainable 
graduation strategies, in terms of social policy’s ability to promote 
people’s self-reliance and build their capacity (Veras Soares and Britto, 
2008; Yaschine and Dávila, 2008). However, the region has accorded more 
importance to defining CTP exit rules than to graduation strategies proper, 
which in many cases has stemmed partly from budgetary constraints or 
political considerations (such as interest in reducing length of stay in the 
programme and increasing the gross number of programme beneficiaries) 
rather than from programme objectives (Villatoro, 2008).12 Cases have also 
been observed where CTPs simply stipulate that beneficiary households 
should stop receiving benefits when members “lose” their eligibility. 
For instance, families cease to be programme beneficiaries when their 
children reach a certain age, leaving them in a situation of vulnerability 
similar to or worse than prior to the intervention (Banegas, 2008; González 
de la Rocha, 2008). In other cases, exit rules arbitrarily define a maximum 
number of years of participation in the programme.13
There are also CTPs where the objectives are explicitly taken into 
account in designing graduation strategies, such as Mexico’s Oportunidades 
programme, where the original mechanisms needed to be systematically 
overhauled to bring them into line with the objectives (see box V.4). 
Oportunidades, as well as Brazil’s Bolsa Família, Jamaica’s PATH, the 
Dominican Republic’s Solidarity and other CTPs set time limits and the 
possibility of recertification (Cecchini and Madariaga, 2010).14
12 In Nicaragua’s Social Protection Network and Crisis Response System, the maturity 
date of the loan used to finance programmes automatically limited length of stay in the 
programme, with no provision being made for transition to a new protection scheme.
13 For example, in Trinidad and Tobago’s Targeted Conditional Cash Transfer Programme 
(TCCTP) the time limit is two years, in Colombia’s programme of Conditional Subsidies 
for School Attendance (in Bogota) it ranges from two to three years, depending on the type 
of subsidy, and in Brazil’s Child Labour Eradication Programme, it is up to four years.
14 In most cases, provided that families do not exceed certain income thresholds for 
graduation from the programme, they are automatically recertifed as beneficiaries.
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Finally, some CTPs establish more elaborate exit strategies. Such 
is the case of Solidarity Chile, where participation in the programme is 
governed by a graduation scheme in which family support and cash 
transfers are reduced gradually, while some benefits continue to be paid 
after the end of the family support period.
Box V.4 
GRADUATION PROBLEMS WITH MEXICO’S PROGRESA-OPORTUNIDADES 
PROGRAMME AND DIFFERENTIATED SUPPORT SCHEME (EDA)
In line with the programme’s objective of human capital accumulation 
to increase families’ capabilities and its desire to prevent beneficiary 
dependence, Progresa planned to continue providing support to beneficiary 
households for as long as they remained eligible. This was done using a 
procedure for verifying each household’s socio-economic status every three 
years as from their date of admission.
When the programme was rechristened Oportunidades and for a variety 
of financial and other reasons, a graduation scheme was designed allowing 
families to exit from the programme definitively. In 2003, a similar family 
recertification procedure began to be implemented, adding an intermediary 
stage called Differentiated Support Scheme (EDA), which was applied to 
families showing what were deemed to be “sustainable” socio-economic 
and welfare improvements.
EDA implementation varies according to geographical location. In 
rural communities, it comes into force three years after recertification and, 
in urban areas, one year after. Families transferred to the scheme stop 
receiving the Vivir Mejor child support component for primary education and 
the food support component, as they are considered able to afford the costs 
themselves. Families continue to be EDA beneficiaries for a further three 
years after graduating from the programme.
The EDA was implemented because of serious misgivings about the 
suitability of both the chosen parameters (duration, poverty line used in 
the assessment) and the mechanism. Indeed, a number of assessments 
concluded that, after a six-year stay in the programme, only around 20% of 
families had managed to rise above the eligibility threshold. It was also found 
that some 42% of these families would fall back below the threshold in the 
future. Furthermore, families withdrawing from the programme showed the 
typical pattern of reaction or adaptation to economic crisis, meaning that 
they had returned to a highly vulnerable situation.
Between 2006 and 2008, further adjustments were made to the EDA. 
They included increasing to six the number of years required before the 
first assessment, removing households comprising only older adults and 
authorizing graduate households to request readmission to the programme 
subject to meeting certain conditionalities. Nonetheless, the EDA continues 
(continued)
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to be highly controversial. Basically there are two criticisms of the scheme: 
(i) the contradiction between EDA exit criteria based on poverty assessments 
and the programme’s long-term human development objective; and (ii)  the 
absence of a social safety net in Mexico to absorb graduate families 
effectively by providing access to more targeted social programmes.
Source: I. Yaschine and L. Dávila, “Why, when and how should beneficiaries leave a CCT 
programme”, Cash Transfers. Lessons from Africa and Latin America, D. Hailu and F. Veras 
Soares (eds.), Poverty in Focus, No. 15, Brasilia, International Policy Centre for Inclusive 
Growth, August, 2008; Programa de Desarrollo Humano Oportunidades, “Prontuario 
institucional del Programa de Desarrollo Humano Oportunidades” [online] http://www.
oportunidades.gob.mx/Wn_Publicaciones/Pub_anter.html; M. González de la Rocha 
“Programas de transferencias condicionadas. Sugerencias para mejorar su operación e 
impacto”, Futuro de las familias y desafíos para las políticas, I. Arriagada (ed.), Seminarios 
y conferencias series, No. 52 (LC/L.2888-P), Santiago, Chile, Economic Commission 
for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 2008; Israel Banegas, “Trayectorias de 
bienestar y vulnerabilidad: Análisis de un panel de hogares incorporados al programa 
Oportunidades (1997-2006)”, paper presented at the third Congress of the Latin American 
Population Association (ALAP), Cordoba, 24-26 September [online] http://www.alapop.
org/2009/images/DOCSFINAIS_PDF/ ALAP_2008_FINAL_180.pdf, 2008.
2. Income generation and labour force participation
The promotion of decent work is key to overcoming poverty and 
CTPs can play an important role as a channel for linking and integrating 
people. Indeed, CTPs have already begun to incorporate activities for 
matching labour supply (technical and vocational training and remedial 
primary and secondary education) with labour demand (microcredit 
programmes, labour intermediation services and direct or indirect job 
creation) (OAS/ECLAC/ILO, 2010) to facilitate the sustainable graduation 
of beneficiary families from CTPs (Yaschine and Dávila, 2008).
While the envisaged measures are a valiant attempt to integrate 
the poorest and most vulnerable people into the job market, they pose 
a number of problems: matching the supply of jobs to the profile of 
beneficiaries; linkages with the job-creating private sector; monitoring 
those placed in jobs; limited financial and human resources; and lack of 
complementary policies allowing women to balance the burden of home 
care with participation in the programme. Available information shows 
that most CTP beneficiaries do not manage to gain stable employment and 
that women and young people face the greatest difficulties. The deficits 
in terms of education, the shortage of local employment opportunities, 
and ethnic and gender barriers all conspire against the likelihood of 
programmes successfully driving dynamic processes of incorporation of 
the poorest sectors into the labour market (OAS/ECLAC/ILO, 2010).
A number of vocational training and income generation initiatives 
via CTPs have shown the sheer complexity of providing appropriate 
responses to beneficiaries’ highly diverse conditions and needs. For 
Box V.4 (concluded)
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instance, not all families participating in CTPs have the same ability to 
enter the labour market (ECLAC, 2009a), exploit the opportunities offered 
by microcredit and microbusiness programmes (MIDEPLAN, 2009a; 
2009b) or fully internalize the psychosocial counselling they have received 
(Nun and Trucco, 2008).
Assessments of Solidarity Chile show that granting microcredit to 
very poor families may be ineffective in generating income. Some of the 
reasons include their lack of business experience, the limited relevance 
of some projects and inability to plan an investment in the midst of an 
economic emergency with the prospect of receiving income at some future 
date (MIDEPLAN, 2006). As a result, many projects end up working 
informally or simply fail (MIDEPLAN, 2006). There have even been 
instances where beneficiaries decide to sell the capital assets that they 
have acquired to raise immediate funds. Braga, Leandro and Lyra Júnior 
(2008) report that Brazil’s Bolsa Família and Crediamigo (a complementary 
microcredit programme implemented in northern Brazil) were confined 
largely to shoring up existing ventures. In fact, in 82% of cases, the credit 
was found to have been used to expand an existing business.15
These examples illustrate the possible limitations of microbusiness-
related measures as an effective income-generation strategy for poor 
families, as apparently they tend to reinforce previously acquired skills, 
rather than developing new ways of earning income. Therefore, although 
many of the strategies employed may be helpful in coping with emergencies 
and maintaining subsistence levels, they should be considered as a 
temporary solution providing access to quality employment (Rodríguez 
and Alvarado, 2008). Indeed, in the case of Solidarity Chile, the finding 
is that when heads of household obtain a job perceived to be well paid 
and in a valued working environment, they do not consider developing a 
microbusiness to be an attractive option (MIDEPLAN, 2009a; 2009b).
A number of authors (León, 2008; Medeiros, Britto and Veras Soares, 
2008) stress the importance of measures with a direct impact on the labour 
market: either social protection measures proper (labour market regulation, 
unemployment insurance) or measures to promote and encourage labour 
recruitment with broad private-sector participation, as well as measures to 
link beneficiaries effectively with contributory social protection schemes. 
Indeed, experience with Solidarity Chile has shown that one aspect that 
has suffered the highest rate of non-compliance (83.3%) is graduation from 
the programme with at least one family member working regularly and 
earning a stable wage (MIDEPLAN, 2009a; 2009b).
15 The sample used is not representative of beneficiary families of either Bolsa Família or 
Crediamigo.
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This confirms the importance of a comprehensive approach 
involving the use of procedures and regulations that link different social 
policy structures, are in line with each programme’s objectives (in terms of 
guaranteeing certain levels of income or human capital accumulation, for 
example) and are properly coordinated with the rest of public provision. 
This would prevent the situation where a family graduates from the initial 
level represented by CTPs only to rejoin unmet demand for the same 
programmes, but instead would allow the family to rise steadily to ever 
higher levels of social protection and welfare.
Inclusive Social Protection in Latin America: A Comprehensive... 175
Chapter VI
Consolidating social protection in  
Latin America: main challenges
This book has analysed different elements of the recent debate on social 
protection in Latin America, distinguishing conceptual, historical, 
normative and social policy aspects and identifying four social protection 
approaches that have shaped policies and programmes in the region.
As already mentioned, in terms of theory and social policy design, 
the idea of a more comprehensive and citizen-centric approach to social 
protection is gaining ground, based on complementarity between different 
normative and conceptual frameworks that includes human rights, basic 
needs and risk. There is a gradual shift away from the dual approach 
catering to two groups —those with a stable job in the formal sector and 
those living in extreme poverty— towards a more inclusive model that 
guarantees access to social protection for all citizens. This does not mean 
shelving actions and resource allocation in favour of those who most need 
them for reasons of equity, justice or efficiency but, instead, protection 
measures need to be rethought from a broader universal perspective. At 
the same time, public management models are being redefined in line 
with the redesigned policies, making inter-agency coordination one of the 
greatest challenges for the region.
This broader approach also meets the needs of Latin American 
countries arising from globalization, economic crises, the unfulfilled 
promise of full employment, as well as population ageing. Various social 
protection proposals and initiatives are being developed to deepen the role 
of social protection in this scenario and have revealed the need for a new 
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consensus, with social and fiscal covenants that ensure universal access to 
benefits in an environment of solidarity and efficiency (ECLAC, 2006).
While much interest has been shown in a comprehensive approach 
that safeguards citizen guarantees, no single design has been chosen 
for social protection programmes, which vary widely depending on 
individual countries’ political priorities and social investment,  as well 
as their level of development. There are countries that have focused on 
non-contributory social protection initiatives, such as co-responsibility 
transfer programmes (CTPs), as a first big step in extending protection 
to those who have been historically excluded. Other countries combine 
policies of targeted non-contributory social protection with initiatives for 
universalizing certain benefits, such as old-age pensions in the Federal 
District of Mexico or the Dignity Income in the Plurinational State of 
Bolivia. A third group of countries have sought to form coordinated 
rights-based social protection systems in which non-contributory policies 
focusing primarily on people in situations of poverty and vulnerability 
and non-contributory policies are combined. These policies define ad hoc 
arrangements that vary according to the requirements of the different 
population groups.
There are many lessons to be drawn from social-protection policy 
experiences in the region. First, as Argentina, Brazil and Chile have shown, 
it is extremely important to extend social protection gradually until it 
reaches every citizen, consolidating stages and instruments. Second, 
institutional backgrounds and traditions have been found to play a major 
role in which the cumulative effect of different experiences in adopting 
universal social protection programmes and instruments is paramount, as 
in the case of Costa Rica and Uruguay. This does not mean leaving the 
rationales of the various institutions unchanged but, instead, recognizing 
the contribution of cultures and historical traditions when designing new 
social policy systems.
The goal of providing universal social protection through 
interlinked contributory and non-contributory systems designed from a 
citizen-centric and inclusive perspective is a realistic one that should be 
pursued. The International Labour Organization (ILO, 2009) has proposed 
extending the non-contributory social protection floor (see box I.1) as in a 
ladder, by adding a second level of compulsory contributory benefits and, 
finally, for those who need or want high levels of protection, a top level 
—voluntary private insurance. However, the path ahead is not entirely 
smooth and, to achieve the desired success, special actions are required 
based on social and fiscal contracts tailored to each country’s reality, 
failing which the current dual system is in danger of being perpetuated.
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At the same time, there are many areas where the social 
protection debate should be deepened, including the third component 
of comprehensive social protection, labour market regulation, which 
has been little analysed in terms of potential instruments, strategies and 
opportunities for consolidation in the region. The contribution of regulation 
should be highlighted and policies identified for strengthening it.
In addition to addressing in a more explicit manner policies for 
regulating the labour market itself, social protection policies are faced 
with the need to strengthen links with active labour market policies. This 
entails actions for increasing the employability and earnings of those 
finding it hardest to enter the labour market and for enhancing the welfare 
of workers and their families (Bertranou and Paz, 2007, p. 52), especially 
women, young people and groups that have traditionally been the furthest 
removed from formal employment, such as indigenous peoples and those 
living in poverty or extreme poverty. Some of these policies therefore seek 
to increase workers’ assets (by means of training, for instance) and to 
prevent asset deterioration (by means of unemployment insurance).
The following sections discuss some of the challenges of 
implementing a comprehensive system of inclusive social protection.
A. Feasibility of implementing a rights-based 
approach in the region
The most pressing challenge in establishing mechanisms to ensure 
sustained progress in safeguarding economic, social and cultural rights is 
the relationship between securing the political will to commit to concrete 
social policy actions and the granting of explicit guarantees endowed 
with a legal basis, institutional capacity and sufficient funding for the 
progressive realization of these rights.
Further action is therefore required to set standards and indicators 
that can shed more light on progress in this area. This is particularly 
important in a context where social rights are far from being realized 
and much of the population suffers continuing lack of protection in 
employment and poverty.
To achieve these standards, there must be a proper legal and 
administrative structure, as their sustainability relies on the existence of 
laws and regulations for ensuring compliance and clear rules stipulating 
which institutions are responsible for their operation, control and 
monitoring. Political will alone is not enough to implement this process, 
as it is also necessary to bear in mind the issues raised by the legal debate 
in each country. So, apart from technical design, provision should be made 
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for a communication and administration strategy to enable them to be 
legally formalized. As there are likely to be cases where the protection 
system’s legal basis offers no quick or easy way of doing this, the hurdle 
will be to work out how to start progressive implementation, based on 
administrative decrees, in order to reduce the opportunity costs that delay 
would inflict on citizens, while creating a political space to facilitate their 
realization through laws that will enhance their sustainability.
At the same time, to ensure proper management that takes into 
account the established standards, there must be active participation 
mechanisms and social oversight bodies, both civic organizations 
(such as watchdog organizations, oversight offices, non-governmental 
organizations and beneficiary groups) and international agencies with 
a more direct commitment to overseeing progress on economic, social 
and cultural rights (such as the United Nations Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR)). Artigas (2005) points to the need 
to strengthen the Ombudsman’s powers for mediating between the 
prosecution of cases involving infringement of these rights and the 
creation of institutional mechanisms.
A key requirement for a fiscally sustainable system is that 
rights should be defined incrementally (Artigas, 2005; United 
Nations, 2009b). Indeed, the main constraint in the region on “new 
constitutionalism”  (characterized by greater incorporation of human 
rights into its structure) is that it requires the material conditions to 
ensure that these rights do not become a dead letter (Gargarella and 
Courtis, 2009). The challenge is to combine the two dimensions —rights 
and sustainability in legal, operational and economic terms— in order to 
define minimum levels that not only contribute significantly to achieving 
the objectives, but are also endowed with sufficient management capacity 
and do not affect macroeconomic balances. One example of this option is 
Chile’s System of Universal Access with Explicit Guarantees (AUGE Plan), 
where the coverage of medical conditions with guaranteed health care 
has gradually been expanded as resources and the capacity to administer 
them have increased.
 It is also necessary to take into account the capacity of countries in the 
region to meet the challenges of improving social institutions. Expanding 
the coverage and implementation of complex systems for monitoring and 
controlling such aspects as targeting conditionalities and mechanisms calls 
for the mobilization of financial and institutional resources that often incur 
high opportunity costs, in addition to placing a heavy additional burden of 
work on the sectors involved (Parra Corrêa and Perez Ribas, 2008; Villatoro, 
2008). Veras Soares and Britto (2008) argue that, in low-income countries, 
there is a trade-off between building institutional capacity and expanding 
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the level and coverage of benefits (see Cecchini, 2009). So, in addition 
to quantifying the required actions, the challenge is how to tailor their 
implementation to existing financial capacity or to expand this capacity 
sustainably for the benefit of social policy as a whole, while making sure 
that they do not lead to present protection yet future vulnerability.
As ECLAC (2000, p. 30) pointed out, “the political recognition of the 
existence of economic, social and cultural rights does not in itself create 
wealth or distribute non-existent resources. The implementation of these 
rights must be compatible, in particular, with the level of development 
that has been reached” and, as described in the following section, “with 
the fiscal covenant that has been established in each society if we are to 
avoid creating unrealistic expectations or macroeconomic disequilibria 
that will ultimately, via other routes, hurt the very social sectors that we 
are trying to protect”.
It is not easy to address these issues because the question that needs 
to be asked is: at which point do institutional and economic constraints start 
to infringe rights and vice versa? This is especially relevant on a continent 
that still faces major growth challenges, as well as much unfinished 
business in terms of inequality and tight social budgets, coupled with low 
taxation and poor tax collection rates. A stronger push is therefore needed 
towards a growth model with better income distribution, which requires 
an acknowledgment that both these elements are part of the same process 
rather than sequential tasks. As in every society, growth is needed in order 
to generate resources for subsequent distribution and greater equity and 
equality are a key asset for promoting growth, increasing human and 
social capital, reducing investment risk and boosting domestic demand.
B. Financing: multiple demands and limited resources
One of the main challenges of a comprehensive social protection system 
is to create the right conditions to ensure sufficient resources and stable 
funding sources. ECLAC (1998, 2006) has raised the need for a fiscal 
covenant that would serve as a political agreement between the various 
social sectors and would determine the structure and level of taxation 
and the allocation of investments. This fiscal covenant is the correlate of 
the social contract or, in other words, its material condition of viability. 
Therefore its strength or weakness is a reflection of the strength or 
weakness of public finance.
However, this fiscal covenant requires adjustments that are difficult 
in a context like the Latin American one. Some of the issues that must be 
addressed include: the political and institutional deficit; the erosion of fiscal 
citizenship; high informal employment rates; changes in tax systems from 
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ones based on direct taxes to ones based on indirect taxes; and the difficulty 
of exploiting favourable macrofiscal situations to minimize the effects of 
frequent economic shocks in the region (Basombrío, 2009, pp. 36-37).
As any move towards an inclusive protection model would 
increase demand, greater public and private efforts will be required. A 
point of agreement in the debate is that an overhaul of Latin America’s 
social protection architecture in the new millennium calls for a thorough 
analysis of the fiscal impact of various measures and the adoption of 
countercyclical instruments (ECLAC, 2009b). This means increased fiscal 
investment, which is difficult to avoid and, in the medium and long 
term, will require the injection of new resources and more efficient use 
of available ones (ECLAC, 2010a; Lo Vuolo, 2009). However, the economic 
costs associated with lack of protection for the population are far from 
negligible, as child malnutrition studies by ECLAC and the World Food 
Programme (WFP) have shown (Martínez and Fernández, 2007 and 2009).1
The demographic dividend (see box  IV.4) is a potential source of 
savings which, to be effective, calls for growth in decent work and the 
formalization of employment in order to build capacity to raise funds 
through the contributory system. Failing this, the opportunity for 
providing financial sustainability to meet future demand from population 
ageing might be missed.
Although the need for more resources is felt throughout the 
region, the challenges vary widely from country to country in terms of 
macroeconomic priorities and the volume of resources. The challenges are 
more acute for countries with wider well-being gaps, that is to say, ones 
with lower per capita gross domestic product (GDP), higher demographic 
dependency rates, more informal labour markets, lower social protection 
coverage, higher poverty levels and less social investment both per capita 
and as a percentage of GDP. They are the group III countries: Dominican 
Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, 
Paraguay, Peru and the Plurinational State of Bolivia (see table II.1). These 
challenges diminish in countries with a narrower well-being gap —group I 
countries: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Panama and Uruguay— 
where all these parameters become less critical (ECLAC, 2010b).
According to ECLAC estimates (2010b; see annex  III), the cost of 
a potential transfer equivalent to half a poverty line for children aged 
between 5 and 14 and one poverty line for children aged under 5, adults 
1 The direct cost of health care and education services, together with loss of productivity 
(represented by the 5.4  million people who died before they could join the working-
age population and the two-year schooling gap of those who have suffered child 
malnutrition) amounted to 6.4% of gross domestic product (GDP) in the Dominican 
Republic and the Central American countries in 2004 and 2.6% of GDP in Paraguay and 
the Andean countries in 2005. These values represent an average of 30% of the respective 
countries’ social investment in those years (Martínez and Fernández, 2007 and 2009).
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over  65 and unemployed people living in households vulnerable to 
poverty, with an income below 1.8 times the poverty line, would cost 2% 
of GDP or less in Argentina, Chile and Uruguay and between 15% and 
18% of GDP in Honduras, Nicaragua and the Plurinational State of Bolivia. 
The cost of transfers to everyone in the above categories, not just those 
living in poverty-vulnerable households, would range from a minimum 
of 4.3% of GDP in Chile to a maximum of 19.8% of GDP in Nicaragua. 
The International Labour Organization (ILO) has calculated that it would 
cost less than 2% of global GDP to provide a social protection floor to 
all the world’s poorest and that 6% of global GDP would be enough to 
provide minimum protection to all those who currently have no access 
to social protection (see box  I.1). As a guide, table  II.1 shows that, while 
social investment in Latin America as a whole averages 14.2% of GDP 
(US$ 666 per capita), it ranges from an average of 10% of GDP (US$ 181) in 
countries with the lowest levels of investment (group III) to 18.5% of GDP 
(US$ 1,220 per capita) in countries with the highest levels (group I).
With respect to these non-contributory transfers, ECLAC (2010b, 
p. 192) has argued against the claim that the receipt of non-labour income 
undermines people’s willingness to join the labour market. In the second 
place, the experience of recent years shows that the expansion of non-
contributory transfers in the region has been accompanied by rising 
participation rates among beneficiaries. Third, in a region where the income 
of around a third of the population is insufficient to lift those households 
out of poverty, it can hardly be argued that the lack of measures to reduce 
vulnerability is a matter of incentives.
ECLAC (2006) has also pointed to flaws in the region’s tax structures 
and continued regressive investment in many social sectors. High-calibre 
technical and political measures will undoubtedly be required to change 
this situation and, above all, strong social consensus capable of pushing 
through the necessary reforms, even though the universalization of some 
services or coverage increases do not necessarily require a marked increase 
in social investment (ECLAC, 2010b). The need to implement active fiscal 
policies also entails improving the quality of resource allocation and 
policy effectiveness (ECLAC, 2010b, p. 236).
Three key factors have been identified as determining fiscal revenue-
raising capacity: the tax burden; the tax structure; and measures to combat 
tax evasion. In 2007-2008, the average tax burden represented 18.3% of 
Latin American GDP and 26.3% of Caribbean GDP, which is considered 
low for the region’s level of relative development and the resource needs 
stemming from existing public policies.2
2 Latin America collects half the taxes of countries of the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD): 36.2% of GDP (Gómez Sabaini, Jiménez and 
Podestá, 2010). This shows that there is great potential for increasing taxation without 
undermining competitiveness.
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ECLAC has also pointed out that much of this revenue comes from 
taxes on consumption and other indirect taxes, while less than a third 
comes from direct taxes on income, explaining why income distribution 
after taxes is even more unequal than primary distribution. This is 
compounded by high rates of non-compliance with tax obligations, in the 
form of tax evasion and preferential treatment for capital income (e.g. by 
means of exemptions) and reinvestment of profits. All these factors confirm 
the need for a fiscal covenant for financing social protection policies in the 
region (ECLAC 2010b, pp. 247-254).
It is therefore a huge challenge to progress towards social covenants 
underpinned by processes of political dialogue. ECLAC (1998, 2006 and 
2008b; Machinea and Cruces, 2006) has already raised the need to strengthen 
the social protection covenant in Latin American countries, by shielding 
social investment earmarked for this purpose, increasing its productivity 
and consolidating its role in the region’s political architectures.
C. The heterogeneity of population  
and protection gaps 
As poverty and inequality stem from a variety of causes and a number of 
rights need to be safeguarded, in order to make social protection really 
inclusive it is necessary to meet multiple demands from the different 
age groups (longitudinal integration) and population groups (cross-wise 
integration) (see chapter IV).
So, if the population is heterogeneous, attention must be differential 
and specialized, which poses the challenge of achieving universality based 
on specificity in order to close gaps in the areas required by each group of 
people. This approach has not gone unchallenged (Lo Vuolo, 2009) because, 
while it helps to guide public-sector support for social protection more 
effectively, it also runs a risk of social fragmentation, with one structure of 
services for the poor and another for the non-poor. The challenge, therefore, 
is to provide an offering that not only is differentiated in line with needs, 
but also fosters equality and social cohesion rather than perpetuating gaps. 
In particular, there is a need for effective and solidarity-based strategies that 
reach not only the poor but also the non-poor but vulnerable who lack assets 
for coping effectively with critical events.
Establishing the concept of protection as an asset common to society 
as a whole rather than solely an individual asset is part of the challenge 
of involving all society’s members on the basis of rights, irrespective of 
age, sex, employment status or other characteristics. Thus the challenge 
is how to integrate solidarity, efficiency and equity into a society that has 
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already moved towards individually funded pension savings accounts 
and personal insurance and where protection is confined to those in the 
formal-sector workforce and their families. Tools must be designed to 
achieve solidarity between generations, the sexes, geographical areas 
and ethnic and socio-economic groups, in order to use public funds to 
protect the least protected groups —the economically inactive, poor and 
vulnerable— based on a new social covenant that recognizes their rights 
and the potential economic benefit of closing gaps and securing a more 
cohesive society.
While some countries are paying increasing attention to the 
differing needs created by the care economy, in terms of the special 
protection needs of different population groups and the vertical 
and horizontal coordination required to meet diverse demands (see 
diagram  IV.2), the need now is to further the debate on the special 
vulnerability of women with no independent income and women who 
have been allotted the role of primary caregivers, limiting their personal 
development and ability to participate in the labour market, with the 
attendant loss of potential productivity.
In addition, only three co-responsibility transfer programmes in 
the region have explicitly incorporated indigenous peoples —those most 
excluded from social security and most vulnerable to risk owing to their 
historical exclusion from the region’s societies (León, 2008; Mesa-Lago, 
2009). This indicates that a great challenge still lies ahead for universalizing 
their enjoyment of rights.3
Thus, the challenge is to implement dynamic mechanisms for entry 
and exit from each State’s wide array of social policies, in order to mitigate 
and overcome the short-, medium- and long-term risks of the various 
population groups.
D.  Cross-sector coordination: a key prerequisite
As mentioned earlier, there is a whole host of possible instruments 
and proposals for developing a comprehensive social protection system. 
The first challenge is to implement mechanisms for coordinating policies 
and their operational instruments in order to respond effectively to 
citizens’ diverse protection needs and so meet the requirements of 
horizontal integration (coordination across sectors) and vertical integration 
(coordination between levels of government) described in chapter IV.
3  Colombia and Panama have developed specific models for working with indigenous 
districts and families, based on an ethnic approach, while Mexico has stepped up the 
Oportunidades programme in indigenous areas (Robles, 2009; Waters, 2009).
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The rationale for progressively incorporating social protection 
components into comprehensive systems comes up against a number of 
institutional constraints in coordinating and linking these components, 
which public management has failed to take into account in the past. 
Even though the cross-sector approach took root in Latin America 
during the last decade in connection with the debate on State reform and 
modernization (Cunill, 2005; Repetto, 2010b), its analysis tended to be 
confined to specific experiences requiring cross-sector coordination. The 
design of comprehensive social protection and promotion systems calls 
for a new rationale, which complicates the tasks and responses to which 
various institutions and actors already have an ongoing commitment 
(Acosta and Ramírez, 2004; Ramírez and Peñaloza, 2007, pp. 56-57).
The coordination required for a comprehensive social protection 
system can be defined in terms of a permanent body or mechanism in 
which the different parties and institutions feel they play a part, as active 
partners with rights and obligations, and where everyone benefits from 
the outcomes but must also bear part of the costs. When considering the 
components required by such a system to provide a horizontally integrated 
offering, the priority is to ensure the participation of departments or 
ministries of labour (in some cases separate from those responsible for 
pensions and social security, as in Brazil) and of social development, 
health and education, provident or social security funds, pension fund 
managers and others. Provision should also be made for representation, at 
least on an advisory basis, of workers’ organizations such as trade union 
associations, as well as civic organizations, related non-governmental 
organizations and the community at large.
When management is based on coordination, there is a risk that 
the difficulties in implementing it and differences between its members 
will be used as an excuse for poor performance and failure to achieve 
objectives. To reduce this risk and achieve the desired success, there must 
be a common analytical base and basic agreements on objectives, goals and 
priorities, as well as on policy components, institutions and programmes.
The experiences of countries in the region indicate that the time is 
ripe for implementing and enhancing coordination. Nonetheless, further 
work is required to achieve a true culture of inter-agency coordination, as 
States continue to apply strong sectoral rationales. This makes it difficult, 
for instance, to coordinate the wide range of non-contributory pension 
instruments that coexist in a country, as illustrated by Brazil (Levy, 2009; 
Mesa-Lago, 2009). It also reveals even more starkly the lack of entities for 
managing or coordinating the various bodies involved in social protection 
systems, as illustrated by Colombia (DNP, 2008, p. 13). In addition, the cross-
sector approach remains more of a goal than a reality owing either to the 
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plethora of instruments for the same components, such as old-age pensions 
in Mexico (Rubio and Garfias, 2010), or to obvious operational constraints 
arising from the political culture and regulatory framework, as in Chile.
As mentioned in chapter  IV, coordinating social protection 
provision poses a challenge of both horizontal and vertical integration. The 
heterogeneity of existing governance structures in the region, ranging from 
federal to unitary countries, not only makes it impossible to define a single 
pathway but also compounds the problem of identifying institutional 
systems for formulating synergistic management processes. The more 
room there is for autonomy at regional and local levels, the greater the 
effort required to negotiate and agree on common goals and objectives.
To prevent agreements between the different sectors or levels of 
government from falling hostage to management situations, it is vital to 
institutionalize them through formal inter-agency cooperation agreements, 
which in turn calls for legal instruments to set up this cooperation and 
facilitate its implementation and control.
E. Information for comprehensive management:  
a still to achieve goal
As mentioned earlier, despite the fact that, for more than two decades, 
there have been moves in the region to include systems for monitoring and 
evaluating social policy management, this goal has still not been achieved.
 Until the early 1980s, the methodologies used were based on cost-
benefit analysis, as they were developed in connection with productive 
and public-investment projects. In the mid-1980s, efficiency analysis began 
to be used because of the problem in estimating the economic benefits 
of social programmes, which led to the parallel design of ex post impact 
assessments and cost-impact or cost-effectiveness analysis. As from the 
mid-1990s, the latter model grew significantly, accompanied by stronger 
financial monitoring, operational monitoring and process evaluation. 
What has been lacking so far is a move towards developing comprehensive 
systems that make it possible to conduct ex ante estimates, monitoring, and 
ex post evaluations of the management of social programmes in general 
and social protection in particular.
The experiences of countries in the region have not yet enabled a 
true culture of evaluation, defined as a management tool, to develop. In 
many cases, evaluation is used solely for the purposes of administrative 
oversight, budget control or academic development. While such 
approaches are not inherently negative, clearly they are insufficient to 
improve effectiveness.
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The challenge is to develop comprehensive information systems 
by combining the advantages of the different analytical approaches, 
so that they can help to place the focus on quality management. They 
must therefore contribute to the (real and perceived) attainment of 
social objectives, income redistribution and economic benefit, enhancing 
efficiency by means of process analysis.
 So far, progress with evaluation has been confined to specific 
programmes and projects, in terms of both social policies in general and 
social protection in particular. While this is a positive achievement, it is 
not enough in itself. For information to contribute to decision-making on 
the comprehensive proposals described in this book, which call for the 
coordination of various interventions, there must be information systems 
with social, financial and operational indicators that are not confined to 
their own specific management but extend to social policy as a whole. 
In other words, they must be coordinated with the national system of 
economic and social indicators and take into account the data from 
programme and project monitoring and evaluation, including national 
economic and social statistics from household surveys, official records and 
public finance and national accounts statistics.
Finally, in close conjunction with the approach of studying policy 
effects, information systems must take into account not only the cost of 
trying to resolve problems but also, and more importantly, the cost of 
failing to do so (Martínez and Fernández, 2007). The challenge, therefore, 
is for decision-making on social protection to consider the social and 
economic consequences of lack of protection, both present and future: for 
instance, loss of human capital and investment opportunities arising from 
breaches of the agreements enshrined in the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
F. Co-responsibility transfer programmes:  
the “Christmas tree” syndrome
Although the challenges referred to in this book for the development of 
comprehensive social protection systems are common to all protection 
instruments, in view of the importance that co-responsibility transfer 
programmes have acquired in protecting the region’s poor, a number of 
specific aspects need to be considered, as discussed below.
As mentioned in chapter  V, for CTPs to be an effective social 
protection tool and not merely an isolated and short-lived intervention, 
they must become a gateway into the system and help to establish a 
continuum of benefits at different levels of social policy. That is to say, CTPs 
must inform beneficiaries explicitly, using set operational procedures, that 
they are entering a system that connects them with social institutions in 
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various fields, meaning that, even though they may graduate from certain 
programmes, this does not require them to waive their right to protection. 
This step must entail a move towards new protection alternatives, as well 
as improving access to basic social services. It should not be construed as 
a permanent state of dependency on State benefits but, on the contrary, as 
an embodiment of social citizenship expressed in terms of monitoring of 
social rights and the establishment of guarantees by the State.
The degree of institutionalization of universal policies in the State 
apparatus and the coverage they have achieved are a good indicator of the 
challenges each country faces in this area but, as many still rely on external 
funding from loans and grants (see table 5 of the statistical annex), their 
sustainability over time will remain a challenge until such time as they 
become a stable part of the national budget appropriation.
The effectiveness of demand-side programmes like CTPs could 
be said to depend chiefly on the capacity, coverage and quality of basic 
social services and poverty policies. This capacity stems from: the 
service infrastructure required to meet the human capital objectives of 
CTPs; the existence of other complementary programmes and services 
facilitating the implementation of conditionalities; a wealth of knowledge 
and experience of policy and programme management; and design and 
management elements.
For co-responsibility transfer programmes to become useful 
and effective social protection instruments, they must be given specific 
objectives and functions, with defined powers and responsibilities. 
Some CTPs have expanded their range of social services and benefits 
by implementing specific actions, ranging from health talks to technical 
and vocational training workshops, under the same CTP (Cecchini 
and Madariaga, 2010). However, this may not be the most appropriate 
method, as it can undermine or even contradict programme objectives and 
jeopardize progress already achieved. Therefore there is a danger of co-
responsibility transfer programmes becoming a kind of Christmas tree 
on which new benefits are hung mechanically, together with more and 
more requirements, leading to an all-encompassing but not very specific 
or effective structure that tends to become independent of sectoral public 
policy management and of the specific policy objectives.
This book has revealed that it is no easy task to consolidate inclusive, 
rights-based, comprehensively managed social protection systems in Latin 
America. On the contrary, major political, technical, administrative, legal 
and financial efforts are required. Countries wishing to move clearly and 
decisively towards this goal will need to amass resources and manage them 
effectively, as well as to maintain a long-term perspective in order to tackle 
the many challenges and difficulties they will encounter along the way.
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Annex 1
Social protection and economic,  
social and cultural rights
The minimum legal protection requirements that States are obliged to meet 
are defined by the international system of human rights and, in particular, 
standards relating to economic, social and cultural rights. These rights 
were first enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (United 
Nations, 1948), the direct predecessor of the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted by the United Nations in 
1966. In Latin America and the Caribbean, the Inter-American Human 
Rights System of the Organization of American States (OAS) concluded the 
American Convention on Human Rights in 1969 and the Protocol of San 
Salvador in 1988. To date, eight countries in the region have also ratified 
the Social Security (Minimum Standards) Convention, 1952 (No.  102), of 
the International Labour Organization (ILO). These instruments underline 
how important it is to adopt rights as a key element in the region’s social 
protection approach.
A. Universal Declaration of Human Rights
The Declaration provides an essential guide to the areas that the State 
must safeguard for everyone, including civil, political, economic, social 
and cultural rights. It is based on the fundamental principle of equal 
and non-discriminatory access to mechanisms that contribute to the 
realization of rights.
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With respect to social protection, the Declaration reveals an early 
concern with the various components that would later shape policy. 
Article  22 establishes the right of everyone to social security and to the 
realization of economic, social and cultural rights.
Articles 23 and 24 deal explicitly with workers’ rights. Article 23 
states that everyone has the right to work, to free choice of employment, 
to just and favourable conditions of work, to equal pay for equal work 
and to just and favourable remuneration ensuring for workers and their 
families an existence worthy of human dignity. Article 23 also establishes 
the right to protection against unemployment and the right to form and 
join trade unions. Article  24 establishes everyone’s right to rest and to 
basic working conditions.
Article 25, relating to non-contributory social protection, states that 
everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and 
well-being of themselves and their families, including food, clothing, 
housing and medical care and necessary social services. In addition, it 
defines the entitlement to social protection for motherhood and childhood. 
Article 25 also mentions social security, stating that everyone has the right 
to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, 
old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond their control.
Article  26 states that everyone has the right to education, which 
shall be compulsory and free, at least in the elementary and fundamental 
stages. It states that technical and professional education shall be made 
generally available and higher education shall be equally accessible to all 
on the basis of merit.
B. International Covenant on Economic, Social  
and Cultural Rights
The Covenant points clearly to a number of aspects and standards that 
should be enshrined in the social protection policies of States that have 
undertaken to realize these rights and have ratified the Covenant. It is 
therefore important to interpret the Covenant’s content from a social 
protection perspective.
Articles  1 to  5 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights establish the principles guiding the specific rights 
recognized by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which inspire 
a rights-based approach. In brief, these articles state the following.
Article 1: All peoples have the right of self-determination, entitling 
them to freely determine their political status and freely pursue their 
economic, social and cultural development.
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Article  2: Each State Party to the Covenant is obliged to respect, 
protect, promote and achieve progressively the full realization of the rights 
recognized in the Covenant, without discrimination, to the maximum 
of its available resources and respecting each State’s sovereign decisions 
regarding the applicability of rights to non-nationals.
Article 3: Men and women have an equal right to the enjoyment of 
all economic, social and cultural rights.
Article  4: States may subject economic, social and cultural rights 
to such limitations as are determined by law only insofar as this may be 
compatible with the Covenant.
Article  5: No rights may be subject to arbitrary acts of any kind. 
These principles provide a guide to the ensuing nine articles, which define 
matters relating directly to social protection.
Articles 6 to 8 deal with issues pertaining to decent work and labour 
market regulation. The key elements of each of these articles are as follows.
Article 6: Everyone has the right to gain their living by work, which 
they may choose freely. For this right to be realized, States must ensure 
access to technical and vocational guidance and training programmes, 
policies and techniques to achieve steady development and full and 
productive employment. This right is therefore linked with access to the 
social services provided by social protection.
Article  7: Everyone has the right to the enjoyment of just and 
favourable conditions of work, ensuring sufficient remuneration to provide 
all workers with a decent living for themselves and their families, equal 
pay for equal work and equal working conditions for men and women. 
Article 7 also enshrines the right to safe and healthy working conditions, 
equal opportunity for everyone to be promoted in their employment, and 
paid rest periods.
Article 8: Everyone has a right to form or join trade unions and the 
right to strike.
The rights enshrined in articles 9 to 11 relate more directly to the 
State’s obligations to safeguard incomes and to maintain an adequate 
standard of living for workers and their families. In brief, these rights are 
designed to ensure the following.
Article 9: Everyone has the right to social security, including social 
insurance.
Article 10: Protection and assistance should be afforded to family, 
particularly for its establishment (based on marriage between freely 
consenting spouses) and while the family is responsible for children’s 
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education. Article 10 also states that special protection should be accorded 
to mothers before and after childbirth, which is related to labour market 
regulation. It also stipulates the State’s obligation to provide special 
protection to children and young people from economic and social 
exploitation, punishing by law employment of children or young people in 
work harmful to their welfare in any way.
Article 11: Everyone has the right to an adequate standard of living 
for themselves and their families, including adequate food, clothing and 
housing, and to the continuous improvement of living conditions. This 
right is linked to access to social services.
Articles 12 to 14 identify the following key areas for social services 
that States must safeguard.
Article  12: The right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest 
attainable standard of physical and mental health. The article makes 
States responsible for implementing measures for: the reduction of infant 
mortality and the healthy development of the child; the prevention, 
treatment and control of diseases; assuring medical care; and the 
improvement of all aspects of environmental and industrial hygiene.
Article 13: Everyone has the right to education. States are obliged to 
make primary education compulsory and available to all free of charge. Free 
secondary and higher education shall also be introduced progressively and 
made accessible to all, as well as fundamental education for those who have 
not received or completed the whole period of primary education.
Article  14: Countries where primary education is not free and 
compulsory throughout the territory must, within two years, work out and 
adopt a plan of action for the progressive implementation of the principle 
of compulsory education free of charge for all.
Article 15 recognizes the right of everyone to take part in cultural 
life and to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress. While this right does 
not relate directly to social protection, it can be seen as one of its outcomes 
because it pertains to the broader area of human welfare and development. 
It should therefore be considered as a cross-cutting issue of all its functions.
In accordance with a rights-based approach and the 
interrelationship defined by this approach in all recognized human rights, 
the rights enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights must 
be linked with all those recognized by other conventions and protocols, 
including the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, No. 169 (ILO, 
1989), the Convention on the Rights of the Child (United Nations, 1989) and 
the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (United Nations, 1965).
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C. American Convention on Human Rights  
and Protocol of San Salvador
In Chapter  III, article  26, of the Convention, OAS member States 
undertake to progressively achieve “the full realization of the rights 
implicit in the economic, social, educational, scientific and cultural 
standards”. It states that this undertaking must be achieved by legislation 
or other appropriate means. The Protocol of San Salvador, concluded in 
1988, focuses specifically on economic, social and cultural rights.1
Articles 1 to 5 of the Protocol of San Salvador establish the general 
rules of operation for signatory States with respect to measures to be 
adopted in these matters. In particular, article  1 states that measures 
should be adopted, to the extent allowed by States’ available resources, for 
achieving progressively the full observance of the rights recognized in the 
Protocol; article 2 obliges States to adopt such legislative measures as may 
be necessary for making those rights a reality; and article  3 establishes 
that these measures must be implemented in a non-discriminatory way. 
Articles 4 and 5 state that restrictions on such rights may be established 
only by means of laws promulgated for the purpose of preserving the 
general welfare in a democratic society.
Articles 6 to 8 focus on the economic rights pertaining to the world 
of work, as follows.
Article 6: Everyone has the right to work and to secure the means 
for living a dignified and decent existence by performing a freely 
elected activity. States must adopt measures for the achievement of full 
employment, vocational guidance and technical and vocational training, 
directed in particular at people with disabilities and at women, to 
guarantee their right to work.
Article 7: Everyone shall enjoy the right to work under just, equitable 
and satisfactory conditions, in particular with respect to: remuneration; 
the right of all workers to follow their vocation; promotion; stability of 
employment; safety and hygiene at work; working hours; and rest time. 
In particular, it establishes measures to protect child employment, stating 
that in no case shall work constitute an impediment to school attendance 
by minors under the age of 16.
Article 8: States shall ensure the right of workers to organize and join 
trade unions, in keeping with the provisions of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights (United Nations, 1948) and the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (United Nations, 1966).
1 The Protocol of San Salvador came into force in November 1999.
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Article 9: Everyone shall have the right to social security protecting 
them from the consequences of old age and of disability, which prevents 
them from securing the means for a dignified and decent existence. 
Article  9 also establishes the right to survivors’ insurance for workers’ 
dependents. In the case of people who are employed, the right to social 
security shall cover at least medical care and an allowance or retirement 
benefit in the case of work accidents or occupational disease, and paid 
maternity leave before and after childbirth.
Articles  10, 12  and  13 deal with areas highly relevant to social 
services.
Article  10: Everyone shall have the right to health, understood to 
mean the enjoyment of the highest level of physical, mental and social 
well-being. The States Parties agree to recognize health as a public good 
and to guarantee that all individuals subject to the State’s jurisdiction are 
provided with primary health care, universal immunization against the 
principal infectious diseases and public education on the prevention and 
treatment of health problems.
Article  12: Everyone has the right to adequate nutrition which 
guarantees the possibility of enjoying the highest level of physical, 
emotional and intellectual development. To eradicate malnutrition, States 
must improve methods of production, supply and distribution of food.
Article  13: Everyone has the right to education. States must make 
primary education compulsory and accessible to all without cost, and 
secondary and higher education should be made accessible to all by the 
progressive introduction of free education. At the same time, States must 
encourage basic education for those who have not received or completed the 
whole cycle of primary instruction, as well as implementing special education 
programmes for people with physical disabilities or mental deficiencies.
Articles 11 and 14 define key areas for all the economic, social and 
cultural rights, such as the right to a healthy environment and the right 
to the benefits of culture. Articles  15 to  18 provide a set of regulations 
concerning the special protection of the family and the most vulnerable 
population groups. For the areas most directly related to social protection, 
these regulations include the following.
Article 15: States must ensure that the material conditions of families 
are improved, in particular by undertaking to provide special care and 
assistance to mothers before and after childbirth; to guarantee adequate 
nutrition for children at the nursing stage and during school attendance 
years; and to adopt special measures for the protection of adolescents in 
order to ensure the full development of their capacities.
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Article 16: This article reiterates the right of every child to free and 
compulsory education, at least in the elementary phase.
Article  17: Everyone has the right to special protection in old age 
and States should take progressively the necessary steps to make this right 
a reality. In particular, they should provide suitable facilities, as well as 
food and specialized medical care, for elderly people in need and should 
undertake work programmes specifically designed for them. States should 
also foster the establishment of social organizations aimed at improving 
the quality of life for elderly people.
Article  18: States must undertake work programmes aimed 
specifically at people with disabilities, as well as provide special training 
to their families and encourage the establishment of social groups 
specifically for people with disabilities.
D. ILO Social Security (Minimum Standards) 
Convention, 1952 (No. 102) 
The Convention establishes minimum standards  for social security 
benefits and conditions of entitlement to them, which can be determined 
in accordance with countries’ wage levels. The Convention covers nine 
social security areas: (i) medical care (articles 7 to 12); (ii) sickness benefit 
(articles 13 to 18); (iii) unemployment benefit (articles 19 to 24); (iv) old age 
benefit (articles 25 to 30); (v) benefits for work accidents and occupational 
diseases (articles  31 to  38); (vi)  family benefit (articles  39 to  45); 
(vii) maternity benefit (articles 46 to 52); (viii) disability benefit (articles 53 
to 58); and (ix) survivors’ benefit (articles 59 to 64).
In Latin America and the Caribbean, the Convention has been 
ratified by Barbados, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Brazil, Costa 
Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru and the Plurinational State of Bolivia. States 
may ratify the Convention by accepting the standards of at least three of 
the nine social security areas and meet the obligations arising from the 
remaining areas at a later date, enabling States gradually to meet all the 
objectives established in the Convention. Members with an insufficiently 
developed economy and medical facilities may avail themselves of 
temporary exceptions to enable them to restrict the scope of the Convention 
and the coverage of benefits provided.
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Annex 2
Three model co-responsibility  
transfer programmes in the region
A. Mexico’s Oportunidades programme
Mexico’s education, health and nutrition programme (formerly 
called Progresa and now renamed Oportunidades), which was established 
in 1997 to change the traditional policy approach to poverty reduction 
in Mexico, marked the growth of nationwide co-responsibility transfer 
programmes in the region.
Progresa’s design owed much to the challenges and lessons of the 
social programmes that preceded it between the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
As mentioned by Levy and Rodríguez (2005), in the past Mexico’s social 
policy was characterized by programmes that began and ended with 
election cycles, were isolated from other public interventions and were 
hostage to patronage networks and corporations. This was exacerbated by 
Mexico’s federal structure and the influence of local warlords.
Between the mid-1980s and mid-1990s, Mexico’s main non-
contributory social protection programmes were food programmes, in the 
form of food distribution or food subsidies, some federal for the country’s 
entire poor population and others administered by devolved sectoral 
public entities.
Some of the main problems with these programmes were that they 
were highly fragmented, independently run and poorly coordinated with 
other programmes, which resulted in duplication of functions, inefficiency, 
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variations in operating rules from one programme to another and limited 
capacity to cover the target population (Levy and Rodríguez, 2005). In 
1996, the Federal Government was running 19 food subsidy programmes 
(14 targeted and 5 universal, predominantly subsidizing milk and tortilla1). 
General subsidies had a marked urban bias, with nearly three quarters of 
resources channelled into urban areas (especially the metropolitan area), 
despite the fact that around 60% of the poor were living in rural areas. 
In addition, coverage of rural areas was particularly low in small and in 
highly marginalized communities, with the result that, in 1996, around 
60% of poor rural families received no subsidies from any programme. 
Targeted programmes were run by entities that imposed their own 
particular criteria for identifying poor households. Even though, in 
principle, their target population was the same, the methods they used 
were neither homogeneous nor completely objective and transparent, 
leading to significant errors of inclusion. For instance, in the case of the 
Trust Fund for Payment of the Tortilla Subsidy (FIDELIST), a subsidiary of 
the National Basic Commodity Corporation (CONASUPO), the inclusion 
error amounted to 20% overall, rising to 50% in the Federal District of 
Mexico. Similarly, the LICONSA Milk Entitlement Programme (which 
comes under the Ministry of Social Development (SEDESOL)) also had an 
estimated 50% inclusion error.
Another predecessor to Progresa, which ran from 1989 to 1994, was 
the National Solidarity Programme (PRONASOL). PRONASOL succeeded 
in instigating the debate on shared responsibility between the State and 
programme users, as well as in shifting the emphasis to decentralization 
and community participation (Cohen, Franco and Villatoro, 2006). At the 
same time, PRONASOL provided a set of benefits typical of today’s co-
responsibility transfer programmes, which were to go on to form the 
backbone of Progresa (Cohen, Franco and Villatoro, 2006), including: direct 
cash and non-cash transfers; other cash subsidies; promotion of human 
capital assets (education and health); and investment in infrastructure 
for enhancing such assets. While PRONASOL was highly successful in 
boosting local social capital (Levy and Rodríguez, 2005), critics pointed out 
that, beyond the debate, the programme tended to fall into old patronage 
and bureaucratic practices that favoured corporatist social policy schemes 
(Cohen, Franco and Villatoro, 2006).
The severe economic crisis that struck Mexico in 1994 and 1995 
opened a window of opportunity for deeper reforms. On the one hand, 
there was a desire to avoid a sudden and disorderly expansion of existing 
programmes in response to the economic crisis, especially the tortilla and 
1 Tortilla is a thin, unleavened flat bread made from finely ground maize that is a staple of 
the Mexican diet.
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milk programme, which would have compounded recognized problems 
and had a serious financial impact (Levy and Rodríguez, 2005). On 
the other hand, as described by Levy and Rodríguez (2005), the lesson 
learned from operating these programmes in 1994 and 1995 was that 
substantive changes needed to be made, which would be difficult if the 
programmes continued to expand. There was widespread agreement, for 
example, on the need to: unify and ensure transparency in beneficiary 
selection rules to make them more objective and establish a more balanced 
distribution between urban and rural areas; enhance the nutritional 
impact of programmes, especially for pregnant and nursing women and 
children under the age of five; and exploit in a more systematic way the 
complementarities between such sectors as health and education.
In 1995, in mid-crisis, the first proposal was put forward to convert 
the food programmes into a programme of income transfers to the poor, 
conditional upon their use of health services. In 1996, a pilot programme 
called Basic Food Basket for Family Welfare in the State of Campeche 
was used to evaluate the acceptability, impact and costs of alternative 
mechanisms (Levy and Rodríguez, 2005).2 The programme included cash 
transfers to mothers on condition that they attended health checks at the 
requisite health centre, where they were also given food supplements; this 
condition was later expanded to include education. The results of these 
experiments were key to the design of Progresa, particularly in taking into 
account: corruption and patronage problems; the importance of targeting; 
the need to boost the supply of basic services and to adjust coordination and 
operational monitoring requirements; people’s preference for cash transfers; 
the positive impact of higher incomes on local trade; and the importance 
of maintaining a close link between education and health interventions 
(Cohen, Franco and Villatoro, 2006; Levy and Rodríguez, 2005).
In its original design, Progresa included a set of benefits in the areas 
of education, health and nutrition (transfers in cash and kind and access to 
a basic package of health care). These benefits were provided in exchange 
for action by beneficiaries in the aforementioned areas, such as children’s 
school attendance and participation in health checks by pregnant women, 
mothers, infants and preschool children. Progresa’s approach specified a 
move towards interventions exploiting the synergies among education, 
health and nutrition measures.
2 This raised a number of dilemmas: whether to provide a direct cash transfer or a subsidy; 
whether to target the entire poor population or only the rural poor; whether to introduce 
new selection criteria or use existing ones; how large the transfer amounts should be; 
which conditionalities should be included and how to deal with the increased workload 
in the respective sectors; and whether resources should be earmarked to support 
demand or supply (Levy and Rodríguez, 2005).
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This approach included some even more innovative guidelines, 
such as making the family the core unit of social action and basing 
interventions on the family as a whole, as well giving women a central 
role as intermediary between the programme and the family. Progresa 
also addressed problems of targeting and basic services, prioritizing new 
service provision in rural communities with high levels of marginalization 
and extreme poverty, while at the same time ensuring a minimum supply 
of education and health services to comply with the conditionalities 
demanded of families. This was combined with a federal resource 
allocation to communities with an inadequate supply of services so that 
they could join the programme at a future date.
Significant efforts were also made to shield Progresa from political 
manipulation and corporate interests. This involved setting strict operating 
rules, disseminating information and the rules more widely, temporarily 
suspending the inclusion of new beneficiaries during election periods and 
contracting with independent external institutions to evaluate programme 
outcomes (Levy and Rodríguez, 2005). Even though the programme’s name 
was changed to Oportunidades in 2001, its intervention and management 
model remained the same, while a number of changes were introduced to 
improve it (Cohen, Franco and Villatoro, 2006). They included: expanding 
programme coverage to include semi-urban and urban areas; improving 
capacity to deliver the benefits and certify the conditionalities; increasing 
coordination between sectors; establishing exit mechanisms for beneficiary 
families (Differentiated Support Scheme (EDA)); and improving means of 
citizen participation (community outreach committees were set up). In 
subsequent years, Progresa’s cash transfers were gradually increased, with 
the inclusion of grants for students in intermediate and higher education 
and for older adults, cash incentives for young people to prevent them from 
dropping out at the highest levels of schooling (the Youth with Opportunities 
education grant) and additional transfers to cover the rising costs of fuel 
(Energy Subsidy) and food (the Vivir Mejor food support component).
Since it has been in operation, Oportunidades has achieved results 
in a range of areas, such as nutrition, health, education and income 
(SEDESOL, 2008). This has consolidated it both domestically and abroad 
and turned it into Mexico’s leading poverty reduction programme, one 
of the largest in the region and an undisputed world standard (Cohen, 
Franco and Villatoro, 2006; Fiszbein and Schady, 2009). The challenges 
of Mexico’s social policy have now led to Oportunidades being viewed 
as part of a social protection network that acts not only to create basic 
skills but also to protect against risks, improving the environment and 
providing income-generating options (Merino, 2010). At the same time, the 
programme continues to improve the benefits it provides and to address 
the specific needs of the different population groups. In practice, this has 
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resulted in pilot projects to test operating rules tailored to the conditions 
of urban areas and indigenous communities (Programa de Desarrollo 
Humano Oportunidades, 2009).
B. Brazil’s Bolsa Família conditional  
cash transfer programme
The emergence and consolidation of Bolsa Família in Brazil took place 
in two stages (Godoy, 2004): the debate in the late 1980s within the 
Brazilian Workers’ Party on the need for a guaranteed minimum income 
programme and the impetus of the 1988 Constitution and its definition of 
social assistance from a social rights perspective. The first co-responsibility 
transfer programmes began to appear in the early 1990s.
As time went on, proposals for supplementing income by means of 
a universal minimum income were associated increasingly with resolving 
specific social problems, identified chiefly as low levels of schooling and 
high drop-out rates. As a result, the idea of an education-linked minimum 
income gained momentum (Godoy, 2004) and the human development 
and capital component started to acquire greater prominence. Conditions 
were imposed on the receipt of benefits (associated with school attendance 
and health checks), while the idea of a universal minimum income was 
gradually replaced by that of a more modest grant targeted at poor families 
with young or school-age children (Draibe, 2006).
Starting in 1995, local pilot programmes began to be implemented, 
first in the Federal District (Brasilia) and later in the municipalities of 
Campinas (1995), Belo Horizonte (1997), Vitória (1997) and Recife (1997), 
as well as in small and medium-sized municipalities.3 These programmes 
differed in such respects as selection criteria, amounts and methods of 
calculating transfers (fixed-sum transfers, progressive transfers up to a 
certain threshold or transfers based on the number of children).4 However, 
all programmes shared a similar target population, namely families 
with school-age children (between 7  and 14  years old) and the aim of 
making benefits conditional upon such activities as children’s school 
attendance and unemployed parents’ participation in training courses and 
employment programmes (Godoy, 2004).
3 According to Godoy (2004), between the emergence of the first local minimum-income 
programme in the Federal District of Brasilia and implementation of the nationwide 
programme (Bolsa Escola) in 2001, similar programmes were introduced in seven 
Brazilian states, including in 10 of the 27 capitals and more than 200 municipalities with 
various political affiliations.
4 Other variations were the requirement for a minimum period of residence in the 
municipality and duration and continuance in the programme.
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Following this local trend, in 1999 the Federal Government launched 
a similar programme called Minimum Income Guarantee Programme 
(PGRM) in municipalities with a per capita income of less than half that of 
their state. In 1996, it introduced the Programme for the Eradication of Child 
Labour (PETI) to provide cash transfers and socio-educational services 
to poor families with children involved in child labour, in exchange for 
the children stopping work and attending school and extra-curricular 
activities. In 2001, the nationwide Bolsa Escola school grant programme 
was introduced, consisting of an education-linked minimum income 
administered by the Ministry of Education and 100% funded by the Federal 
Government, which established definitively the interest in federal-level 
targeted conditional cash transfers. Bolsa Escola was implemented through 
the municipalities, prioritizing those with the lowest human development 
indices and highest levels of marginalization and providing incentives for 
the introduction of beneficiary-registration instruments and mechanisms 
for targeting the very poorest. In subsequent years, a range of similar 
programmes emerged in other sectors, adding to the already widespread 
local and federal initiatives. Examples included the Ministry of Health’s 
Bolsa Alimentação food grant and the Ministry of Mines and Energy’s Cartão 
Alimentação food card and Auxilio-Gás cooking gas subsidy.
Even though these experiences, especially Bolsa Escola, were 
extensively publicized both at home and abroad and received positive 
assessments (Aguiar and Araujo, 2002), the high levels of fragmentation 
and overlaps (Draibe, 2006) led President Luiz Inácio Lula Da Silva to roll 
all sectoral and local income transfer programmes into the Bolsa Família5 
programme. One reason was to simplify the bureaucracy into a single 
structure, pooling the efforts of the different administrative levels and 
emphasizing a cross-sector approach (Draibe, 2006). Bolsa Família was 
therefore placed in the hands of the Ministry for Social Development 
and Fight against Hunger (MDS) where it was incorporated into the 
multisectoral Zero Hunger programme, becoming the linchpin of the new 
Government’s poverty reduction policy.6
5 In 2003, the “carry-over programmes” (Bolsa Escola school grant, Cartão Alimentação food 
card, Bolsa Alimentação food grant and Auxilio-Gás cooking gas subsidy) were concluded, 
although the gas subsidy was temporarily re-opened in late 2008 in response to rising 
fuel prices. While these programmes continued to pay out benefits, they were closed 
to the entry of new beneficiaries, directing them instead to Bolsa Família. In 2005, the 
Programme for the Eradication of Child Labour was also merged into Bolsa Família. 
However, in this instance the aim was to harmonize benefits to allow the programme to 
continue operating solely for non-poor families with children involved in child labour, 
while Bolsa Família took over responsibility for the entire poor population.
6 Despite its international acclaim, domestically the Zero Hunger programme did not 
perform as well as expected as a platform for coordinating various public interventions 
and programmes, with the result that Bolsa Família went on to become Brazil’s leading 
social assistance programme (Draibe, 2006).
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The consolidation of co-responsibility transfer programmes in 
Brazil and the pursuit of a cross-sector approach were aided by a political 
determination embodied in various institutional arrangements. In 
addition to the influence of the 1988  Constitution, as mentioned earlier, 
and the subsequent enactment in 1993 of the Framework Law on Social 
Assistance (LOAS), the State poverty alleviation fund (FECOP) was set up 
in 2001, enabling the Federal Government to finance all income transfer 
programmes, as well as to simplify and speed up their implementation 
(Draibe, 2006). The creation in 2003 of the Ministry for Social Development 
and Fight against Hunger was another decisive move, as its focus was 
to integrate policies for social assistance, income transfer and food 
and nutritional security. Thus Bolsa Família was followed in 2004 by the 
National Social Assistance Policy (PNAS), which gave rise to the Unified 
Social Assistance System (SUAS) in 2005 and the National System for Food 
and Nutritional Security (SISAN) in 2006. Both initiatives were designed 
to create a management model for coordinating non-contributory social 
protection policy, based on: redefining the responsibilities of the different 
administrative levels; improving the organization of the various actions 
and benefits; and introducing a new approach to the implementation of 
non-contributory social protection, focusing on decentralization and 
community participation (MDS, no date). A number of critical tools 
emerged in this connection, such as the nationwide single register for 
social programmes (CadÚnico), which unifies all available information on 
households eligible for the different social programmes and benefits, and 
the Family Development Index (IDF), which provides information about 
families’ vulnerability, enabling municipalities to implement a range of 
supplementary social policy measures (Bolsa Família, 2010).
Internationally, Bolsa Família marked the emergence of a type of co-
responsibility transfer programme associated with the establishment of 
a guaranteed minimum income (Godoy, 2004; Draibe, 2006; Britto, 2008). 
While, in practice, this had to be reconciled with resource availability, 
the debate on the universalization of its benefits is still ongoing (Britto, 
2008; Suplicy, 2009). This has led the programme to give more importance 
to monitoring conditionalities and the difficulties that families face in 
complying with them than on penalizing non-compliance (Draibe, 2006). 
Families are monitored by means of local instruments of the Unified Social 
Assistance System, including Social Assistance Referral Centres (CRAS) 
and the Comprehensive Family Support Programme (PAIF).
Bolsa Família adds a citizenship dimension to co-responsibility 
transfer programmes where the ultimate aim of transferring income and 
enhancing human capital to fight poverty is to remedy a deficit in the 
realization of basic citizens’ rights (Godoy, 2004). Thus, the conditionalities 
are seen as “strengthening rights” (Mesquita, 2009). In addition, heavy 
emphasis is placed on decentralized management of Bolsa Família 
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processes and the Federal Government earmarks funding to support 
this decentralized management. Much like Oportunidades and other co-
responsibility transfer programmes, Bolsa Família prioritizes the family as 
its unit of intervention, gives preference to direct cash transfers over other 
kinds of subsidy and delivers the benefits to women.
In 2006, Bolsa Família began to expand its scope of intervention 
progressively to incorporate new benefits for its beneficiaries through 
“complementary programmes”. These are federal programmes 
implemented by the respective sectors in such areas as education and 
literacy, income generation and living conditions. The complementary 
employment programmes have gained much prominence in recent years, 
making it possible to plan exit routes from the programme by building the 
capacity and self-reliance of individuals to generate income (OAS/ECLAC/
ILO, 2010). The aim of these interventions is to enhance the impact of cash 
transfers and prevent beneficiary dependency.
C. Solidarity Chile
The Solidarity Chile system and its main component, the Puente 
programme, were set up in 2002 following the identification of a persistent 
hard core of extreme poverty in Chile that had not diminished during 
the 1990s in the way that poverty had done. The finding was that, by the 
end of the decade, while economic growth had reduced poverty figures 
and education, health and social security coverage was among the highest 
in the region, the decline in extreme poverty had tended to level off and 
remain fairly constant.
The need to address this problem prompted the Chilean 
Government to identify the reasons in order to implement new social 
policies. The conclusion was that the problem stemmed from barriers to the 
inclusion of extremely poor households that were isolating them severely 
from the country’s social, economic and cultural dynamics. This isolation 
was particularly evident in families’ disconnect from the extensive public 
supply of social services. In other words, even though the network of 
public services reached most poor people, it failed to reach those living 
in structural and chronic poverty —the very people who were most in 
need of the services. This calls for a specialized type of intervention to be 
designed for the extremely poor group that differs from that for the poor 
(FOSIS, 2004b).
In view of the social exclusion experienced by these families, it was 
decided that public provision should reach out to families rather than 
the reverse. This meant that it had to evolve from a scheme of “waiting 
for provision” (which favours the best-informed households because 
Inclusive Social Protection in Latin America: A Comprehensive... 231
this facilitates their access to public benefits and entitlements) to one 
of “converting potential demand into effective demand” (Cohen and 
Villatoro, 2006). This led to the concept of a one-stop shop, which remedied 
the fragmentation of social institutions and instigated a coordinated, cross-
sector approach by establishing a pathway into public provision that: (i) is 
the same for all social programmes and services and (ii) prioritizes families 
experiencing the most extreme poverty and exclusion. Furthermore, this 
approach emphasizes the capabilities of individuals to overcome their 
own exclusion and the need to develop these capabilities as a strategy for 
overcoming poverty. The adoption of the shared-responsibility concept 
is designed to emphasize the role of individuals in improving their own 
situation and the associated social promotion efforts.
The proposed solution was therefore intended to combine non-
contributory social protection with social promotion in an unusual 
way (FOSIS, 2004b). Strictly speaking, Solidarity Chile is not so much a 
programme as an institutional framework that lays down certain rules 
for integrating and coordinating the entire supply of public programmes 
around families in extreme poverty, with the Puente programme as 
its linchpin and the gateway through which a social worker provides 
psychosocial support tailored to the needs of each participating family 
(Larrañaga and Contreras, 2010).7 The psychosocial support programmes 
are intended to: (i) make public provision available to beneficiary families 
and (ii)  address the psychosocial issues and family dynamics that 
compound social exclusion (FOSIS, 2004b; 2004c).8 Under this scenario, the 
Solidarity Chile system is responsible for setting the rules and procedures 
for incorporating new users into public programmes and services, while 
ensuring that supply meets incremental demand by organizing inter-
agency agreements and fund transfers.9 Moreover, the psychosocial 
support actions provide users with the information and basic skills they 
need to take advantage of the different public programmes and subsidies.
In contrast to the emphasis placed by Mexico’s Progresa-
Oportunidades on incentives and Brazil’s Bolsa Família on minimum 
incomes, Solidarity Chile adopts a psychosocial approach through Puente 
7 Since 2004, further psychosocial monitoring and support programmes similar to the 
Puente programme have been included for people in extreme poverty with specific 
vulnerabilities. They are the Vínculos programme for older adults, Calle for the 
integration of homeless people and Abriendo Caminos for the children of families with 
members deprived of their liberty.
8 They include lack of self-reliance, self-esteem, trust in institutions and basic problem-
solving skills (FOSIS, 2004c).
9 Inter-agency management called for major institutional changes, as well as changes in 
such areas as resource allocation to sectors and coordination both between different 
sectors and between the different administrative levels, as well as a significant degree of 
decentralization and capacity-building of local governments (FOSIS, 2004a).
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and other associated programmes (Cohen and Franco, 2006a). The family 
focus of co-responsibility transfer programmes is of special significance 
in that it emphasizes the need to consider the family dynamics, rather 
than the cash transfer, as the factor determining human-capital 
investment decisions. In this case, the cash transfers are intended to 
cover the extra costs incurred by families in joining the network of public 
services and programmes and are not a key element of the Solidarity 
Chile intervention strategy.
This means that the family support counsellors (apoyos familiares) 
in the Puente programme take a leading role. They are responsible for 
working with families to create a space for dialogue and learning in order 
to enable them to achieve certain living standards considered as minimum 
social norms. Counsellors sign a contract with the family in which the 
family undertakes to achieve 53 basic social standards in 7  dimensions: 
health, education, housing, employment, income, family dynamics and 
identification. This undertaking is tailored to the needs and timeframes 
deemed relevant by each party. This “family support period” lasts 
24 months, during which families progress gradually through the stages 
in their psychoemotional development, joining the successive institutional 
protection and social promotion networks. As part of this process, the 
programme provides a cash transfer called the “protection bonus”, which 
is intended not to supplement the family income but rather to cover the 
transaction costs associated with accessing public provision and to help 
with applications for the various subsidies. That is why the amount of the 
bonus (starting at approximately US$ 20 per family and falling to US$ 10 
by the end of the two years) is small compared with the transfers offered 
by Oportunidades (where the child support component can be as much as 
US$ 73) and Bolsa Família (US$ 40 for the basic benefit).
The activities carried out with the Puente family support counsellor 
serve, in turn, to plan a gradual exit from the Solidarity Chile system. As 
the family meets the successive minimum standards in each dimension, 
visits from the family support counsellor becomes less frequent, while the 
protection grant amount declines. Upon completion of the support period 
(graduation from the Puente programme), families continue to receive the 
transfer (exit grant) and preferential access to public provision for a further 
three years, after which they leave the Solidarity Chile system for good.
The aim of achieving certain minimum social standards and the 
effort to incorporate beneficiaries into the public service network have 
broadened the concern for poverty alleviation to include a rights approach, 
where minimum social standards are intended to reflect a basic level of 
citizenship achieved using the dimensions in the Puente programme 
and other Solidarity Chile interventions. To this end, a few institutional 
Inclusive Social Protection in Latin America: A Comprehensive... 233
changes have been introduced, such as replacing the beneficiary selection 
record based on proxy means-testing (called the Social Action Committee 
(CAS) record) with the Social Protection Record, which defines beneficiary 
families more on the basis of vulnerability and structural poverty than 
of transient poverty and income fluctuation. The Integrated Social 
Information System (SIIS) was set up as an information and management 
platform and, more recently, the Protege Network (2009), which aims to 
extend the full range of social policy to the rest of the poor and non-poor 
population using a life-cycle approach. This makes Solidarity Chile the 
first link in a chain of interventions tailored to people’s lives and socio-
economic characteristics.
To support the idea of differences in emphasis between co-
responsibility transfer programmes, in Chile, despite the existence of the 
National Supplementary Food Programme (PNAC) for providing food 
and food supplements to pregnant women and children with nutritional 
problems in exchange for compliance with health and education conditions 
(Vergara, 1990), the format used for co-responsibility transfer programmes 
differed substantially from that of Mexico’s Oportunidades programme. 
Solidarity Chile also diverges significantly from Brazil’s Bolsa Família 
programme, in that it attributes little importance to the income component, 
as reflected in the small sums it disburses. However, Solidarity Chile is 
similar to the other models in choosing the family as its intervention unit 
and attributing a leading role to women as the link between the programme 
and households, as well as in its emphasis on targeting.
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Annex 3
Estimated cost of non-contributory  
cash transfers1
ECLAC (2010a, 2010b) has conducted simulation exercises of the cost to 
the State of fulfilling its social protection function, which includes non-
contributory cash transfers for guaranteeing and redistributing income. 
The simulation exercises were conducted on the basis of microdata from 
household surveys and were parameterized using national accounts data 
in order to estimate costs in gross domestic product (GDP) terms. The 
model allocates an amount equivalent to one poverty (or extreme poverty) 
line to each person eligible under the selected criteria and computes the 
new household income. On this basis, indicators of poverty and inequality 
are re-estimated and the scope of household coverage for each measure is 
determined.
The estimates in ECLAC (2010b) are based on four types of transfer:
•	 Allocation of one poverty line for children aged under 5.
•	 Allocation of half a poverty line for children aged between 5 
and 14.
•	 Allocation of one poverty line for persons aged over 64.
•	 Allocation of one poverty line for the unemployed (people 
unemployed for the first time in the formal and informal sectors).
1 This section is based on ECLAC (2010b, pp. 192-202).
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The poverty line is the monetary value of a basic basket of goods 
and services that includes food, housing, transportation, clothing, 
communications and a few other items required to meet basic needs. One 
half of the poverty line is equivalent to the cost of covering nutritional 
needs only (equivalent to about 2,000  kilocalories per person per day). 
In Latin America, the poverty line currently varies between US$ 60 and 
US$  250, depending on the cost of the basic basket and the purchasing 
power of the dollar in each country.
ECLAC (2010b) simulated these benefits for two universes: on the 
one hand, persons in the categories described and, on the other hand, 
persons in these categories who also belong to households with an income 
below 1.8 times the poverty line (or those deemed vulnerable to poverty).
This exercise was used to estimate the costs of the above-mentioned 
alternatives in GDP terms, as well as their impact on each country’s 
poverty and inequality rates. These estimates give an idea of the fiscal 
effort required for these transfers; naturally, that effort will vary in 
accordance with the severity of the well-being gap in each country. 
As the following figures show (with the exception of the transfer to the 
unemployed), it increases progressively from countries with a smaller 
well-being gap (group I in table II.1) to those with a wider well-being gap 
(group III). Those impacts can also be estimated in relation to each benefit 
and to all benefits combined.
Transfers to children. Despite variations from one country to 
another, the incidence of child poverty is much higher than that of adult 
poverty. A fundamental consideration of any intergenerational social 
covenant is therefore the amount of money that each society is prepared 
to pay to support the family’s role in the care, development and protection 
of children. The ECLAC simulation exercises (2010b) show the cost of 
generating an additional cash transfer for children aged  0 to 4  years 
(figure  A.1) and children aged  5 to  14 years (figure  A.2), in a universal 
format and then in one targeted at vulnerable sectors. These estimates are 
calculated without eliminating transfers already received by these families 
and, consequently, the values estimated here are additional to existing 
efforts. In the case of countries with small well-being gaps (group I), the 
cost of supplementing existing benefits with an additional transfer of 
one poverty line for each child aged under 5 and half a poverty line for 
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each child aged between 5 and 14 is affordable in both the targeted and 
universal versions within a relatively short timeframe. Given the sharp 
juvenilization of poverty in these societies and their low fertility rates, 
this is a highly recommendable measure, since it means investing in more 
productive future generations and more egalitarian societies.
Figure A.1 
LATIN AMERICA (16 COUNTRIES): COST OF TRANSFERRING ONE  










Group I Group II Group III



















































































































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). Time for equality: closing 
gaps, opening trails (LC/G.2432(SES.33/3)), Santiago, Chile, 2010, on the basis of special tabulations of 
data from household surveys conducted in the respective countries.
a  For single parent households, the transfer amounts to 1.5 poverty lines per child. The data for 
Nicaragua relate to 2005, those for Argentina, Chile and Guatemala, to 2006, and those for Honduras 
and the Plurinational State of Bolivia, to 2007. Group I = countries with small well-being gaps; Group II 
= countries with moderate well-being gaps; Group III = countries with severe well-being gaps.
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Figure A.2 
LATIN AMERICA (16 COUNTRIES): COST OF TRANSFERRING HALF THE  
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Time for equality: closing 
gaps, opening trails (LC/G.2432(SES.33/3)), Santiago, Chile, 2010, on the basis of special tabulations of 
data from household surveys conducted in the respective countries.
a  For single parent households, the transfer amounts to 0.75 poverty lines per child. The data for Nicaragua 
relate to 2005, those for Argentina, Chile and Guatemala, to 2006, and those for Honduras and the 
Plurinational State of Bolivia, to 2007. Group I = countries with small well-being gaps; Group II = countries 
with moderate well-being gaps; Group III = countries with severe well-being gaps.
Transfers to older persons. Countries of the region are facing a 
critical problem: how to provide basic cash transfers to older persons who 
can no longer work or nd employment, while continuing to invest in 
human capital for future generations. ECLAC (2010b) estimates the cost to 
the region’s economies of providing older persons with a universal and 
a targeted cash benet (giving it to all persons over 64  years living in 
households with per capita incomes below 1.8 poverty lines). As gure A.3 
 shows, for many countries these costs are not exorbitant but merely require 
a reallocation of available funds. In group I countries, such as Argentina, 
Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica and Uruguay, the outlay required represents 
1%  of GDP or less. In countries (such as those in group  III) where this 
effort would represent too high a burden on budgets, more targeted or less 
generous benets can gradually pave the way for meeting the objective at 
lower scal cost.
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Figure A.3 
LATIN AMERICA (16 COUNTRIES): COST OF TRANSFERRING ONE  










Group I Group II Group III





















































































































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Time for equality: closing 
gaps, opening trails (LC/G.2432(SES.33/3)), Santiago, Chile, 2010, on the basis of special tabulations of 
data from household surveys conducted in the respective countries.
a  The data for Nicaragua relate to 2005, those for Argentina, Chile and Guatemala, to 2006, and those for 
Honduras and the Plurinational State of Bolivia, to 2007, Group I = countries with small well-being gaps; 
Group II = countries with moderate well-being gaps; Group III = countries with severe well-being gaps.
Transfers to the unemployed. Unemployment is a scourge not only 
because of its effect on household incomes but also because of its impact 
on people’s position in society. Government strategies must therefore pay 
close attention to combating unemployment, especially at times of crisis 
or when labour markets are sluggish. Yet it is clear that if unemployment 
insurance is restricted to people who held formal jobs and had sufcient 
seniority to be eligible, coverage will be insufcient and will not reach 
the neediest population groups. If programmes are to help the vulnerable 
and unemployed poor they must be designed to identify and include 
workers who have no social security. The macroeconomic cost of a transfer 
equivalent to one monthly poverty line, as proposed by ECLAC (2010b), 
which could be accompanied by part-time employment in Government-
administered works and services and by training, would be moderate 
under several scenarios (see gure  A.4) if it included a selection system 
to capture those effectively unemployed. Given the complexities in 
identifying unemployed informal workers, the system could be applied 
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only in a typically countercyclical mode, when open unemployment 
exceeds a predened threshold or when GDP stalls or contracts. In those 
cases such mechanisms could be activated to the benet of all workers 
who declare themselves unemployed.
Figure A.4 
LATIN AMERICA (16 COUNTRIES): COST OF TRANSFERRING ONE  
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Time for equality: closing 
gaps, opening trails (LC/G.2432(SES.33/3)), Santiago, Chile, 2010, on the basis of special tabulations of 
data from household surveys conducted in the respective countries.
a  The data for Nicaragua relate to 2005, those for Argentina, Chile and Guatemala, to 2006, and those for 
Honduras and the Plurinational State of Bolivia, to 2007. Group I = countries with small well-being gaps; 
Group II = countries with moderate well-being gaps; Group III = countries with severe well-being gaps.
All transfers combined. In computing the total cost to countries 
of transfers to children, older adults and the unemployed, there are some 
relevant data to be considered. As gure A.5 shows, even if the transfer is 
targeted solely at vulnerable households (with incomes below 1.8 poverty 
lines) countries with smaller well-being gaps would need to commit 
between 1.8 and 2.8 percentage points of GDP in order to transfer income 
equivalent to a basket of food and non-food goods to those aged under 15 
and over  64 and to the unemployed. While this represents a signicant 
effort, it is not unreasonable if those targets are projected over time. By way 
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of illustration, if coverage were restricted or benets reduced (for example 
by half), the effort would in no case tie up more than 1.4% of GDP. In 
many of these countries the measures proposed here already exist, but not 
with the simplicity and the scope with which they were simulated in the 
exercise. This suggests that a relatively simple design of a basic guaranteed 
income supplement is scally feasible. As we move towards countries 
with moderate well-being gaps (group  II) or severe gaps (group  III), the 
challenges become more complex. Lastly, as table  A.1 shows, the impact 
on poverty reduction and income distribution from this set of transfers is 
very signicant, particularly in group  III countries with relatively lower 
levels of development, more poverty, weaker social protection systems and 
more precarious labour markets.
Figure A.5 
LATIN AMERICA (16 COUNTRIES): COST OF ALL INCOME TRANSFERS TO 
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Time for equality: closing 
gaps, opening trails (LC/G.2432(SES.33/3)), Santiago, Chile, 2010, on the basis of special tabulations of 
data from household surveys conducted in the respective countries.
a  The data for Nicaragua relate to 2005, those for Argentina, Chile and Guatemala, to 2006, and those for 
Honduras and the Plurinational State of Bolivia, to 2007. Group I = countries with small well-being gaps; 
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Although it has emerged as one of the pillars of social development 
strategies, social protection is not tackled in the same way across 
the region. On the contrary, it is an area that has been approached 
from different angles and based on different analytical and political 
dimensions. 
This publication examines the main debates under way on social 
protection and co-responsibility transfer programmes. It identifies 
the role played by these programmes and considers the conceptual 
elements, needs and the challenges that will have to be overcome 
to consolidate comprehensive social protection systems in Latin 
America. The authors argue that these should be solidarity-based 
systems that provide universal coverage and are essentially egalitarian 
in the guarantees established as citizens’ rights. Citizenship as a 
whole is thus becoming part of protection policies as the region 
moves towards all-encompassing social policies that combine 
the complementary principles of targeting as the instrument and 
universality as the end. 
A Comprehensive,  
Rights-based Approach
Simone Cecchini 
Rodrigo Martínez
